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This study examines the mediating effect of audit quality (AQ) proxied by audit fees 
and Big 4 auditors on the relationship between the audit committee (AC) 
characteristics and financial reporting quality (FRQ) of listed companies in Nigeria. 
The study employed 88 firms listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange through 440 
firm-year observations for five years ranging from 2012 to 2016. A multiple 
regression was employed to test the mediation using the Baron and Kenny and 
Sobel Tests. The findings reveal that the AC size, AC independence, AC financial 
accounting experts (ACFAEs), AC legal experts (ACLEs), female AC members 
(FACMs), AC stock ownership (ACSO), and AC tenure are negatively and 
significantly associated with the discretionary accruals (DA) and income smoothing 
(IS) behaviour of firms. In contrast, it is documented that the AC chair cannot be 
relied upon in minimising agency problems in a situation where the committee is 
chaired by a shareholder. The study shows that the AC size, AC independence, 
ACFAEs, ACLEs, and ACSO are positively related to AQ. It is established that AC 
meetings, FACMs, AC tenure, and AC chair are inversely related to AQ. It is also 
established that a higher audit fee is associated with lower DA and lower IS. 
Moreover, the mediation model reveals that audit fees partially and significantly 
mediate the relationships amongst the AC size, ACFAEs, ACLEs, FACMs, ACSO, 
and FRQ. This study recommends that the Nigerian SEC should, in the review of 
subsequent codes, recognise the presence of independent directors and legal experts 
in the AC as they are found to be effective monitors in constraining artificial 
smoothing. However, the regulators should be cautious about shareholders serving 
as chairpersons of the AC, and emphasis should be placed on the financial expertise 
and experience rather than relying on the status of the shareholders.  
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Kajian ini menyelidik kesan perantaraan kualiti audit ke atas hubungan di antara 
ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit (AC) dan kualiti pelaporan kewangan (FRQ) syarikat-
syarikat tersenarai di Nigeria. Kajian ini menggunakan 88 buah firma yang 
disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Nigeria melalui 440 pemerhatian tahunan firma 
selama lima tahun bermula dari 2012 hingga 2016. Regresi berganda telah 
digunakan untuk menguji perantaraan tersebut menggunakan ujian Baron  dan 
Kenny and Sobel. Dapatan menunjukkan saiz AC, kebebasan AC, pakar perakaunan 
kewangan AC (ACFAE), pakar perundangan AC (ACLE), ahli wanita AC (FACM), 
pemilikan saham AC (ACSO) dan tempoh lantikan AC adalah negatif dan ketara 
berhubungkait dengan akruan budi bicara (DA) dan tingkah laku pelicinan 
pendapatan (IS) firma. Sebaliknya, seperti yang telah didokumentasikan, tidak 
hanya mengharapkan pengerusi AC untuk mengurangkan masalah agensi sekiranya 
jawatankuasa itu dipengerusikan oleh seorang pemegang saham. Kajian ini juga 
menunjukkan bahawa saiz AC, kebebasan AC, ACFAE, ACLE, dan ACSO 
mempunyai kaitan positif dengan kualiti audit. Seperti yang telah dibuktikan, 
mesyuarat AC, FACM, tempoh lantikan AC dan pengerusi AC tidak mempunyai  
sebarang hubungkait dengan kualiti audit. Dapatan daripada kualiti audit dan model-
model FRQ pula telah menunjukkan bahawa yuran audit yang tinggi ada hubungkait 
dengan DA dan IS yang rendah. Selain itu, model perantaraan menunjukkan bahawa 
yuran audit menjadi perantara secara separa atau ketara, kepada hubungan di antara 
saiz AC, ACFAE, ACLE, FACM, ACSO dan FRQ. Kajian ini mencadangkan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
bahawa SEC Nigeria, patut mengkaji semula kod berikutnya dan mengambil kira 
kehadiran pengarah bebas dan pakar perundangan di dalam AC kerana mereka 
didapati boleh berfungsi sebagai pengawas yang berkesan dalam menghalang 
tingkah laku penipuan dalam bentuk pelicinan (pendapatan) palsu. Walau 
bagaimanapun, pengawal selia perlu berhati-hati dengan pemegang saham yang 
berkhidmat sebagai pengerusi AC, dan penekanan harus diletakkan pada kepakaran 
dan pengalaman kewangan, dan bukannya bergantung pada status pemegang saham. 
 
 
Kata kunci: ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit, kualiti audit, yuran audit, juruaudit Big4, 






In the Name of Allah, the most beneficial and the most merciful. All praise is due to 
Allah (SWT) who gave me health and strength, and made it possible for me to 
complete this work. May the infinite mercy and blessings of Allah (SWA) be upon 
his beloved prophet (SAW), his progeny, and his companions. I thank Almighty 
Allah for giving me the strength and wisdom to carry this work to its logical 
conclusion. 
I owe a debt of profound gratitude to my able and amiable supervisors, Assoc. Prof. 
Dr. Noor Afza Amran and Dr. Hasnah Shaari whose guidance and contribution did 
not only set the path for this thesis, but have made it a reality. I am very grateful to 
my examiners in the persons of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Shamharir Abidin and Assoc. Prof. 
Dr. Hasnah Kamardin. Their professional advice and critical assessments provided 
valuable contributions that significantly improved this thesis.  
My special gratitude and appreciation also goes to my twin brother Hassan Bala of 
the Private Law Department ABU Zaria for his words of encouragement, motivation, 
and good advice. May your dream also come true. I also thank my mother for her 
moral, and spiritual support; may Allah reward you with „Jannatul firdaus‟. To my 
late father, for his moral and spiritual support, may Allah also reward you with 
„Jannatul firdaus‟. 
I would like to register my sincere gratitude to my lovely wife for her patience, 
support, perseverance, and encouragement. My special appreciation goes to my 








TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TITLE PAGE                Page  




TABLE OF CONTENTS v 
LIST OF TABLES ix 
LIST OF FIGURES xi 
LIST OF APPENDICES xii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xiii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Background of the Study 1 
1.3 Problem Statement 10 
1.4 Research   Questions 20 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 21 
1.6 Scope of the Study 21 
1.7 Significance of the Study 22 
1.7.1 Literature Significance 22 
1.7.2 Practical Significance 25 
1.8 Organisation of the Study 27 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 29 
2.1 Introduction 29 
2.2 Concept of Financial Reporting 29 
2.3 Financial Reporting in Nigeria 32 
2.3.1 Regulatory Framework on AC and External Auditors in Nigeria 35 
2.3.1.1 Composition of AC in Nigeria 36 
2.4 Importance of Financial Reporting Quality 38 
2.5 Measures of Financial Reporting Quality 43 
2.5.1 Value Relevance 44 
2.5.2 Persistence and Predictability 45 
2.5.3 Timeliness and Conservatism 46 
2.5.4 Accruals Measure 48 
2.5.5 Income Smoothing 51 
2.6 Concept of Corporate Governance 58 
2.6.1 Corporate Governance System in Nigeria 60 
2.6.2 Audit Committee 64 
2.7 Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality 65 
2.7.1 Audit Committee Size 68 
2.7.2 Audit Committee Independence 72 
2.7.3 Audit Committee Meetings 77 
2.7.4 Audit Committee Financial Accounting Expert 80 
2.7.5 Audit Committee Legal Expert 84 
2.7.6 Female Audit Committee Member 86 
2.7.7 Audit Committee Stock Ownership 90 
 
 vi 
2.7.8 Audit Committee Tenure 93 
2.7.9 Audit Committee Chairperson 94 
2.8 Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on Audit Committee 97 
2.8.1 Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Quality 99 
2.8.2 Audit Quality and Financial Reporting Quality 105 
2.9 Literature Gap 112 
2.10 Summary of the Chapter 115 
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 116 
3.1 Introduction 116 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 116 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 117 
3.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory 119 
3.2.3 Institutional Theory 120 
3.2.4 Signaling Theory 121 
3.2.5 Feminist Theory 122 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 127 
3.3.1 Audit Committee Size and Financial Reporting Quality 127 
3.3.2 Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality 129 
3.3.3 Audit Committee Meetings and Financial Reporting Quality 131 
3.3.4 Audit Committee Financial Accounting Expert and Financial Reporting 
Quality 133 
3.3.5 Audit Committee Legal Expertise and Financial Reporting Quality 135 
3.3.6 Female Audit Committee Member and Financial Reporting Quality 136 
3.3.7 Audit Committee Stock Ownership and Financial Reporting Quality 139 
3.3.8 Audit Committee Tenure and Financial Reporting Quality 141 
3.3.9  Audit Committee Chair and Financial Reporting Quality 142 
3.3.10 Audit Committee Size and Audit Quality 145 
3.3.11 Audit Committee Independence and Audit Quality 147 
3.3.12 Audit Committee Meetings and Audit Quality 150 
3.3.13 Audit Committee Expertise and Audit Quality 151 
3.3.14 Female Audit Committee Member and Audit Quality 153 
3.3.15 Audit Committee Stock Ownership and Audit Quality 155 
3.3.16 Audit Committee Tenure and Audit Quality 156 
3.3.17 Audit Committee Chair and Audit Quality 157 
3.4 Audit Quality and Financial Reporting Quality 159 
3.5 Summary of the Chapter 162 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 164 
4.1 Introduction 164 
4.2 Research Method and Design 164 
4.2.1 Population and Data Source 165 
4.2.2 Sampling Technique 166 
4.3 Variable Measurement 167 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 168 
4.3.2 Independent Variable 171 
4.3.3 Control Variables 173 
 
 vii 
4.4 Data Analysis Technique 176 
4.4.1 Normality Test 177 
4.4.2 Multicollinearity Test 177 
4.4.3 Homoscedasticity Test 178 
4.4.4 Regression Analysis Model 178 
4.4.5 Testing the Mediation 179 
4.4.6 The Causal Steps 180 
4.5 Summary of the Chapter 182 
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS I (DA) AUDIT COMMITTEE 
CHARACTERISTICS AND DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS THE 
MEDIATING EFFECT OF AUDIT QUALITY 183 
5.1 Introduction 183 
5.2 Population of the study 184 
5.2.1 Sample Size and Selection Procedure 184 
5.2.2 The Post-Estimation Test 185 
5.2.3 Outliers 186 
5.2.4 Normality Test 186 
5.2.5 Heteroscedasticity and Model Selection Criteria 187 
5.2.6 Multi-collinearity Test 189 
5.2.7 Linearity 192 
5.2.8 Model Specification Test 193 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics Related to the Regression Variables 194 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis: Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship 
between AC Characteristics and Discretionary Accruals 198 
5.4.1 Regression Results and Discussion on the Relationship Between AC 
Characteristics and Discretionary Accruals 199 
5.4.2 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between AC 
Characteristics and Audit Quality (using audit fees) 209 
5.4.3 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between AC 
Characteristics and Audit Quality (using BIG4 auditors) 219 
5.4.4 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between the  
Audit Quality (using Audit fees) and the Discretionary Accruals 229 
5.4.5 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between the  
Audit Quality (using BIG4) and the Discretionary Accruals 231 
5.4.6 Mediating Effect of Audit Quality (Audit fees) on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and the Discretionary Accruals 233 
5.5 Robustness Check 248 
5.5.1 Alternatives Estimation 248 
5.5.2 Alternative Measure of the Independent Variables 250 
5.5.3 Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variables 252 
5.6 Summary of the Chapter 254 
CHAPTER SIX: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS II (IS)  AUDIT COMMITTEE 
CHARACTERISTICS AND INCOME SMOOTHING THE MEDIATING 
EFFECT OF AUDIT QUALITY 257 
6.1 Introduction 257 
6.2 Post-estimation Tests for Binomial Logistic Regression 258 
 
 viii 
6.2.1 Multicollinearity Test 258 
6.2.2 Model Fitness Test 260 
6.2.3 Model Specification Test 262 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics Related to the Regression Variables 262 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis: Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and Income Smoothing 264 
6.4.1 Pooled Logit Regression Result and discussion on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and FRQ (Income Smoothing) 264 
6.4.2 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between Audit  
Fees and Income Smoothing 273 
6.4.3 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between the  
BIG 4 Auditors and Income Smoothing 275 
6.4.4 Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the Relationship between the AC 
Characteristics and Income Smoothing 278 
6.5 Robustness Check 292 
6.5.1 Alternative Measurements of the Independent Variables 293 
6.5.2 Alternative Measurements of the Dependent Variables 295 
6.6 Summary of the Chapter 297 
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 300 
7.1 Introduction 300 
7.2 Overview of the Thesis 301 
7.3 Summary of the Findings 303 
7.3.1 Findings on the Relationship between AC Characteristics and Financial 
Reporting Quality 303 
7.3.2 Findings on the Relationship between AC Characteristics and Audit  
Quality 307 
7.3.3 Findings on the Relationship between Audit Quality and Financial 
Reporting Quality 310 
7.3.4 Findings on the Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship 
Between AC Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality 312 
7.4 Contribution 314 
7.5 Practical Implication 320 
7.6 Limitations 322 






LIST OF TABLES 
Title                   Page 
Table 2.1  Summary of Evolution of Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 63 
Table 4.1  Detailed Distribution of Firms Listed by NSE as at 31 December  
2016 166 
Table 4.2   Sample Computation for Firms that Meet the Filtering Process 167 
Table 4.3   Summary of the Dependent Variables Measurement 171 
Table 4.4   Summary of Independent Variable Measurement 172 
Table 4.5   Summary of Control Variables Measurement 176 
Table 5.1  Detailed of Samples Firms Listed by the NSE in 2016 184 
Table 5.2   Sample Computations for the Firms 185 
Table 5.3  Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the AC Characteristics, 
Audit quality and discretionary accruals 191 
Table 5.4  Collinearity Diagnostics of the AC Characteristics, Audit Quality  
and Control Variables 192 
Table 5.5  Standard Deviation of the Discretionary accruals and Model Residual 193 
Table 5.6  Descriptive Statistics between AC, Audit Quality and Discretionary 
Accruals. 195 
Table 5.7  Model One (A) Pool Regression of the Relationship between the AC 
Characteristics and FRQ (Discretionary Accruals) 201 
Table 5.8  The Summary of the Predicted and the Actual Results for on the 
Relationship between the AC Characteristics and FRQ (Discretionary 
Accruals) 208 
Table 5.9  Model One (B) the Relationship between AC and Characteristics  
Audit Quality (using Audit fees) 211 
Table 5.10 The Summary of the Predicted and the Actual Results for on the 
Relationship between the AC Characteristics and Audit Fees 219 
Table 5.11 Model 1 (B) Pool Logit of the Relationship between the AC 
Characteristics and the Audit Quality (using BIG4) 221 
Table 5.12 Results of the Predicted and the Actual Hypothesis on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and Audit Quality (using BIG4) 228 
Table 5.13 Model One (C) The Relationship between Audit Quality (Audit fess)  
and FRQ (Discretionary Accruals) 230 
Table 5.14 Model One (C) Regression Two of the Relationship between the  
Audit Quality (BIG4) and  FRQ (Discretionary Accruals) 232 
Table 5.15 Summary Results of the Predicted and the Actual Hypothesis on the 
Relationship between the Audit Quality (Audit fees) and the 
Discretionary Accruals 233 
Table 5.16  Model One (D) of the Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the 
Relationship between AC Characteristics and FRQ (Discretionary 
Accruals) 236 
Table 5.17 Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship 
between AC Size and the Discretionary Accruals 238 
Table 5.18 Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship 




Table 5.19 Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship 
between AC Stock Ownership and the Discretionary Accruals 245 
Table 5.20 The Summary of the Predicted and the Actual Results for on the 
Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC 
Characteristics and the Discretionary Accruals 247 
Table 5.21 Results of the Alternatives Estimation (Heteroskedasticity Robust 
Standard Error Clustered across Firms) 249 
Table 5.22 Result for the Alternative Measure of Independent Variables 251 
Table 5.23 Result for the Alternative Measure of Dependent Variables 253 
Table 6.1  Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the AC Characteristics, 
Audit Quality and Income Smoothing 259 
Table 6.2  Collinearity Diagnostic of the AC Characteristics, Audit Quality and 
Control Variables 260 
Table 6.3 Goodness of Fit Test of the Models 261 
Table 6.4 Model Specification Test 262 
Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Dichotomous Variables 263 
Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics of  the Income Smoothing Partitioned by Year 263 
Table 6.7  Model Two (A) Pool Logit Regression of the Relationship between  
AC Characteristics and FRQ (Income Smoothing) 267 
Table 6.8  Summary of the Predicted and Actual Results for on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and Income Smoothing 273 
Table 6.9  Model Three (C) Regression One of the Relationship between the  
Audit Quality (AUF) and the FRQ (using IS) 274 
Table 6.10 Model Two (D) Regression Two of the Relationship between the  
BIG4 Auditors and FRQ (Income Smoothing) 277 
Table 6. 11 Results of the Predicted Hypothesis on the Relationship between the 
Audit Fees and Income Smoothing 278 
Table 6.12  Model One (D) of the Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the 
Relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ  
(Income Smoothing) 281 
Table 6.13 Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the Relationship  
between AC Size and Income Smoothing 283 
Table 6.14 Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship 
between AC Legal Expert and Income Smoothing 287 
Table 6.15 Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship 
between AC Stock Ownership and Income Smoothing 290 
Table 6.16 Summary of the Predicted and Actual Results for the Mediating Effect  
of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between the AC Characteristics  
and Income Smoothing 292 
Table 6.17 Result for the Alternative Measure of the Independent Variables 294 
Table 6.18 Result for the Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variables 296 
 
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Title                   Page 
Figure 1.2  Graphical representation of Fraud Related Cases in Nigeria  
(2011-2013) 12 
Figure 1.3  Graphical Representations of Audit Market Trends in Nigeria  
(2015-2016): Nairametrics (2017) 14 
Figure 3.1  Conceptual Framework of the Mediating Effect of Audit Quality  
on the Link between AC Characteristics and FRQ 126 
Figure 5.1:  Residual Distribution 187 
 
 xii 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Title                   Page                            
Appendix A Listed companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31 December 
2016 365 
Appendix B List of Sample Companies Examined by the Study 370 
Appendix C Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on Audit Committee    
Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality 373 
Appendix D Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on Audit Committee 
Characteristics and Audit Quality 377 
Appendix E Summary of Selected Empirical Studies on Audit Quality and  Financial 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAN   Accountants of Nigeria     
ACC   Audit Committee Chair     
ACFAE  Audit Committee Financial Accounting Expert  
ACI   Audit Committee Independence    
ACLE   Audit Committee Legal Expert    
ACM   Audit Committee Meetings    
ACS   Audit Committee Size    
ACSO   Audit Committee Stocks Ownership   
ACT   Audit Committee Tenure    
AUF   Audit Fees 
AQ   Audit Quality   
BE   Board Expertise    
BI   Board Independence     
BIG4   KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young & Deloitte 
BOFIA  Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act   
CBN   Central Bank of Nigeria    
COF   Cash Flow from Operation    
DA   Discretionary Accruals     
EM   Earnings Management     
FACM   Female Audit Committee Member   
FAGE   Firm Age      
FRCN   Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria   
FRQ   Financial Reporting Quality    
FS   Firm Size      
GLS   Generalized Least Square    
IBEI   Income Before Extraordinary Items    
IOP   Income from Operation    
IS   Income Smoothing      
LEV   Leverage      
MCCG  Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance   
NAICOM  National Insurance Commission    
NDIC   Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporations   
NI   Net Income      
NSE   Nigerian Stock Exchange     
OLS   Ordinary Least Square     
OPI   Operating Income     
PCAO   Public Company Accounting Oversight Board  
PENCOM  Pension Commission     
ROA   Return on Asset     
SEC   Securities and Exchange Commission   
SGROWTH  Sales Growth      
SOX   Sarbanes Oxley Act     





This chapter consists of the background of the study, which discusses the importance 
of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality. Practical issues 
relating to the ineffectiveness of financial reporting practices and corporate 
governance practices are presented in the chapter. This is followed by the problem 
statement, the research objectives, scope of the study, significance of the study, and 
the organisation of the chapters. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
Financial reporting is the economic outcome of an entity that is made available 
to the public. The essence of financial reporting is to communicate and share the 
financial information of a company with the stakeholders. The most pivotal item of a 
financial reporting system is the financial statement. The financial statements are a 
major means through which companies communicate to their users their financial 
results as well as position. Financial analysts and investors make use of the financial 
statement to make rational decisions (Yahaya & Adenola, 2011). These financial 
statements should not be intentionally prepared to mislead the user (Kibiya, Che-
Ahmad & Amran, 2016b). This is because managers usually use financial statement 
to mislead investors‟ understanding of firm's value through earnings management 
(Lo, Ramos & Rogo, 2017). Thus, earnings management (EM) reflects managers‟ 
decision in financial reporting to modify financial reports to either deceive some 
stakeholders about the basic financial performance of the firm or to influence 
 
 2 
contractual outcomes that rely on reported accounting numbers  (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999; Lo et al., 2017). Therefore, in this current study EM serve as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality (FRQ) in a reverse manner since lower EM indicates 
higher FRQ (Christensen, Huffman & Lewis-Western, 2017; Trovato, 2017). 
 
It has been contended that the quality of financial reporting relies on the relevance 
and reliability of the accounting earnings (Christensen et al., 2017; Trovato, 2017). 
Thus, the relevance of the accounting earnings to the stakeholders of any given firm 
is very crucial since the entire faith of the entity as well as of its stakeholders 
depends on it. The accounting earnings are also the most vital items in financial 
statement that helps direct resource allocation in capital market. They are also the 
summary measure of company‟s performance use by various users including 
investors and creditors (Dechow, 1994). 
 
It has been argued that earnings are relevant if they can be relied upon and hence, a 
system is reliable if it works in the manner it is supposed to work (Goel, 2014). 
However, the quality of earnings is considered as a significant determinant in 
detecting EM (Goel, 2014). Thus, management attempts to smooth the permanent 
variability of incomes will lead to lower earnings quality (Dechow, Ge & Schrand, 
2010). Furthermore, it has been affirmed that firms may employ accruals to conceal 
poor present performance or to understate good present performance with a view to 
effectively save that for the future (Burgstahler, Hail & Leuz, 2006). Thus, managers 
take advantage of their experience about the entities and their opportunities to select 
accounting approaches and estimates that suit the entity‟s business economics, which 
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can potentially increase the value of the accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999). In that, for earnings to maintain their relevance and reliability, there is a need 
to provide the means that can be used to improve the reported earnings.  
 
It has been argued that corporate governance mechanisms have been established to 
aid stakeholders by aligning the interests of managers with the interests of investors, 
and by improving the dependability of the financial information and the truthfulness 
of the financial reporting process (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983).  Some of the key 
components of these corporate governance mechanisms are the AC and external 
auditors. Thus, the agency theory posits that the key function of the AC is to ensure 
that an agent is performing in the best interest of the shareholders.  Though the board 
of directors is likely to serve as the overall monitor of managers activities, it is the 
AC that is explicitly charged with the oversight of financial reporting (Krishnan, 
Wen &  Zhao, 2011). Thus, the AC is expected to be mainly concerned about the 
consequences of poor or erroneous financial reporting, which comprise lawsuits and 
SEC action (Krishnan et al., 2011). Therefore, the AC has been included in this study 
because it is an effective corporate governance oversight mechanism that has a 
disciplining role on the manager‟s discretion in the estimation of the accounting 
numbers (Usman et al., 2017). The primary function of the AC is to promote the 
quality of the audits thereby increasing the FRQ (Malik, 2014). Furthermore, the 
external auditors play an important role in corporate governance which serves as a 
complementary mechanism for enhancing the legal protection of outside 
shareholders (Huang, 2006; Choi & Wang,  2003). This is because they assist in 
reducing the principal-agent conflict by ensuring that financial reports are diligently 
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made and free from material errors, and mitigate the likelihood of financial fraud and 
illegal reporting practices, such as EM (Wallace, 1980).  
 
Studies have been conducted on the function of the AC in monitoring management 
(Abbott, Park & Parker, 2000; 2004; Defond, Rebecca, Hann & Hu, 2005; Farber, 
Huang & Mauldin, 2016; Baxter, 2007; Miettinen, 2008). It has been argued that 
independent and active AC members require a high level of audit to avoid 
monitoring and reputational losses arising from lawsuits.  Abbott et al. (2000) and 
Defond et al. (2005) contended that only the financial accounting expertise of the AC 
improves governance, but broader financial skills improves the quality of the 
financial reporting environment. However, Krishnan et al. (2011) suggested that 
legal experts in the AC serve as monitors rather than a signal to FRQ. Farber et al.  
(2016); Liu, Tiras and Zhuang (2014); and Abernathy, Beyer, Masli and Stefaniak 
(2014) contended that a financial accounting expert plays a significant role in 
reducing EM and, consequently, enhances the quality of the financial reports.  
More so, prior studies have argued better audit quality provides greater assurance 
about the reliability of financial reports, which enhances investors‟ protection (Alves, 
2013; DeFond  &  Zhang,  2014). Thus, audit quality has been considered as another 
important governance and monitoring mechanism that enhances the reliability of the 
financial information (DeFond  &  Zhang,  2014).  To achieve the quality of the 
audit, the auditors must be independent of mind and appearance. Thus, the AC 
ensures the auditor‟s independence; this, in turn, enhances the FRQ.  As such, having 
an AC alone may not be enough in monitoring the reliability of an entity‟s financial 
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reports and auditing processes, and eventually protecting the interest of the investors 
(Alves, 2013). Previous literature suggests that internal governance mechanisms and 
external audits can be substituted for each other, which implies that greater internal 
control may decrease the demand for additional audit effort expected from the 
external auditors (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006). However, their empirical findings 
do not support this opinion (Abbott, Parker, Peters & Raghunandan, 2003; Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal & Riley, 2002; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002; Hay, 
Knechel & Ling, 2008). On the other hand, prior studies on the effect of internal 
governance and external audits always propose that they are complementary, in that 
improving internal governance is associated with higher audit quality (Alves, 2013; 
Miettinen, 2008;  Saleem  & Alzoub, 2016). 
Despite the importance of the AC and audit quality in monitoring management, the 
findings of previous researches have been mixed and the studies have been mostly 
conducted in developed nations. Seemingly, the Nigerian reporting environment has 
many differences with those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other 
well-developed markets. Consequently, results from those markets do not necessarily 
generalise to the Nigerian context considering the unique feature of the AC 
formation which comprises representatives of both shareholders and directors. It has 
been argued that the existence of shareholders in the AC can erode their monitoring 
ability because this may compromise their independence in the decision-making 
process (Ahmed, 2017). 
In Nigeria, the financial crisis in 2008 had increased the need to look for indicators 
of earnings reliability. This was because the crisis had led to the huge crash of the 
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Nigerian stock market in 2009 (Aina & Adejugbe, 2015). Examples of this are the 
accounting scandals by Cadbury Nigeria PLC, African Petroleum PLC, 
Intercontinental Bank, and Oceanic Bank. This scandal has been considered as 
Nigerian‟s Enron equivalent (Okaro & Okafor, 2015). In addition, the competing 
problems of the failed banks have remained in that they shared one thing in common. 
The management of the banks had been issuing non-performing and unsecured loans 
which led the CBN to inject N620 billion equivalent to (4.1 billion US Dollars) as a 
bailout (Kuye, Ogundele & Obaro, 2013). However, the CBN certified the banks as 
distressed just a few months after the auditors had certified their health (Okaro & 
Okafor, 2015). Most recently were the financial scandals relating to concealment and 
accounting manipulations by the Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc in 2015 (Marshall, 
2015; Ebosele & Nelson, 2015). The foregoing issues have brought about doubt in 
the minds of the shareholders on the credibility and reliability of financial reports in 
Nigeria (Okaro & Okafor, 2015). 
In the light of the foregoing, various codes and statutes have been put in place to 
regulate, save, and sanitise the financial system in Nigeria and improve financial 
reporting practices. The regulatory authorities in Nigeria, such as the SEC, have 
compelled companies to conform with stringent codes of corporate governance. 
However, Nigeria has a diversity of codes with unique dissimilarities, namely, the 
SEC code of corporate governance 2003, which was reviewed in 2011; Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) code of 2003, 2006, 2011 and 2014 as amended; National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) code of 2009; National Pension Commission 
(PENCOM) Code 2008; and Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) Code of 
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Governance for the Tell Communication Industry (2014). However, the SEC code of 
corporate governance (2011) guides the operation of public companies listed on the 
NSE. 
Owing to the above, the Nigerian Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 as 
amended in 2004 mandates public companies under Section 359(3), (4), and (6) to 
establish an AC. As such, companies establish ACs to improve accounting and 
reporting policies and ensure that the firms adhere to the legal requirements and 
agreed ethical practices (Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, FRCN Act, 2011). 
The AC has the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the entity‟s financial 
statements, confirm that the regulatory and legal requirements are complied with, 
perceive the independence and qualifications of external auditors, and assure that the 
entity‟s internal and external audits function well (Nigerian SEC Code of CG, 2011). 
The committee is recognised to promote an entity‟s accountability by engaging with 
the auditors and management to improve or strengthen the FRQ of the firm (Okolie, 
2014). Similarly, Enofe, Aronmwan and Abadua (2013) stressed that the AC 
enhances the reporting functions as it strengthens the independence of the auditors by 
allowing them to report their independent opinions to the executive directors. 
Furthermore, in aligning with the global best practices of financial systems, Nigeria 
has adopted the International Financial Standards (IFRS). In view of the above, the 
Nigerian Accounting Standards Board Act 2003 (NASB) and its Standards, and 
Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS) were replaced by the FRCN Act (2011) in 
January 2012 to foster the implementation of the IFRS. The functions of the FRCN 
are similar to those of the NASB with some little modifications or improvements. 
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These include, amongst others, the establishment and issuance of accounting 
standards to be employed in producing financial reports of public companies as well 
as promoting and confirming strict compliance with the accounting standards 
approved by the Council (FRCN Act, 2011). Therefore, any company that fails to 
comply with the standards, if it is brought to the notice of the FRC, is punishable by 
imprisonment or a fine on each of the principal officers of the company as well as the 
external auditors. 
Despite the considerable attention given by the Nigerian authorities in providing the 
multiplicity of codes, the established rules and procedures have seemed to be 
completely ineffective, henceforth, the need to address the issue (Osemeke & 
Adegbite, 2016). This is because the SEC ability to effectively monitor compliance 
with accounting ethics is insufficient, thus, it is currently under re-organisation 
(Adegbite & Adegbite, 2012). In addition, the banking investigation directed by the 
multiparty panel of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and National Deposits and 
Insurance Commission (NDIC) on the 30th December 2014 revealed many corporate 
abuses and the corporate governance mechanisms failed to address. These suggest 
the need for a review and update of the corporate governance standards in Nigeria to 
meet world best practices (Marshall, 2015).   
In response to the above, the Nigerian legislatures has provided the FRCN with the 
statutory responsibility to formulate a unified code of corporate governance in the 
country and to ensure its compliance (Marshall, 2015). The code is meant to regulate 
corporate governance for public and private entities and to ensure the transparency, 
accountability, and reliability of corporate disclosure which will, in turn, guarantee 
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investors‟ confidence and protect the interest of the shareholders. Hence, the 
reliability of corporate financial disclosure lies on the credibility of the financial 
reporting provided by the management to financial information users. 
Studies conducted in Nigeria on the FRQ, such as Madawaki and Amran (2013), 
have contended that the AC formation positively enhanced the FRQ. Ibrahim, Bello 
and Kargi (2016) concluded that only AC financial expertise was found to be 
effective in mitigating real activity manipulation. Kantudu and Samaila (2015) 
stressed that the proportion of independent directors in the AC enhances the 
monitoring function of the committee and enhances the financial report quality 
Kibiya et al. (2016b) documented that AC stock ownership induces the AC to 
actively monitor and, consequently, enhance the entity‟s FRQ. Whilst Ormin,Tuta 
and Shadrach (2015) suggested that the frequency of the AC meetings should be 
increased because the more the committee meets, the better the quality of the 
financial report. Furthermore, AC gender is  proved to have similar functions with 
female directors, in minimising EM in Nigeria (Dakata, Kamardin & Delima, 2016; 
Eze, 2017). More so,  it has been argued that the longer the directors stay on the 
board, the more knowledgeable and experience they will have about the company‟s 
practices and thus, they will become more effective in minimising financial reporting 
fraud (Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). In contrast Ahmed (2017) 
argued that long tenure of directors in the AC increases EM. 
The above inconsistencies of the findings require a more sophisticated analysis to 
determine the real impact of the AC on the FRQ in Nigeria. Furthermore, prior 
literature have documented that the functions of AC with respect to audit quality is 
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complex and goes beyond a direct relationship. Thus, warrants further research to 
fully explore the effect of AC and AQ in relation to FRQ (Goodwin-Stewart  &  
Kent,  2006). Therefore, the foregoing facts further necessitate the need to investigate 
the likely impact of the AC characteristics on the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. Hence, studying the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship 
between the AC attributes and the FRQ of the Nigerian listed companies is expected 
to be of great importance because it will contribute more to the Nigerian economy. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The global financial meltdown of 2008 has exposed many weaknesses in running the 
affairs of companies all over the world. This is coupled with several accounting 
scandals and failures (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, Xerox, and WorldCom), which 
have made a lot of investors lose confidence and, consequently, raised serious 
concern about the credibility and reliability of financial reports and the AC 
effectiveness in protecting investors‟ interests (Adegbite & Adegbite, 2012; 
Domikowsky, Bornemann, Duellmann & Pfingsten, 2014). In response, there has 
been a global transformation towards promoting and implementing governance 
mechanisms to minimise the opportunistic behaviours that have dented the 
shareholders‟ reliability in financial information. For instance, the United Kingdom‟s 
Financial Reporting Council had consistently reviewed the Combined Code in 2010 
and 2012 and the United States in 2002 introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as 
a response to the scandals of Enron and WorldCom to help promote the quality of 
information and improve financial reporting (Kingsley, Gina & Vivian, 2014). 
Therefore, there is an increasing need to be more proactive in corporate governance 
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issues since weak corporate governance can lead to the failure of a country‟s 
economic structure (Aina & Adejugbe, 2015). 
Consequently, in Nigeria, Section 57 of the FRC Act (2011) mandates every public 
entity to prepare financial reports and ensure that the financial reports are in 
compliance with the accounting and financial reporting standards. Furthermore, 
Section 62 of the Act requires an independent investigation of any unethical practice 
or misconduct by any organisation to ensure the quality of the financial reporting to 
protect the interests of the investors.  To achieve the quality of financial reporting, a 
monitoring committee is often put in place in order to make sure that firms produce 
relevant and reliable information which will eventually protect the interests of both 
existing and prospective investors. The most important of these monitoring 
committees is the AC. This is because the AC has been an active corporate 
governance oversight device that has a disciplining role on the manager‟s decision in 
the estimation of the accounting numbers  
 
Despite the existence of these monitoring committees, there have been a lot of 
corporate failures in Nigeria in recent years. Thus, the independence of AC has been 
called into question. This is because the composition of AC in Nigeria has been 
criticized of being skewed in favour of management thus reducing the visible 
independence of the committee (Chukwunedu, Ogochukwu & Onuora, 2014). This in 
turn tends to compromise the quality of their work (Komolafe, 2012). For instance, 
the issue in Cadbury (Nig.) Plc, the AC of the firm was heavily indicted by the 
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Nigerian SEC report on the accounting scandal in that company as they were found 
guilty of complete negligence of duty (Al-Faki, 2008; Chukwunedu et al., 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the SEC has disclosed a number of fraud related cases that had 
increased overtime. Figure 1.2 presents the trends of fraud related cases and the huge 
amount in losses incurred as a result of income misstatement by Nigerian firms. It is 
revealed from Figure 1.2 that there were about 1,639 cases with losses of 18.5 
million USD in 2011. The year 2012 witnessed the highest losses of 314.5 million 
USD with 3,380 cases. For 2013,  the highest number of cases of about 3,756 with 
losses of 254.5 million USD were observed (Noah, 2013; SEC Report, 2012, 2013). 
This has raised serious doubts about the credibility of financial reporting in Nigeria. 
 
Figure 1.2  
Graphical representation of Fraud Related Cases in Nigeria (2011-2013) 
 
 
Most recently, in 2015, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) again 
issued a regulatory order thereby suspending the Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc 
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Chairman and its CEO for contention of concealment, accounting manipulations, and 
insufficient disclosures in the financial reports, which are contrary to the provision of 
Section 62 of the FRC. The audit firm (KPMG) has been suspended by the FRC for 
the approach  it adopted that could not detect the infractions in the two accounting 
periods (Naija 24/7 News, October 28, 2016; Odunsi, 2015).   This created a doubt as 
to the integrity of their financial statement and questioned the independence of the 
auditors. However, despite the existence of auditors and the AC, corporate scandals 
still exist. 
As a result of the above-mentioned fact, this study has included a mediating variable 
„audit quality‟. This was to enable the study to examine whether the relationship 
between the AC and FRQ passed through the mediation of audit quality (proxied by 
audit fees and Big 4 auditors). This was motivated by the recent increase and 
dominance of Big 4 auditors in the audit market concentration in Nigeria, which 
directly affect the fees paid to external auditors by their clients. Thus, Nairametrics 
(2017) gathered that  the Big 4 auditors earned about 6.4 billion Naira (equivalent to 
20.3 million USD) in the auditing services of the 28 largest firms in Nigeria in 2016 
alone.  Figure 1.3 presents the data which was obtain for the breakdown of the audit 
fees paid by the 28 Nigerian companies from various sectors of the economy 
including financial services, consumables, construction, and oil and gas (Footprint to 
Africa Media & Investment, 2017).  
It is apparent from Figure 1.3 that the Big 4 firms (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
KPMG, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) earned audit fees amounting to (8.1 million 
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USD, 6.2 million USD, 4.0 million USD, and 0.15 million USD) in 2015, 
respectively. 
Figure 1.3  
Graphical Representations of Audit Market Trends in Nigeria (2015-2016): Nairametrics 
(2017) 
 
The figures had increased to (9.2 million USD, 7.2 million USD, 4.4 million USD, 
and 0.20 million USD) leading to an increase of (14%, 17%, 10%, and 31%) in 2016, 
respectively. However, the question that remains unanswered is whether this 
dominance of the Big 4 auditors in the market concentration in Nigeria and the 
corresponding increase in audit fees have influence over the FRQ of the listed firms 
in Nigeria.  
In Nigeria, prior studies on the AC paid less attention on the AC expertise variables 
and female AC members. The work of Ormin et al. (2015) used three variables, 
including AC independence, AC meetings, and AC attendance. Ugbede, Lizam and 
Kaseri (2013) only used one independent variable (AC size). Similarly, Ahmed and 
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Che-Ahmad (2016) used a sample of 14 banks in Nigeria to examine AC size and 
EM. Fodio, Ibikunle and Oba (2013) used two variables (AC size and AC 
independence). Hassan and Ahmed (2012) used three independent variables (AC 
size, AC independence, and AC meetings). Kibiya, Che-Ahmad and Amran (2016a); 
Ibrahim, Bello and Kargi (2016); Miko and Kamardin (2014); and Dabor and Dabor 
(2015) considered AC expertise. However, they looked at only one aspect of 
expertise (financial accounting expertise). Dakata et al. (2016) only proposed a 
framework about female AC members and EM. The non-use of other important 
components of AC expertise and female AC members, which are believed to play a 
significant role in the activities of the AC, provided a gap that needed to be filled. 
However, none of the Nigerian codes has discussed the issue of gender or the AC 
expertise variables, such as AC financial accounting experts and AC legal experts. 
Consequently, this study has considered some specific aspects of AC expertise that 
were not explored by prior studies in Nigeria (AC financial accounting experts and 
AC legal experts) and AC gender, AC tenure, and AC stock ownership Female AC 
members represented AC gender because they have been proved to have similar 
functions with female directors in minimising EM in Nigeria (Dakata et al., 2016; 
Eze, 2017). Furthermore, AC tenure was chosen because the longer the directors stay 
on the board, the more knowledgeable and experienced they will be about the 
company‟s practices and thus, become more effective in minimising financial 
reporting fraud (Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). In addition, this study 
has incorporated AC stock ownership because it is shown to be a good motivator in 
making AC members more watchful, passionate, and vigorous in their monitoring 
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responsibilities (Kibiya et al., 2016b). However, studies on the AC in Nigeria have 
examined different attributes of the committee, but they have failed to explore the 
uniqueness attributed to the formation of the AC in Nigeria that is composed of the 
equal representation of shareholders and directors. Consequently, this study has 
examined how the influence of the AC chair (either a director or a shareholder) 
affects the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. This is in line with the argument 
that the AC chair is very pivotal in establishing a relationship between the committee 
and the board of directors as well as the internal and external auditors  (Schmidt & 
Wilkins, 2013). 
At the same time, the period covered by some of the previous studies has left a gap. 
The works of Ormin et al. (2015), for instance, covered the period from 2003 to 
2013. Ugbed et al. (2013) covered the period of 2007 to 2011 and Okaro and Okafor 
(2015) covered the period of 2012-2013. These periods can be considered as not too 
current as a lot of activities have taken place in the Nigerian market since then, 
which include the changes in the current corporate governance code of 2014 by 
Nigeria Securities and Exchange Commission and the IFRS adoption in 2012. Some 
of the findings of these studies may not be relied upon since the studies have been 
taken over by the changes. 
Similarly, most of the studies on the AC and FRQ used the DA as measures of the 
FRQ or earnings quality ranging from the Jones Model (1991) (Baxter & Cotter, 
2009; Chi-Chi & Friady, 2016; Klein, 2002; Krishnan et al., 2011; Hamdan, 
Mushtawa & Al-Sartawi, 2013; Moses et al., 2016) and the modified Jones model by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) (Al-Maqoushi &  Powell, 2017; Bajra & Čadež, 2018; 
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Jatiningrum, Abdul-Hamid & Popoola, 2016; Lara, Osma, Mora & Scapin, 2017; 
Lehmann, 2016; Lennox, Wu & Zhang, 2016). For that reason, this study has, in 
addition to the accrual model, adopted an income smoothing model,  using the Eckel 
Model (1981). 
The reason for the choice of income smoothing and discretionary accruals as 
measures of FRQ was a result of the fact that income smoothing has appeared to be a 
common practice by firms in many countries of the world (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that firms preparing their financial statements under 
the IFRS exhibit significant increases in income smoothing and aggressive reportage 
of accruals (Ahmed, Neel & Wang, 2013; Capkun & Collins, 2018; Chen, Tang 
Jiang & Lin 2010; Hail & Wysocki, 2010; Kaserer & Klingler, 2008). This is 
because, the adoption of the IFRS gives managers, more or less, a chance to 
manipulate earnings, which is evidenced through the application of fair value 
estimates that is performed by management who can use their discretion to 
manipulate income to costume their desires (Hassan, 2015; Kaserer & Klingler, 
2008). This is affirmed by Ozili (2015) who contended that listed banks in Nigeria 
smooth reported earnings over time throughout the periods of voluntary IFRS 
adoption and suggested that IFRS adoption reduces the reliability of loan loss 
provisions. However, prior studies considered profit smoothness to be an indicator of 
lower FRQ since it is another form of artificial earnings manipulation (Dechow, Ge 
& Schrand, 2010; Gaynor, Kelton, Mercer & Yohn, 2016; Yang, Tan & Ding, 2012). 
Accordingly, earnings manipulation and creative accounting are prevalent 
phenomena in Nigeria (Hassan, 2015). In addition, the  issues of Cadbury, African 
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Petroleum PLC, and some bank failures in Nigeria, as highlighted above, were as a 
result of the prevalence of income smoothing practices (Akenbor & Ibanichuka, 
2012; Sanusi & Izedonmi, 2014). Thus, in light of the above issues, it was expected 
that choosing these FRQ metrics would ensure high construct validity and 
considering the period of the study commencing from the effective date of the IFRS 
adoption by the Nigerian listed companies. 
To provide better understanding on the relationship between the AC and FRQ, this 
study did not rely on a simple linear or direct relationship between the AC and FRQ, 
but rather, it also included a mediating variable „audit quality‟. The reason for the 
choice of audit quality as the mediating variable on the relationship between the AC 
and FRQ is that high quality audits provide greater assurance in the financial 
reporting processing (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Gaynor et al., 2016). This means that, 
the AC demands greater assurance from the external auditors to ensure the effective 
oversight of financial reports and to safeguard their capital reputation (Boo & 
Sharma, 2008; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2002; Marini, Rohana & Keshab, 
2016). Therefore, AC enhances audit quality in the demand for greater audit 
assurance and in return, the audit quality improves the FRQ by increasing the 
credibility of the financial reports (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).  
 
Thus, to reflect the above arguments in the mediation model, Wu and Zumbo (2008, 
p. 379) contended that “a simple mediation model exists when the predictor variable 
is premised to cause the mediator and, in turn, the mediator causes the dependent 
variable”. Thus, the mediation effect of audit quality can be based on the 
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complementary effect hypothesis which suggests that the AC is expected to enhance 
audit quality which, subsequently, enhances the FRQ. This assumption indicates that 
external auditors contribute to the monitoring of the FRQ provided by the AC. The 
complementary effect hypothesis explains the demand aspect of the audit which is 
linked to the agency theory which presumes that audit services are required to lessen 
agency conflicts ascending from the interest of equity holders and managers 
(DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
It was because of the foregoing statements that the researchers considered it of 
paramount importance to focus on the mediating effect of audit quality and AC on 
FRQ. However, studies have been conducted on the relationship between the AC 
characteristics and FRQ. For instance, in Australia, Bepari and Mollik (2015) found a 
positive significant association between AC meetings and FRQ; whilst in the US, 
Miettine (2008)  reported a negative significant influence between AC meetings and 
quality of financial reporting. In India, Mishra and Malhotra  (2016) found a positive 
significant correlation between AC size and FRQ. On the contrary, Leong, Wang, 
Suwardy and Kusnadi (2015), in Singapore, revealed a negative significant 
association between AC size and FRQ. In Malaysia, Marzuki, Wahab and Haron 
(2016) showed that AC independence is positively associated with FRQ and 
Mohammad, Wasiuzzaman and Salleh (2016) revealed a positive significant 
influence between AC financial expertise and quality of financial reporting. Yet, 
some of these studies reported insignificant relationships between AC characteristics 
and FRQ (Abata & Migiro, 2016; Abdullah & Ku-Ismail, 2016; Nelson & Jamil, 
2012). These mixed findings make the direction of these relationships illusive, and to 
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the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, these inconsistencies of the findings have still 
not been resolved. Therefore, there is a need to study this relationship in the Nigerian 
context that has a unique set of AC characteristics which consists of representatives 
from shareholders and directors.  
In view of the above, there is a need to conduct a study with a view to fill all the gaps 
that exist in the literature. This study, therefore, has focused on the effect of AC 
characteristics on FRQ and examined the mediating effect of audit quality on the 
relationship between the AC characteristics and the quality of financial reporting of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. 
1.4 Research   Questions 
To find a solution to the research problems, a study has been conducted to answer the 
question of how audit quality mediates the relationship between AC characteristics 
and FRQ of listed companies in Nigeria. Specifically, this study has looked at the 
following questions: 
i. Do the audit committee characteristics influence the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria? 
ii. Do the audit committee characteristics influence the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria? 
iii. Does audit quality affect the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria? 
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iv. Does audit quality mediate the relationship between the AC characteristics 
and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria? 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to examine the mediating effect of audit quality 
on the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ of listed companies in 
Nigeria. Thus, the specific objectives were; 
i. To determine the influence of the audit committee characteristics on the FRQ 
of the listed companies in Nigeria; 
ii. To examine the effect of the audit committee characteristics on the audit 
quality of the listed companies in Nigeria; 
iii. To determine the effect of audit quality on the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria; and 
iv. To examine the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between 
the AC and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
The study covered the period of five years from 2012 to 2016. The choice of the 
period (2012 to 2016) was as a result of the review of the SEC Code of CG (2003) 
effective from 2011. The data was purely from a secondary source through the 
annual reports of the listed firms in Nigeria. The variables of the study included AC 
characteristics, being the independent variables. The proxies of which were AC size, 
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AC independence, AC meetings, AC expertise, female AC members, and AC tenure. 
The dependent variable was represented by the FRQ proxied by the income 
smoothing models from Eckel (1981) and accrual measures by Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005).  The reason for the adoption of multiple models was due to the fact 
that the use of a single model to determine the quality of earnings is not sufficient 
(Chen, 2010). However, both of the models have similar outcomes because artificial 
income smoothing and discretionary accruals have negative consequences on FRQ. 
Perhaps, the conclusion derived from the two models would not be misleading since 
they are indicators of lower earnings quality. However, the mediating effect of audit 
quality on the association between AC and FRQ has also been determined in this 
study. 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
This study entitled „AC characteristics and FRQ: the mediating effect of audit 
quality‟ will contribute tremendously in the following manner: 
1.7.1 Literature Significance 
There is a lot of evidence on the impact of AC characteristics on FRQ around the 
globe, for example, some studies examined the relationship between AC 
characteristics and FRQ (Haji & Anifowose, 2016; Zgarni, Hlioui & Zehri, 2016; 
Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Moses et al., 2016), audit quality and FRQ (DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014, 2016; Nawaiseh, 2016), and the joint impact of AC and audit quality 
on FRQ (Ruhaida, 2011; Saleem & Alzhobi, 2016; Bamahros  &  Wan-Hussin, 
2015). Other studies for instance, Zgarni et al. (2016) used Big 4 auditors, audit 
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tenure, and audit industry specialisation to moderate the association between AC and 
EM. Jintawattanagul, Pichetkun and Visedsun (2016) studied the mediating role of 
the accruals quality on the AC attributes and the cost of equity listed firms in 
Thailand. However, there is limited evidence from the prior literature that 
empirically examines the mediating role of audit quality on the relationship between 
the AC characteristics and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. For example, 
studies on corporate governance in Nigeria, such as Miko (2016), consider the 
interaction of institutional shareholdings on the relationship between three attributes 
of AC (size, independence, and financial expertise). Consequently, this study 
introduced audit quality to mediate the relationship between AC characteristics and 
FRQ. Thus, it is the first of its kind to the best of the researchers‟ knowledge that 
examines the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between the AC 
characteristics and the income smoothing behaviour of firms. Therefore, a mediation 
analysis will provide a better explanation about how the influence of AC affects audit 
quality and, in return, affects FRQ.  
This study, therefore, serves as evidence for further research in this area to use the 
empirical finding and discuss its implication from the Nigerian perspective. The 
study also contributes to the debate of the mixed findings in the existing literature on 
the relationships between AC characteristics proxied by AC size, AC independence, 
AC meetings, AC financial accounting experts, AC legal experts, female AC 
members, AC stock ownership, AC tenure, AC chair, and the FRQ. Consequently, 
the study provides additional evidence for future research. Additionally, as 
highlighted earlier, several studies have been conducted on the relationship between 
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AC characteristics and FRQ. In addition, the study has determined the direct 
relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ, AC characteristics and audit 
quality, and audit quality and FRQ; then, it was followed by the indirect relationship. 
Each of these relationships adds value to the agency theory, resource dependence 
theory, institutional theory, signaling theory, and feminist theory that underpin the 
variables of the study because of the inclusion of a new mediator (audit quality).  The 
mediating effect has enabled the study to compare the direct relationship and indirect 
relationship of these variables using audit quality as a mediator. This has not been 
provided by prior studies using the same variables. However, AC has been 
considered as an independent variable because it is an effective corporate governance 
oversight mechanism that has a disciplining effect on the manager‟s discretion in the 
estimation of accounting numbers. 
Furthermore, the study also includes some of the AC expertise (financial accounting 
experts and legal accounting experts) variables and female AC members that were 
given little attention by previous studies in Nigeria. More so, according to Fatile and 
Ejalonibu (2016), the issue of gender is of considerable attention in Nigeria today 
and is concerned with the notion of equity.  In light of the above, the Nigerian 
legislative body, in 2011, had proposed a bill for gender and equal opportunities for 
women. This was done with a view to address the issue of gender equality that has 
been a debatable topic all over the world (Ekpe, Eja & John, 2014).   The above-
mentioned facts stimulated the researcher to include female AC members as one of 
the predictor variables. This is because the bill clearly established a clause 
demanding a minimum of 35 per cent participation of women in offices, positions, 
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and appointments in both the private and public sectors (Gender and Equal 
Opportunities Bill, 2011). The findings of the study will serve as part of the 
empirical evidence that the regulators can use in formulating policies on gender 
related issues in Nigeria. Additionally, Farber et al. (2016); Liu et al. (2014); 
Abernathy et al. (2014); and Krishnan et al. (2011) suggested that the composition of 
directors with all forms of expertise enhances FRQ. In view of the above, this study 
has included two forms of AC expertise (financial accounting and legal expertise).  
However, legal experts have been included because they serve as effective monitors 
rather than signals to FRQ (Krishnan et al., 2011). 
1.7.2 Practical Significance 
The findings of this study are expected to be useful to the regulators, practitioners 
(auditors and forensic accountants), and board of directors who are responsible for 
promoting the oversight of companies. Thus, reducing the chances for management 
to engage in accounting manipulation. In the same vein, it will also serve as a basis 
for the formulation of laws and policy implications. For instance, it has been argued 
that the major challenge that Nigeria is facing about corporate governance is the 
inability to harmonise the various corporate governance codes (Aina & Adejugbe, 
2015). In this regard, the outcome of the study is relevant to the authorities, such as 
policymakers and regulatory agencies, CBN (regulating banking sector), NAICOM 
(for insurance companies), PENCOM (regulating the pension managers), NCC 
(regulating telecommunications in Nigeria), and FRCN (responsible for assurance of 
good corporate governance in Nigeria).  Each of these agencies has a distinct code 
with some peculiar differences and conflicting statements. Therefore, the findings of 
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this study will be one of the sources that the regulators will use in policy 
implementation. For example, the FRC recently established a rule called Rule 2(c) in 
2016 mandating AC chairs to have financial accounting expertise. However, a 
Federal High Court in Nigeria overruled the FRCN rule in January 2018 on the 
grounds that it is contrary to the provision of the CAMA (2004) and the SEC Code 
(2011) (Egwuatu, 2018). This is because CAMA (2004) and the SEC Code do not 
require AC chair to have financial expertise. This study incorporates the AC chair as 
one of the AC attributes to be examined. Thus, the outcome of the empirical findings 
will serve as a basis for addressing this debating issue. 
Furthermore, the regulators will also better understand the impact of the mediating 
role that audit quality can play in enhancing the effectiveness of the AC to mitigate 
EM thereby improving the financial reporting process. A mediation analysis helps to 
better understand whether audit quality complements (complementary hypothesis) 
the AC functions on the FRQ. The outcome of the mediation may either be a full 
mediation or partial mediation. As suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) and 
Holmbeck (1997), a full mediation exists when the mediator eliminates the impact of 
the predictor variables on the dependent variable; whilst a partial mediation exists 
when the mediator substantially reduces the impact of the predictor variables on the 
dependent variable. Consequently, a partial mediation of audit quality will mean that 
audit quality plays a complementary role in the influence of AC on FRQ.  Whilst a 
full mediation may indicate that without audit quality, the AC alone cannot perform 
the oversight function on the FRQ. However, this assumption can only be made 
through mediation analysis  not moderation, because, a moderator clarifies when a 
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predictor variable most strongly or weakly causes a dependent variable; whereas, a 
mediator clarifies the procedure of why and how a cause-and-effect occurs (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Wu & Zumbo, 2008). Therefore, this study is expected to be useful to 
regulators, investors, and policymakers particularly in light of the current argument 
by prior studies about the controversial ceremonial and symbolic functions of the AC 
rather than the effective monitor it is expected to be (Yu et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2015; 
Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2007). 
The study also serves as a guide to the existing and potential investors as well as 
financial analysts who are also the direct users of the financial statements. The 
findings of study will enable the shareholders to understand the implications of each 
variable in enhancing the credibility and reliability of the financial disclosure which, 
in turn, will improve the confidence of both potential and existing investors. 
1.8 Organisation of the Study 
This study is structured into seven chapters, whereby Chapter One is the 
introduction, which includes an introduction of the chapter, the background of the 
study, problem statement, research questions, objectives of the study, motivation of 
the study, the scope of the study, significance of the study, and plan of the study. 
Chapter Two contains the literature review of the study which provides the 
introduction, the financial reporting concept, financial reporting in Nigeria, concept 
of AC, AC and FRQ, measures of FRQ, review of previous studies on AC and 
earnings quality, and the theoretical framework. Chapter Three focuses on the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses development. Chapter Four provides the 
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research methodology which consists of the introduction of the chapter, the research 
method and design, data analysis technique, variable measurements, and model 
specifications of the study. 
Chapter Five and Six are dedicated to the presentation of the results and discussions 
of the four questions addressed in this study. The chapters present the results and 
analyses of the influence of AC characteristics on the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria, the effect of AC characteristics on audit quality, the effect of audit quality 
on FRQ, and the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between AC 
characteristics and FRQ. Finally, Chapter Seven provides the concluding remarks, 
summary of the research findings, and their respective implications. The 
contributions, limitations of the thesis, and opportunities for further research are also 







This chapter contains a review of previous studies on AC and FRQ. It discusses the 
concept of FRQ, FRQ in Nigeria, the importance of FRQ, and measures of FRQ. The 
chapter also provides a discussion on the concept of corporate governance, corporate 
governance in Nigeria and concept of AC. Previous studies on AC characteristics and 
FRQ are also reviewed in this chapter. This is followed by AC characteristics and 
audit quality, audit quality and FRQ, mediating effect of audit quality on the link 
between AC characteristics and FRQ, and finally, the summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Concept of Financial Reporting 
Financial reporting is a dual operation in which the providers of the financial reports 
make them available to the users, who apply them with the anticipation that the 
financial reports will aid them to improve their economic decisions (Tasios & 
Bekiaris, 2012). The goal of financial reporting is to prepare financial reports 
concerning the company that is valuable to the stakeholders when making decisions 
in their positions as capital providers (IASB) (2008, p.12). To achieve this aim, 
financial reports ought to broadcast information concerning the firm‟s economic 
resources, dues on those resources, the dealings and other procedures, and the 
conditions that alter them. This is because financial disclosure and information are 
hypothetically imperative means for management to communicate firms‟ 
performances and governance to external investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Hence, 
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establishing a high quality of economic reporting disclosure is imperative since it 
will absolutely affect stakeholders in creating investment, credit, and analogous 
resource allocation decisions in promoting overall market productivity (Al-Rassas, 
2015). In that regard, FRQ is a requirement for an effective investment portfolio 
since various people and groups make their resource allocation pronouncements 
based on financial evidence (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
According to  Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009, p. 3) FRQ is defined as “the precision 
with which financial reporting communicates information concerning the firm’s 
operations, in particular its expected cash flows, that inform shareholders”. Tang, 
Chen, and Lin (2008) define FRQ as the degree to which the financial accounts 
provide true and fair revelations concerning the basic performance and financial 
situation. Thus, this study has considered FRQ as a full and transparent economic 
disclosure that is prepared not to confuse or mislead users (Jonas & Blanchet, 2000). 
The agency theory posits that, due to the estrangement between managers and 
owners, investors need to be safeguarded as managers will possibly have agendas 
distinct from the investors and, consequently, might not always perform in the 
owners‟ finest interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). For that 
reason, there is a need to engage the service of independent auditors to provide their 
independent opinions on the truth and fair view of corporates‟ financial reports.  This 
will be an option available for monitoring processes that can enhance the financial 
reporting which, consequently, will raise investors‟ confidence about the firm 
performance and traded securities that reflect the company image (Islam, Islam & 
Islam, 2010; Johl, Kaur & Cooper, 2015). 
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Invariably, information disclosure can help mitigate principal-agent conflicts and 
costs (Namazi, 2013). Since, high-quality information would likely reduce 
informational asymmetry problems between the firm and its investors, and hence, 
would decrease the agency costs (Bushman & Smith, 2001).  However, there is no 
consensus as to what constitutes FRQ. For instance, Jonas and Blanchet (2000) 
disclosed that auditors, AC members, and management are making great efforts to 
provide a definition of the quality of financial reporting.  Kothari (2001, p. 91) 
stressed that the quality of financial evidence and transparency of an information 
system or accounting standards are normally used interchangeably.  A specific 
explanation of quality or transparency that all and sundry agree on has been elusive. 
Hence, the quality of a financial material report, however, is prejudiced, and not just 
by the value of the accounting standards. But likewise, by other conventional actors, 
such as corporate governance, the legal structures, and the presence and 
implementation of laws concerning investor safety and disclosure ethics that 
influence the demand for and the supply of financial information (Kothari, 2001). 
Previous studies have often considered the conservatism part of accounting quality, 
i.e., the level in which losses are combined into incomes on a timely (Ball, Robin & 
Wu, 2003; Guay & Verrecchia, 2006). As FRQ is an extensive perception and multi-
dimensional, it is imperative to extend the practical results outside the conservatism 
dimension (Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
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2.3 Financial Reporting in Nigeria 
The evolution of financial reporting in Nigeria has a link with the British financial 
system. Thus, being the Nigerian former colonial mater, most of the laws and 
policies in Nigeria were derived from the British (Olamide & Temitope, 2016). 
Similarly, the advancement of accounting standards in Nigeria is attributed to the 
Association of Accountants of Nigeria (AAN). The AAN was established in 1960 
whilst it was legitimately recognized in 1965, under the National Parliament Act 
number 15 of 1965. The primary responsibility of the body was to regulate the 
accountancy profession in the country. The AAN (now Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria, ICAN) was said to be in charge of the creation of the NASB 
before it was taken over by the federal executives (Josiah, Okoye & Adediran, 2013; 
Olamide & Temitope, 2016). 
 
The Nigeria Accounting Standards Board (NASB) was provided in 1985. After that, 
the NASB Act was established by the NASB in 2003 under the recommendation of 
the federal government. The Act was ratified by the Nigerian National Assembly 
with representatives from each accounting professional body, federal ministry of 
finance, and all regulatory agencies in Nigeria (NASB Act, 2003). The major 
function of the Board is to draft the standards to be employed when preparing 
financial reports and to enhance the acceptability and adoptability of the same 
standards by preparers and users of financial reports. This is to ensure strict 
compliance with the accounting standards established and reviewed by the Board as 
well as to impose sanctions on any noncompliance as may be prescribed by the 
Board. In light of the above, the Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS) was 
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established by the Board, and has served as the local standards used by companies in 
the preparations of financial statements. 
 
Furthermore, the internationalisation of economic trade and the harmonisation of 
international accounting standards have led to the advent of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as well as the International Public-Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSAS). Nigeria has joined the international community by 
adopting the IFRS and IPSAS. The adoption started with private companies in 
January, 2012, followed by the adoption of the IPSAS by the public entities in 
January, 2016 (Ocansey & Enahoro, 2014; Saidu & Dauda, 2014). In view of the 
above, the NASB Act 2003 and its standards, SAS, were taken over by the FRCN 
Act 2011 and IFRS, respectively. The functions of the FRCN are similar to those of 
the NASB with some little modifications or improvements. These include, amongst 
others, the establishment and issuance of accounting and financial reporting 
standards to be employed when preparing the financial reports of public firms, and 
they appraise, enhance, and ensure strict adherence with the accounting and reporting 
standards supplied by the council. It also admits announcements of non-compliance 
with the approved standards from all users of financial reports (FRC Act, 2011). 
Therefore, any company that fails to comply with the standards, if it is brought to the 
attention of the FRC, is punishable by imprisonment or a fine on each of the 
principal officers of the company as well as the external auditors. 
 
Similarly, the adoption of the IFRS has brought about some changes in the reporting 
system in Nigeria. For instance, the IFRS discusses in detail the qualitative 
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characteristics of FRQ; some of these aspects were lacking in the Nigerian SAS. A 
statement of the changes in equity and significant management estimates, disclosure 
of minority interest in income statements, substantive standards on borrowing cost, 
substantive accounting for agriculture, identifications of primary and secondary 
segments, and substantive standards for intangible assets except for goodwill were 
completely absent in the Nigerian SAS (Ocansey & Enahoro, 2014). Another 
significant change by the IFRS to the Nigerian SAS was the recognition of the 
valuation of assets and liabilities under fair value estimates. Several studies argued 
that adoption of the IFRS enhances the transparency of financial reports and provides 
higher quality information to investors (Adekunle & Taiwo, 2013; Ocansey & 
Enahoro, 2014). 
 
Other sources of financial reporting practices in Nigeria include, the Companies and 
Allied and Matters Act 1990 (CAMA), amended in 2004, and the Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Act 1991 (BOFIA). The CAMA was a byproduct of the British 
legal system originating from the Joint Stock Company Act 1885. The Act provides 
the establishment of the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) that is responsible for 
the formation, incorporation, and registration of companies in Nigeria. The Act also 
provides several provisions on corporate laws, accounting, auditing practices, and the 
establishment of companies‟ directors, ACs, preparations of financial reports, 
auditors, disclosure, and secretaries. Similarly, Section (35) of the CAMA mandates 
every company to provide a Memorandum and Articles of Association that will serve 




Studies in Nigeria on FRQ include Uadiale (2012) who examined the corporate 
governance and EM of the listed banks. He employed the survey method and 
examined board independence and AC financial literacy for the single period of 
2011. Hassan and Ahmed (2012) employed 60 firm-year observations and then 
examined the influence of corporate governance and EM on the financial 
performance of manufacturing firms. Davies, Gberegbe, Ofurum and Egbe (2016) 
examined the corporate governance and earnings quality of the listed banks in Rivers 
State only,  and Ani (2014) studied the fraudulent financial reporting of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. She used a survey method and took a sample of the listed 
companies from one state in Nigeria. However, none of the above studies has 
extensively explored the influence of AC characteristics that are believed to play a 
significant role in FRQ. 
2.3.1 Regulatory Framework on AC and External Auditors in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, Section 359 (3) and (4) of the CAMA (2004) and the SEC Code (2011) 
mandate every public company to establish an AC. The committee has the 
responsibility to ensure the integrity of the entity‟s financial statements, confirm that 
the regulatory and legal requirements are complied with, perceive the independence 
and qualifications of the external auditors, and assure the entity‟s internal and 
external audit functions. It is also meant to establish an internal audit function and 
ensure that there are other sources of gaining adequate assurance of consistent review 
or evaluation of the internal control system in the entity. It also supervises the 
management‟s process for the recognition of significant fraud risks within the 
 
 36 
company and ensures that reasonable deterrence, detection, as well as reporting 
devices are in place. 
In addition to the AC statutory functions, the SEC Code (2011) provides that the AC 
is expected to aid in the oversight of the integration of the entity‟s financial 
requirements. Furthermore, it further ensures the progress of a comprehensive 
internal control outline for the firm, and obtains assurance and reports, yearly, in the 
financial report, on the effectiveness of the entity‟s internal control system.  At least, 
on a yearly basis, the committee is mandated to revisit and assess a report by the 
internal auditor explaining the quality and strength of the internal controls as well as 
any issues or authorisations for improvements raised as a result of the most recent 
internal control assessment of the firm (SEC Code, 2011). The members also debate 
on procedures and policies with reference to risk valuation, and also, meet on a 
regular interval with management, and internal and external auditors. In addition, 
they appraise with the external auditors, matters relating to the audit scope, 
boundaries or difficulties arising and solutions to the same. 
2.3.1.1 Composition of AC in Nigeria 
Section 359(6) of the CAMA (2004) recommends that there should be equal 
representation of shareholders and directors. It requires that every public company 
should have an AC that consists of a maximum of three shareholders and three 
directors. Furthermore, the SEC code of CG (2011) stipulates that there is at least 
one independent non-executive director on the board. However, there is no such 
provision about AC independence, which is contrary to the global best practice. In 
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addition, the SEC Code (2011) requires that the AC shall meet at least four times in a 
year. The chairman of the committee shall develop an agenda for the meetings by 
having consultations with other members of the committee. Furthermore, the 
number, time, and duration of meetings shall be enough to ensure that the committee 
achieves its objectives.  It is observed that the Code also recommends that the AC 
members should have basic financial literacy. It also requires that at least one 
member of the AC shall have experience in accounting or financial management. 
More so, Section 359 (4) of the CAMA (2004) requires that the AC shall consists of 
equal representation of directors and shareholders. This uniqueness of the AC 
formation in Nigeria makes the committee to be more flexible as the chairmanship of 
the committee could be handled by either a director or a shareholder. It has been 
argued that existence of shareholders in the AC can erode their monitoring ability 
because this may compromise their independence in the decision-making process 
(Ahmed, 2017). 
Similarly, Section 357 (1) of the CAMA (2004) stipulates that every company shall 
appoint an auditor at each annual general meeting. The auditor(s) is/are required to 
examine the accounts and ascertain whether the financial evidence obtained in the 
annual report is consistent with the ethical and regulatory provisions (CAMA, 2004).  
In addition, SEC Code (2011) requires that external auditors should be retained for 
no longer than ten years consecutively. Thereafter, they shall be disengaged after ten 
years but may be re-engaged after another seven years since their disengagement. 
However, it has been argued that exceptionally long tenure of auditors might 
compromise their independence because the longer they stay as auditors of the same 
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firm, the more likely it is that they will befriend the managers and thus, become less 
critical of the accounting issues (Carey & Simnett, 2006). 
2.4 Importance of Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial reporting quality is a subject that, for many years, received serious 
attention and became a debatable issue for investors, regulators, as well as 
researchers (Hermanns, 2006). The quality of financial reports can be assessed from 
the financial statements prepared by the management concerning the reporting entity. 
The financial statements are a major means through which companies communicate 
to their users their financial results as well as their position. Financial analysts, 
investors, government authorities, and creditors, amongst others, make use of 
financial statements to make rational decisions. Thus, supplying high quality 
financial reporting disclosure is important since it will positively influence the capital 
providers and other users in making investment, credit, and identical resource 
allocation decisions in enhancing overall market efficiency (IASB, 2006; IASB, 
2008). For instance, managers, boards of directors, auditors, and audit committees 
benefit from producing high quality financial reports; thereby, assisting in decreasing 
the cost of capital by minimising information asymmetry, and improving high 
disclosure and high earnings quality that would result in the attraction of potential 
investors (Aboody, Hughes & Liu, 2005). 
 
It has been argued that the quality of the financial information the stakeholders 
receive is a function of both the quality of (accounting) standards guiding the 
disclosure of accounting information and the regulatory enforcement or corporate 
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application of the standards in an economy (Kothari, 2001).  It, therefore, becomes a 
collective responsibility to both regulators and standard setters to formulate rules and 
laws that can be used in enhancing the quality of reported financial information 
which will positively improve capital market effectiveness. Similarly, the quality of 
financial reporting is an issue of serious concern to stakeholders. This is because of 
its influence over economic decisions which, in turn, can have a great impact on the 
society as witnessed by the sequence of corporate failures (e.g., Enron, Parmalat) and 
collapses of financial institutions (Lehman Brothers, Fortis, AIG) and by the 
economic environment derived from the economic meltdown (Tasios & Bekiaris, 
2012). 
 
Previous literature on financial reporting concentrated on different aspects that have 
direct influence over the quality of the financial (Abbott et al., 2016; Achim & Chis, 
2014; Ball et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Daske & Gebhardt, 2006; Kothari, 
2001; Tasios & Bekiaris, 2012; McDaniel, Martin & Maines, 2002). For instance, 
Ball et al. (2003) argued that incentives seem to dominate accounting standards as a 
determinant of financial reporting in some Asian countries. They found that, for 
countries struggling to achieve a higher quality of financial reporting, reforming 
managers and auditor incentives are more important than mandating foreign 
accounting standards. They contended that high-quality standards do not assure high-





It was also revealed that within the European Union, private firms disclose lower 
levels of financial reporting quality, and those active legal systems are correlated 
with higher financial reporting quality in both private and public firms. It was further 
established that private and public companies react differently to institutional factors, 
such as outside investor protection, book-tax alignment, and capital market structure. 
Hence, it was found that firms‟ reporting incentives designed by market forces and 
institutional factors are two important determinants of accounting quality 
(Burgstahler et al., 2006). Additionally, disclosure quality has significantly increased 
in three European countries (Germany, Australia, and Switzerland) under the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in both types of companies, those 
which have voluntary and mandatory adoption. Hence, the quality of financial 
reports has significantly increased with the IFRS adoption (Daske & Gebhardt, 
2006). Similarly, Beest, Braam and Boelens (2009) documented that the 
measurement technique employed in their study is a valid and reliable method in 
assessing the quality of financial reports. Since, it contributes in enhancing the 
quality of financial reporting information, following a request from both the IASB 
and the FASB (2008) to make the qualitative characteristics operationally 
measurable. 
 
Furthermore, McDaniel et al. (2002) found that financial experts and financial 
literates are different in evaluating financial reports. They document that the experts' 
assessments of quality financial reporting are more strongly correlated with their 
evaluations of the attributes that are fundamental to reporting quality (e.g., 
relevance). In addition, they contended that literates are more probable than experts 
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to identify concerns on reporting treatments for commercial activities which are 
noticeable in the business media or are differentiated by their non-recurring feature, 
whilst experts are more probable to raise concerns about reporting treatments for less 
noticeable recurring activities. Finally, they recommend that incorporating financial 
experts on audit committees is likely to transform the composition and attention of 
the committee's discussions about the quality of financial reporting, which may likely 
influence the committee's overall assessment of the quality of a firm‟s financial 
reports. However, Chen et al. (2010) affirmed that the majority of the FRQ indicators 
(absolute discretionary accruals, managing earnings toward targets, and accruals 
quality) improved after the IFRS adoption in 15 European Union nations. This 
indicates less earnings management, lower discretionary accruals, and high accruals 
quality. On the contrary, public companies were involved in income smoothing and 
large recognition of losses in a less timely manner after the IFRS adoption. 
 
Choudhary, Merkley and Schipper (2016) employed two qualitative attributes of 
financial reporting quality (immaterial error and material error associated with 
restatement). They observed that considering the relevance of equity valuation, 
investors consider immaterial errors relevant, and that with the valuation impact, it 
was smaller than those associated with restatements disclosed. Considering the 
predictive ability for reporting quality, immaterial errors are informative about the 
financial reporting reliability. Since, they signify an increased ability for future 
material errors, immaterial errors, and material weakness assessments. The predictive 
propensity of immaterial errors for quality of reporting is not qualitatively 
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differential from that of material errors. This is in line with the assumption that 
immaterial errors are informative about reporting quality. 
 
Despite the emphasis on the importance of high FRQ by regulators and standard 
setters (e.g., FASB & IASB 2008), the major problem found in prior studies is how 
to operationalise this quality (Beest et al., 2009). Due to its contextual specification, 
an empirical evaluation of FRQ unavoidably includes alternative choices amongst its 
multiple components (Daske & Gebhardt, 2006; Dechow & Dichev, 2002). Since 
different user groups will have differential alternative choices, perceived quality will 
be aberrant amongst the constituents (Beest et al., 2009). Consequently, measuring 
quality directly seems problematic (Botosan, 2004). Thus, some of the factors that 
influence FRQ include the accounting standards that guide the management and 
auditors in preparing and examining the financial reports, respectively, the 
management incentives, and the institutional factors including the legal system, 
capital market forces, and investor protection amongst others (Beest et al., 2009; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Ball et al., 2003; Kothari, 2001). 
 
Various codes and regulations have also been put in place to guide management and 
external auditors in enhancing the quality of financial reports, globally. For instance, 
there are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US, Code of Accounting Practice and 
Financial Reporting (2011) in New Zealand, Financial Planning Association Code 
Professional Practice in Australia (2013), Code of Practice on Local Authority 
Accounting in the United Kingdom (2015) amongst others. The objectives of the 
above mentioned codes are to improve financial reporting practices which, in turn, 
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enhance financial reporting quality all over the world. However, the concern about 
the quality of financial reports and its association with audit quality has been 
increasing over time since the collapse of some high-profile companies due to 
financial scandals committed by their managers. For that reason, regulators and 
investors have often questioned the job of both audit committees and external 
auditors because the audited financial reports have been proven to be false and 
misleading in many of the recent financial scandals (Alves, 2014). Therefore, there is 
a need to apply a more advanced method to examine the causal effect of the AC and 
audit quality in relation to FRQ in order to determine what is really going on. 
2.5 Measures of Financial Reporting Quality 
Despite the emphasis given by both the FASB and IASB on the role of high FRQ, 
one of the major hitches found by prior researchers is how to operationalise and 
determine this quality (Beest, Braam & Boelens, 2009). This is due to its context-
specificity, which makes its empirical assessment inevitably include alternative 
choices amongst a lot of constituents (Daske & Gebhardt, 2006; Dechow & Dichev, 
2002). This is because, different categories of users may partake of different 
predilections, apparent quality will be amongst the divergent constituents. Again, the 
participants inside a user group may also observe the importance of similar evidence 
differently, given its framework. Because of this framework and user-specificity, 
determining quality, directly, appears to be problematic (Botosan, 2004). As a result 
of this, a lot of researchers measured FRQ, indirectly, by relying on the 
characteristics that are thought to influence FRQ, such as EM, financial restatements, 
income smoothing, and timeliness (Beest et al., 2009). 
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The quality of financial reports is not a measure that can be simply computed; 
because, it may not be observed, directly, since it is based on the presumption of the 
stakeholders. Each class of handlers has its own anticipation and presumption 
concerning what evidence is useful and of good quality (Achim & Chis, 2014). To 
assess FRQ, various predictors and approaches have been used. The most widely 
used methods, in prior studies, were the accrual models, value relevance models, 
earnings smoothing, earnings persistence and predictability, timeliness of reporting, 
earnings conservatism, and methods operationalising the qualitative characteristics 
(Achim & Chis, 2014; Barth et al., 2001; Beest et al., 2009; Burgstahler, et al. 2006; 
Ching, Teh, San & Hoe,  2015; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; LaFound & Watts, 2008). 
2.5.1 Value Relevance 
Financial information has a value relevance if it has an anticipated correlation with 
the market value of equity. Whilst accounting earnings is of relevance if it can make 
a difference on the decisions of the users‟ financial statements (Barth et al., 2001). 
When the two concepts are highly correlated, it indicates that changes in accounting 
information are equal to changes in the market value of the firm. It is presumed that 
earnings information provides relevant and reliable information (Nichols & Wahlen, 
2004). Value relevance is a return-based approach that determines the extent in 
which earnings explain returns and serve as an indicator of the accounting 
information relevance. Consequently, if the information contribution of earnings to 
investors is discovered to be significant, then earnings should give back a 
considerable explanatory power in terms of market returns, which gives out a 
consideration of the returns/earnings correlation, known as the R2 of the regression of 
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stock returns on earnings which measures the information contribution of earnings to 
relevant investors (Lev, 1989). 
A lot of studies have been conducted to determine the usefulness of earnings in 
estimating accounting information relevance. For instance, Lev (1989); Ball & 
Brown (1968); and Amir (1996) emphasised that earnings usefulness can be obtained 
from the value of the correlations between stock returns and earnings, considering 
the returns/earnings correlation, i.e., R2 contribution of the regression of returns on 
earnings. Barth et al. (2001) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) stressed the relevance 
of the value relevance and contended that the value relevance of financial 
information is derived when accounting numbers reflect information that the 
investors used in valuing the company's equity. 
2.5.2 Persistence and Predictability 
Predictability is the ability of earnings to predict itself (Francis, Lafond, Olsson & 
Schipper, 2004). Thus, earnings predictability indicates the potentiality of past 
earnings to predict future earnings. Because, if the earnings‟ predictivity increases, 
the present earnings information is assumed to be more beneficial in predicting 
future earnings and, consequently, the response coefficient increases (Lipe, 1990). 
Earnings persistence, on the other hand, is defined as the likelihood that an entity's 
level of earnings will recur in future periods (Nichols & Wahlen, 2004) Hence, 
persistent earnings are needed since they are sustainable and reoccurring (Francis et 
al., 2004). They viewed earnings persistence as the rate of change in the coefficient 
from the regression of current earnings on lagged earnings.  
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Persistence and predictability are distinct in the sense that predictability of earnings 
is a function of the mean absolute degree of the annual earnings‟ surprises, whilst the 
time series persistence of earnings indicates the autocorrelation in the firm‟s earnings 
(Lipe, 1990). Hence, earnings are said to be of high quality if they have a high level 
of persistence and have more predictability. It was contended that predictability and 
persistence may not be sufficient in determining high quality earnings. Since, there 
are instances whereby predictability and persistence may not be consistent, then 
volatile earnings may be of high quality in relation to high persistence, but low 
quality in relation to low predictably (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). As such, high 
persistence may be possible through managerial opportunistic behaviour or earnings 
management (Dechow et al., 2010).  Therefore, the consequence of earnings 
management is poor quality. Then, poor quality is undesirable since it can mislead 
investors, thereby making them victims of the misallocation of resources. 
2.5.3 Timeliness and Conservatism 
Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability desired for the recognition of 
profit or losses that brings about an undervaluation of net assets (Holthausena & 
Wattsb, 2001). It is based on the notion that accountants are to be cautious in the use 
of policies and estimations in a manner that the firm‟s earnings are not overstated 
and an entity‟s losses are not understated. Basu (1997) annotated conservatism as 
earnings that reflect 'bad news' more quickly than 'good news‟. Whilst, timeliness 
reflects the timely inclusion of economic losses in accounting earnings. Lafond and 
Watts (2008) contended that information asymmetry between company insiders and 
outside equity investors brings about conservatism in financial statements which 
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reduces the manager‟s incentives and their capability to manipulate financial 
information and, consequently, reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight 
losses which information asymmetry can cause. As such, conservatism reduces 
managers' opportunistic behaviours and anchors managerial biases with its 
asymmetrical confirmability requirement (Watts, 2003). Conservatism exists because 
it reduces agency costs connected with information asymmetries and loss activities 
amongst the contracting parties as well as inability to authenticate the more informed 
parties' private information (Lafond & Watts, 2008). 
Francis et al. (2004) opined that the major indicator for both timeliness and 
conservatism is stock returns. Whilst, conservatism is the ratio of the variability 
coefficients on negative returns to the ratio of the variability coefficients of positive 
returns in a reverse regression of income and returns. Timeliness is the R2 of a 
reverse regression of earnings on returns. Thus, the difference between conservatism 
and timeliness is that the former reveals a distinctive ability of accounting earnings to 
represent economic losses (proxied by negative stock returns) against economic 
profit (proxied by positive stock returns). 
Previous studies documented that conservatism reduces information asymmetry and 
constrains the managerial opportunistic behaviour on financial reporting (Watts, 
2003; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). Previous literature employed different measures 
to proxy for accounting conservatism, thus, the most frequently used amongst the 
methods are asymmetric timeliness (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2003; Roychowdhury & 
Watts, 2007) and market-to-book value (Ball et al., 2000; Givoly & Hayn, 2000; 
Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007). The empirical findings of these studies used 
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investments, institutions, contracts, current and future performance, and cost of 
equity as factors that influence accounting conservatism (DeFond & Park, 1997; 
Penman & Zhang, 2002; Francis et al., 2004). Most of the findings of these studies 
have recognized that accounting conservatism reduces information asymmetry 
between insiders and the shareholders and this will, invariably, reduce managers‟ 
opportunistic behaviours. 
2.5.4 Accruals Measure 
Accruals admit firms to account for expected revenues and expenses when they are 
earned or they are incurred, respectively. Hence, financial statements are mostly 
prepared under accrual bases. Accruals reflect expected future cash flows and 
outflows. It is the process of accounting that recognises assets or liabilities, returns, 
expenses, gains, or losses for amounts expected to be received or paid, usually in 
cash, in the future (FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concept No. 6). The 
main objective of the accrual is to assist investors in examining the firm‟s economic 
performance in a period using basic accounting ethics, such as the recognition of 
revenue and matching concept (Bissessur, 2008). 
Since accrual accounting is guided by principles and standards. Then, the entities 
may need to comply with the standards, whilst managers are not necessarily 
interested in the information derived through the accrual method and such 
information is little used in practice (Alijarde, 2014). Previous literature has 
demonstrated the importance of accruals in determining the quality of financial 
reports (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2004; Beslic, Beslic, Jacksic & 
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Andric, 2015; Praag, 2001). Because, accrual model literature concentrates on the 
information disclosed in financial statements to determine the quality of the financial 
reporting (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Nichols & Wahlen, 2004; Healy & Wahlen, 
1999). 
It was argued that firms may use accruals to conceal poor present performance or to 
understate good present performance with a view to effectively save that for the 
future (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Thus, it was argued that financial misconduct is 
highly likely when it is expensive for outsiders to supervise the company‟s 
operations and managers (Amiram et al., 2018). Consequently, if financial statements 
are to portray management information on their performance then, standards allow 
managers to use their discretion on financial reporting. Since auditing is not perfect, 
managers take advantage of their experience about the entities and their opportunities 
to select accounting methods and estimates that suit the company‟s business 
economics, which can potentially increase the value of the accounting numbers 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Several studies recommended that accruals-based measures can possibly capture an 
entity's overall information quality (Francis et al., 2004; Ecker, Kim, Olsson & 
Schipper, 2006).  The accruals can be classified into total accruals, which incorporate 
the discretionary and non-discretionary accruals components. Prior literature has 
described the use of total accruals as a proxy for earnings quality as a simple 
approach to assess the FRQ. Since, entities can have high accruals for lawful 
business purposes, such as sales. Then, a more sophisticated measure is desirable by 
partitioning the total accrual into discretionary and nondiscretionary components 
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(Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995). The nondiscretionary components follow 
business conditions, such as duration of the operating circle and growth; whereas, the 
DA reflect management choices.  
Consequently, this study has used DA as a proxy of FRQ because prior studies 
argued that DA are a better measures of detecting earnings manipulation (DeAngelo, 
1986; Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Kothari et al., 
2005). These models also are the most widely recognised and used in measuring the 
quality of financial reports. Consequently, empirical findings on the capability of the 
DA models to detect the accounting manipulations, most especially fraudulent 
financial reporting, are of great concern to regulators, auditors, analysts, researchers, 
and others who are interested in investigating earnings quality (Jones, Krishnan & 
Melendrez, 2008). The DA components of the total accruals are commonly extracted 
with the help of accrual models, such as the Jones Model (1991), modified Jones 
Model by Dechow et al. (1995), the extended modified Jones model by Yoon Miller 
and Jiraporn (2006), as well as the performance-matched model by Ashbaugh, 
Lafond and Mayhew (2003) and Kothari et al. (2005), and the most recent growth 
adjusted model developed by Collins, Collins, Pungaliya and Vijh (2017). The 
findings of these studies showed that managers used DA to increase or decrease 
earnings which indicate EM. Therefore, DA capture the deformity caused by the 
application of EM  (Dechow et al., 2010). 
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2.5.5 Income Smoothing 
Beidleman (1973, p. 653) defined income smoothing as “the intentional dampening 
of variations about some level of earnings that is presently considered to be normal 
for a company". It is also defined as a mechanism employed by management to 
decrease the changeability of a stream of reported profit figures associated to some 
identified target stream by the manipulation of artificial (accounting) or real 
(transactional) variables (Koch, 1981). Similarly, Aflatooni and Nikbakht (2009, p 
61) defined income smoothing as a “means through which management makes use of 
discretionary accounting and management principles to reduce earnings 
variability”. Francis et al. (2004) classified smoothing earnings as accounting-based 
earnings quality attributes. 
The mechanisms used to smooth income figures are classified as either real 
smoothing or artificial smoothing. Real smoothing indicates managerial actions that 
are assumed to control basic economic procedures (Yang et al., 2012). Whilst, 
artificial smoothing is the use of accounting tools undertaken by management to 
smooth profit (Atik, 2009). Examples of real income smoothing instruments include 
shifting the cost from nominal expenditure to capital expenditure, timing of 
discretionary expenses, such as performing repairs, paying bonuses, and following 
research and development projects, amongst others. Artificial income smoothing 
comprises change in accounting policies, such a change from the LIFO to the FIFO 
valuation methods, and straight line methods to the reducing balance method of 
depreciation, amongst others (Barnea, Ronen & Sadan, 1975).  Hence, it can be 
argued that flexibility when choosing accounting methods at times encourages 
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managers to select accounting procedures or to change adopted ones to minimise, 
maximise or smooth profit figures (Atik, 2009). 
Furthermore, Eckel (1981) categorised income smoothing as a natural and 
intentionally smoothed income stream. The natural smoothing according to him, 
results from an income producing process that generates a smooth income stream. On 
one hand, an intentionally smoothed stream arises from real smoothing or artificial 
smoothing procedures. On the other hand, real smoothed income happens when 
managerial actions are taken to architecture the revenue generating events of the firm 
to generate a smooth income stream. Artificially smoothed income occurs when 
managerial actions are performed to alter the ethics of the entries to produce smooth 
profit streams. 
Previous literature used different predictors to measure income smoothing. For 
instance, Beattie et al.  (1994), Herrmann and Inoue (1996), and Moses (1987) used 
accounting choices as instruments for income smoothing. In this method, various 
firm-specific attributes encourage management to use accounting choices to smooth 
income, and thus, smoothing the behaviour varies across companies. Consequently, 
accounting changes are investigated as a smoothing device. They contended that 
smoothing income by accounting changes is correlated with the influence of the 
accounting change on the level of earnings. The factors that instigate these changes 
are called the smoothing variables (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990). These include the 
firm size, bonuses, choice of depreciation and amortisation method, intangible asset 
amortisation, pension cost, purchase and pooling method, inventory extraordinary 
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charges and credits, investment tax credit, and dividend income under the cost 
method of reporting a subsidiary. 
The motives behind the accounting principle choices studied are to obtain evidence 
on the attributes that can influence management decisions (Beattie et al., 1994). Most 
of the studies that used accounting choices as drivers for smoothing found evidence 
to contend that the companies select accounting policies in such a way that they can 
smooth the reported profit over time. Therefore, one of the criticisms against this 
method is that it does not consider the presence of artificial income smoothing 
because of its deficiencies in the research design (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990). 
Barnea et al. (1975), Graig and Walsh (1989), Godfrey and Jones, (1999) used 
income before extraordinary items to predict income smoothing. It was based on the 
argument that managers pretend to classify items which could be labeled as 
extraordinary in order to smooth ordinary income over time. Thus, flexibility in 
ascertaining what comprises ordinary operations enables managers to manipulate the 
operating income (Godfrey & Jones, 1999). Most of the above studies concluded that 
managers use extraordinary items to dampen the variations of the operating earnings. 
One of the criticisms against this method is that it takes into consideration firms that 
smooth their net income. As such, further research is needed by adopting multi-
variable income smoothing models, which include different discretionary income 
smoothing approaches, that are applicable to management (Godfrey & Jones, 1999).  
More so, Aflatooni and Nikbakht (2010), Atik (2009), DeFond and Park (1997), 
Godfrey and Adi (2012), Shaw (2003), and Trisanti (2014) employed DA to predict 
income smoothing.  Atik (2009, p. 600) categorised discretionary accounting changes 
 
 54 
into five groups based on their natures. These included, changes in depreciation or 
the amortisation estimates, changes in depreciation or the amortisation approach, 
changes in capitalisation or expense policies, and changes in the method of inventory 
evaluation. 
Furthermore, Eckel (1981) developed a model in which he classified a firm as an 
income smoother when the coefficient variation of its income (CVI) was less than the 
coefficient of the variation of its sales (CVS) (i.e., CVI<CVS or CVI/CVS < 1). This 
was followed by the study of Albrech and Richardson (1990); Ashari, Koh, Tan and 
Wong (1994); Habib (2005); Etemadi and Sepasi (2007); and Yang et al. (2012). 
They viewed income smoothing in two perspectives (intentional and natural income 
smoothing). They used the coefficient of variations in measuring the variability of 
sales and income. Eckel (1981, p. 33) posited that income is a direct function of 
revenues, which implies that income is equal to sales minus total costs (variable costs 
+ fixed costs). He further stressed that the proportion of variable costs to revenues 
remains consistent over time, fixed costs may be consistent or rise from time to time, 
but might not be decreased. Hence, total revenue can only be deliberately smoothed 
through real smoothing. This means that total revenues cannot be artificially 
smoothed. Thus, a firm is artificially smoothing when the changeability of its income 
is larger than the same changeability of its sales. The finding of the study has been 
used to conclude that entities are unable to decrease the changes of their income time 
series below the changes of their revenue time series. Thus, it may indicate that, for 
the income smoothing hypothesis, the issue remains unanswered. 
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Furthermore, Leuz et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2004) used cash flows as an 
instrument for unsmoothed income, and measured smoothness as the ratio of 
earnings variability to cash flow variability. They contended that, managers can 
adopt their accounting decision to hide economic distress to the company's operating 
cash flow by increasing the reportage of future income or postponing the report of 
present costs to conceal poor present performance. They argued that insiders, in 
trying to protect their personal control benefits, use earnings manipulation to hide the 
organisation‟s performance from outsiders. They found that earnings manipulation is 
expected to reduce investor protection since strong protection constrains the insiders‟ 
abilities to gain private control benefits, which decreases their incentives to hide firm 
performance. 
Most of the above studies have empirically examined the influence of firm specific 
attributes on income smoothing behaviours and practices. DeFound and Park (1997) 
employed current and future performance controlled by leverage and firm size to 
examine their association with the income smoothing behaviour in the US. Francis et 
al. (2004) examined how the cost of equity influenced income smoothness. Similarly, 
Atik (2009) used firm size, employee costs, ownership structure, leverage, 
percentage of earnings deviation, industry type, and monitory effect as the 
determinants of income smoothing in Turkey. Aflatooni and Nikbakht (2010) used 
the book to market value of shares and firm size to examine their relationships with 
income smoothing practices in Iran. Godfrey and Adi (2012) used directors‟ 
remunerations, market concentration, leverage, and firm size as predictors of the 
income smoothing behaviour in Australia. Trisanti (2014) applied external audit 
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quality, institutional shareholding, and industry type as the determinants of the 
income smoothing practices in Indonesia. However, none of these studies has 
examined AC and income smoothing. As such, further research is required by 
employing different constructs that may have influence over income smoothing 
practices or smoothing behaviours of firms. 
Consequently, this study has used income smoothing as a measure of FRQ in 
addition to the DA model. The reason for the selection of income smoothing models 
was as a result of the fact that income smoothing appeared to be a communal 
company‟s practice in various countries of the world. Thus, managers‟ efforts to 
smooth perpetual changes in cash flows will result in less timely and less informative 
earnings numbers (Dechow et al., 2010). However, prior studies on AC and financial 
reporting have given little attention on income smoothing as a measure of FRQ. 
Despite the fact that smoothed earnings are considered to be less informative to 
shareholders and other stakeholders since they are of lower earnings quality (Ayres, 
1994). Similarly, smoothness is an active managerial technique that is applied to 
decrease the earnings changeability of a firm for consecutive periods or within a 
particular period towards a prearranged target, which is another method of artificial 
EM (Beattie et al., 1994). Since, artificial earnings manipulation takes place when 
preparing a financial statement. Then, after this period, the external auditors are 
required to examine the accounts and ascertain whether the financial evidence 
obtained in the annual report is consistent with the ethical and regulatory provisions; 
and if, in their opinion, they are not, they are expected to highlight any potential 
irregularities in their report (CAMA, 2004). At the same time, the AC becomes 
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increasingly responsible for the oversight of the integrity of a firm‟s financial reports 
as well as ensuring compliance with ethical, lawful, and other monitoring 
requirements (CAMA, 2004). Thus, it is expected that when the responsibility of the 
external auditor to examine the account and the oversight function of the AC are put 
together, they may have greater influence over the managers‟ use of discretionary 
accounting to artificially smooth income. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that, firms that prepare their financial statements 
under the IFRS exhibit significant increases in income smoothing and aggressive 
reportage of accruals (Ahmed, Neel & Wang, 2013; Capkun & Collins, 2018; Chen, 
Tang, Jiang & Lin 2010; Hail & Wysocki, 2010; Kaserer & Klingler, 2008). This is 
because, the adoption of the IFRS gives managers more or less a chance to 
manipulate earnings which is evinced through the application of fair value estimates 
that are made by management who can use their discretion to manipulate income to 
cover their desires (Hassan, 2015; Kaserer & Klingler, 2008). This has been affirmed 
by Chen et al. (2010) who found that there was less magnitude of the DA after the 
IFRS adoption amongst firms from 15 European countries, but the firms were 
involved more in income smoothing  during the post-IFRS periods. Ozili (2015) also 
contended that listed banks in Nigeria smoothed reported earnings over time during 
the periods of the voluntary IFRS adoption and suggested that IFRS adoption 
reduced the reliability of loan loss provisions. However, prior studies considered 
profit smoothness to be an indicator of lower FRQ since it is another form of 
artificial earnings manipulation (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010; Gaynor et al., 2016; 
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Yang & Tan, & Ding, 2012). Accordingly, earnings manipulation and creative 
accounting have become prevalent phenomena in Nigeria (Hassan, 2015). 
2.6 Concept of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance can be defined as standard rules and regulations, as well as 
internal processes of an organisation that are aimed to provide guarantees for 
management who are interested in achieving the rights of the owners and protecting 
the rights of all the interested parties of the organisation (Ghalboon & Khalid, 2011). 
It is also defined as rules, processes or laws through which companies are governed, 
regulated, and operated with the sole aim of promoting transparency and efficiency 
in the financial system and stimulating the assignment of responsibilities in an 
ethical, professional, and objective manner (CBN Code of CG, 2014). Therefore, 
good corporate governance is pivotal in providing credible and reliable information 
which, in turn, enhances the confidence of the investors. 
The evolution of modern corporate governance is originated from the publication of 
Berle and Means (1932). However, Wells (2010, p. 1251) argued that “the concept of 
corporate governance has been in existence since the application of corporate firms 
created the feasibility of conflict between owners and managers”. From the above, it 
is observed that the concept of corporate governance arises because of the separation 
between ownership and control which brings about agency problems in 
organisations. Thus, the agency problem depicts a conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and management. Hence, the concept of corporate governance is an act 
of making sure that companies continue to establish a means for investors to carry 
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out corporate risk and produce wealth without inflicting fraud or any type of abuse 
on the investors and stakeholders (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983; Wells, 2010). 
Several corporate and accounting scandals and failures (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, 
Xerox, and WorldCom) raised serious concerns about the credibility and reliability 
of financial reports. Thus, there is a need to protect investors‟ interests. In response 
to this, there has been a global transformation towards promoting and implementing 
governance mechanisms to minimise the opportunistic behaviours that have dented 
shareholders‟ reliability in financial information. For instance, The United 
Kingdom‟s Financial Reporting Council consistently reviewed the Combined Code 
in 2010 and 2012 and the United States, in 2002, introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) as a response to the scandals of Enron and WorldCom, to help promote the 
quality of information and improve financial reporting (Hew, 2015). The Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has also been introduced to 
supervise and oversee the audit of the US public companies thereby protecting the 
interests of investors and enhancing the independent audit report which will, in turn, 
improve the informativeness of the earnings (Jackson, 2010). 
In some emerging markets, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was 
reviewed in 2012 in order to align with the best corporate governance practice. 
Therefore, most of the foregoing codes have recognised the importance of the AC‟s 
role in providing external auditors with independence. However, despite this 
similarity, there are some peculiar differences amongst the codes in developing 
nations.  The Malaysian CG (2012) introduced an audit oversight board which was 
provided to ensure the independent supervision of the external auditors of an entity. 
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On the contrary, the Nigerian SEC Code of CG (2011) has required the presence of 
at least one independent non-executive director on the board, the need for AC 
financial expertise and mandatory external auditors‟ rotation.  This has been 
introduced in order to align with the best governance practices across the globe. One 
major distinctive attribute of corporate governance practice in Nigeria is the 
composition of the AC, which requires the representation of both shareholders and 
directors. Therefore, there is an increasing need to be more proactive in corporate 
governance issues because they are so important; since, weak corporate governance 
can lead to the failure of a country‟s economic structure (Aina & Adejugbe, 2015). 
2.6.1 Corporate Governance System in Nigeria  
The concept of corporate governance did not receive much attention in Nigeria until 
after the financial scandals reported in the manufacturing sector and the Nigerian 
banking industry. These include, the Cadbury scandal of 2006, the banks‟ failures 
that affected Intercontinental Bank Plc, Oceanic Bank Plc, and Afribank Nigeria Plc 
in 2009, and most recently, the financial scandals of Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc in 
2015 (Marshall, 2015; Naija 24/7 News, October 28, 2016). This raised serious 
concern about the corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Since then, there has 
been a series of reviews and reforms with a view to enhancing the corporate 
governance structures and practices in the country. For instance, the SEC Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003) was issued to guide the operation of public companies 
listed on the NSE and this was later reviewed in 2011. Following this, the CBN 
issued a Code of Corporate Governance after the banks‟ consolidation in 2006.  This 
was later reviewed in 2011 and 2014, respectively. The CBN‟s revised code of 2014 
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was renamed the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in 
Nigeria. The essence of the review was to align with the current development and 
global best practices. The NAICOM code of 2009 was also issued to regulate the 
insurance activities in the country. Similarly, the PENCOM Code 2008 and finally, 
the NCC Code of Corporate Governance for the Telecommunication Industry (2014) 
were issued to guide and regulate the pension management and administration, and 
telecommunications in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, in order to provide the best corporate governance practice in the 
country the Nigerian legislature has provided a regulator known as the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) with statutory responsibility to formulate the 
code of corporate governance in Nigeria and to ensure its compliance. The code is 
meant to regulate corporate governance for public and private entities and to ensure 
the transparency, accountability, and reliability of corporate disclosure which will in 
turn guarantee investors‟ confidence and protect the interests of the shareholders, 
both local and internal ones. The Code made some modifications and additions and 
calls for the harmonisation and unification of the various codes of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. The call was made by the Steering Committee which made an 
extensive corporate governance literature review and observed that no nation had 
adopted a sectorial multiplicity of codes of governance like Nigeria (FRC Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2016). As, the multiplicity of codes bring nothing rather than 




Consequently, there is an increasing need to be more proactive in corporate 
governance issues because they are so important, since weak corporate governance 
can lead to the failure of a country‟s economic structure (Aina & Adejugbe, 2015). 
Studies on corporate governance and FRQ in Nigeria have been explored by some 
researchers and these include Kurawa and Saheed (2014) who examined the 
corporate governance and EM of the listed firms in Nigeria related to their FRQ. 
Miko (2016) examined the influence of the corporate governance, firm attributes and 
EM of the listed companies in Nigeria. Abata and Migiro (2016) studied the 
corporate governance and EM of some selected companies in Nigeria. Chi-Chi and 
Friady (2016) examined the corporate governance and FRQ in five companies listed 
in the NSE. They argued that strong corporate governance enhances the financial 
reporting process. However, the AC has been recognised as one of the important 
components of corporate governance (Brennan & Kirwan, 2015), since it is 
established with the primary aim of promoting the quality of audits and thus, 
enhancing the FRQ. In light of the above, it is expected that studying the 
interrelationship of the variables AC, audit quality, and FRQ will be of immense 
importance, particularly in the Nigerian context that has a unique feature of the AC 
formation, which comprises representatives of both shareholders and directors. Next, 















Summary of Evolution of Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
Code Year Effective 
Date 
Provisions 





Functions & responsibilities of directors, Board 
committees including AC, qualifications of AC, 
functions of internal & external auditors, 
reporting & control, shareholders‟ rights & 
privileges,  
CBN Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
2006 3rd April, 
2006 
Nature of equity ownership, Abolition of CEO 
duality, the presence of at least two independent 
non-executive directors on the board, board 
performance, transparency and disclosure 
requirement, risks management committee, 
functions of external & internal auditors, & 
mandating external auditors‟ rotation 





Functions & responsibilities of directors, conflict 
of interest, reporting requirements & issues on 
noncompliance, functions & responsibilities of 
directors, remuneration, performance evaluation, 
company secretary, shareholders & stakeholders, 
risk management & internal control & related 
party transactions 
NAICOM Code of 
Corporate 
Governance 
2009 1st March, 
2009 
The need for good CG, in the industry, board of 
directors, responsibilities of directors of insurance 
companies, shareholders right, complicit of 
interest, audit and compliance committee, internal 
& external audit &disclosure and reporting 
requirement  
SEC Revised Code 
of Corporate 
Governance 
2011 1st April, 
2011 
Abolition of CEO duality, the presence of at least 
one independent non-executive director on the 
board, the need for AC financial expertise, the 
creation of risk management committee and 
corporate governance committee, shareholders 
insider trading, communication policy, mandating 
external auditors‟ rotation 





Compliance with the law, the creation of Whistle 
blowing policy, responsibilities of directors, 
performance evaluation, shareholders & 
stakeholders, risk management & internal control, 
disclosure and reporting requirement 






Introduce guidelines for discount house and also 
introduce guidelines and information on whistle 
blowing policy, right & functions of shareholders 
& stakeholders, ethics professionalism & conflict 
of interest 




2.6.2 Audit Committee 
The audit committee has been conceptualised as a key corporate governance 
mechanism (Brennan & Kirwan, 2015). Thus, the primary responsibility of the AC is 
to render the oversight function on an entity‟s financial reporting. The AC plays a 
crucial role in safeguarding the reliability of the financial reports by enhancing the 
external auditing and internal controls through their active oversight duty (Malik, 
2014).  Arens, Elder, and Mark (2012) defined the AC as a group of individuals 
selected from members of the board who are responsible for maintaining the 
independence of the auditors. The Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) defines the AC as a 
committee recognised by and amongst the members of the board of directors of an 
entity with the aim of supervising the financial and accounting reporting process of 
the entity and audits of the financial reporting of the entity. 
The primary objective behind the establishment of the AC is to promote the quality 
of the audits and check the board of directors, thereby increasing the FRQ. The AC is 
regarded as the distinguishing characteristics of the directors in monitoring the 
managers‟ decisions concerning financial disclosure (Firoozi, Magnan, Fortin & 
Nicholls, 2016). Therefore, it has been contended that government authorities, 
regulatory agencies, and international professional bodies view the AC as likely 
powerful devices that can boost the reliability and transparency of financial reports 
(Bamahros & Bhasin, 2016).  
Studies on the AC can be classified into three broad categories, these include AC 
formation (Madawaki & Amran, 2013; Chau & Leung, 2006) AC effectiveness 
(Alves, 2013; Djuitaningsih, 2016; Zgarni et al., 2016) and AC characteristics 
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(Abernathy et al., 2014; Baxter, 2007; Klein, 2002; Hamdan et al., 2013). This study 
has focused on AC characteristics because it has considered several attributes of the 
AC and their influence over FRQ. Therefore, studying the characteristics of an 
effective AC in enhancing FRQ is an issue that has been difficult to address by prior 
literature, but is presently needed in light of the growing attention to the formation of 
the AC (Cohen, Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2007). More so, the AC has 
been considered as an independent variable because it is an effective corporate 
governance oversight mechanism that has a disciplining role on the manager‟s 
discretion in the estimation of the accounting numbers. 
2.7 Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality 
The AC plays an entirely significant role in increasing earnings reliability in 
environments with a feeble execution of accounting standards, or feeble investors‟ 
legal protection (Poretti, Schatt & Bruynseels, 2018). The AC is regarded as the 
distinguishing characteristics of the directors in monitoring the managers‟ decisions 
concerning financial disclosure (Firoozi et al., 2016). Studies on AC characteristics 
and FRQ have reported mixed findings in the (Abernathy et al., 2014; Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2015; Baxter, 2010; Cotter & Silvester, 2003; Klein, 2002; Hamdan et al., 
2013; Bamahros & Bhasin, 2016; Moses et al., 2016). Some of these studies failed to 
find significant relationships between some characteristics of the AC and FRQ. Audit 
committees‟ characteristics vis-a-vis FRQ has been explored in prior studies using 
various constructs, such as the size of the board (Haji & Anifowose, 2016; Moses et 
al., 2016; Xie, Davidson & Dadalt, 2003), independence (Madawaki & Amran 2013; 
Klein, 2002; Yang & Krishnan, 2005), frequency of AC meetings (Beasley et al., 
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2009; Sultana, 2015), women‟s representation in AC (Abdullah & Ku-Ismail, 2016; 
Lara et al., 2017; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011) and AC expertise (Aanu, Odianonsen & 
Taiwo, 2015;  McDaniel et al., 2002).  Therefore, Krishnan et al. (2011, p. 2100) 
observed that changes in the regulations regarding the appointment of financial 
experts to the company‟s AC have stimulated more studies on the association 
between AC expertise and FRQ. Hence, more attention needs to be given on other 
areas of expertise, such legal experts and public accounting experts, rather than 
financial accounting experts alone. 
Previous studies on the AC have documented that AC characteristics are important 
components of corporate governance, which have influence in reducing the 
managers‟ opportunistic behaviours and improving the financial reporting process. 
For example, the study of Baxter (2010) reveals that the formation of an AC reduces 
EM.  Similarly, Ben Rejib Attia (2012) contended that strong corporate governance, 
including an AC, significantly reduces the artificial income smoothing performed by 
managers.  More recently, Abbadi, Hijazi and Al-Rahahleh (2016) examined the 
corporate governance and EM of the listed companies in Jordan for the period of 
2009 to 2013. The findings of the study show that the AC reduced EM and improved 
FRQ. This is affirmed by Haldar and Raithatha (2017) who argued that the AC 
guarantees better disclosure and prepares entities to present steadfast and robust 
financial statements. Similarly, Usman et al. (2017) studied the influence of 
corporate governance devices on the value of comprehensive income reporting in 
Nigeria.  They showed that corporate governance devices, including AC attributes 
(size, independence, meetings, and expertize), are positively related to the 
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stakeholders‟ pricing of other comprehensive income. In addition, Al-Maqoushi and  
Powell (2017) examined the effect of AC indices, value of firm and accounting 
outcomes in the US. They found that an effective AC has less likelihood of partaking 
in accounting issues, auditor's dismissal after disagreements, and restatements. More 
recently, Bajra and Čadež (2018) studied the effect of the AC and FRQ of 217 big 
European companies for the period of 2004 to 2013. They revealed that AC 
effectiveness and experiences are positively related to FRQ. 
The foregoing findings may not be surprising because reasonable attention is given 
by the regulators and practitioners on the AC through constant reviews and reforms 
of the committees all over the globe. Furthermore, Wu et al. (2015) studied the 
implementation of the AC and the independence of the director on the financial 
reporting in China. They conducted a survey through interviews in the year 2009.  
The result from their analysis shows that the AC appeared to be employed to 
accomplish ritualistic roles rather than to act as true monitors and overseers. This 
may be the reason why the AC and independent directors were mainly ritualistic in 
nature rather than establishing effective supervision and oversight. Hence, the 
usefulness of the AC is substantially measured by the interplay between the AC and 
the effort of the external auditors through both official and unceremonious structures 
or processes (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). For that reason, Brennan and Kirwan (2015) 
suggested that further research should be conducted on the communication between 
the AC members and the professional auditors or experts briefing the AC. They also 
contended that AC research as compared with research on the boards of directors is 
still in its infancy. 
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2.7.1 Audit Committee Size 
Most of the global corporate governance practices mandate that there should be three 
members in the AC (Smith Report, 2003; Cadbury Report, 1992). Studies that have 
been conducted on the association between AC size and FRQ provided mixed 
findings. For instance, Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solleri (2003) conducted a study on 
AC characteristics and the perceived quality of financial reporting in the US. The 
study covered the period of two years, ranging from 1995 to 1996. They took a 
sample of 119 firms from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). They employed 
the industry performance score as a measure of FRQ. The findings of the study 
reveal a positive significant association between AC size and FRQ. Vafeas (2005) 
used 252 companies in the US and examined the AC, boards, and earnings quality. 
The result reveals a negative correlation between AC size and negative earnings 
surprise. This validates the findings of Liu and Sun (2010) who studied the role of 
directors‟ tenure on the effectiveness of an independent AC. Their result shows that 
AC size has a negative significant relationship with EM. This suggests that a larger 
AC is more effective in mitigating EM.  It can be argued that the above findings 
support the notion that a moderate number of AC members is better in enhancing 
FRQ. 
In contrast, Lin, Li and Yang (2006) examined the impact of AC performance on 
earnings quality. They used a sample of 212 firms listed in the US Stock Exchange. 
They utilised earnings restatement as a proxy for EM. They found that AC size was 
positively correlated with earnings restatements. Furthermore, Leong et al. (2015) 
measured the influence of the AC on FRQ in Singapore.  After running the cross-
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sectional data using OLS, the result of the study revealed a negative significant 
relationship between AC size and FRQ. More so, a recent study of Al-Shaer, Salama 
and Toms (2017) examined the AC characteristics and disclosure quality of  350 
listed firms in the UK for the period of 2007 to 2011. They found that AC size has a 
negative significant relationship with disclosure quality. 
From emerging economies, Shirazi and Salehi (2016) examined a sample of 100 
firms in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2013 to 2014. The findings of 
the study from the fixed-effect generalised least square (FGLS) model provided 
evidence of a positive significant impact between AC size and financial disclosure 
quality. Similarly, Azzoz and Khamees (2016)  adopted the modified Jones model 
and examined the effect of the corporate governance attributes on EM in Jordan. The 
findings of the study reveal that AC size has a negative significant impact on DA. 
Therefore, these results show that companies, which have a larger board size on the 
AC and consist of independent directors, have a low level of DA, which, in turn, 
indicates a high level of FRQ. This is empirically supported by the finding of  Mishra 
and Malhotra (2016) who used 130 companies from the Indian Stock Exchange 
market for 2013 to 2015 and studied the influence of AC characteristics and EM. 
They adopted the modified Jones Model 1995 as the measure of EM. The study 
reveals a negative significant association between AC size and EM. This implies that 
a larger number of members on the AC mitigates EM and improves the quality of the 
financial reporting. 
On the other hand, Fuad (2016) examined the effect of the AC characteristics on the 
real EM of the listed firms in Indonesia for the period of 2012 to 2014. The study 
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reveals that AC size has a positive significant association with the real EM. In 
contrast, a recent study of Setiany, Hartoko, Suhardjanto and Honggowati (2017) 
examined the AC attributes and voluntary financial disclosure in Indonesia. They 
utilised a sample of 100 firms for the period of 2009 to 2012. The study reveals that 
AC size has a positive significant influence over the voluntary financial disclosure of 
the firms. More so, Mohammed, Ahme and Ji (2017) explored the influence of 
corporate governance, political connections, and accounting conservatism in 
Malaysia. They utilised a sample of 206 companies for the period of 2004 to 2007. 
The study reveals a positive significant association between AC size and accounting 
conservatism. Equally, Ismail and Kamarudin (2017) explored whether the AC 
supports the informative or deceptive implication of creative accounting in Malaysia. 
They argue that AC independence supports the deceptive proponent of creative 
accounting practice as evidenced by an inverse association between AC size and the 
income smoothing behaviour of the firms. 
In Nigeria, Fodio et al. (2013) used 25 insurance firms in Nigeria to determine the 
influence of corporate governance and earnings quality for the period of 2007 to 
2010. The study reveals a negative significant association between AC size and DA 
from the modified Jones Model (1995). Similarly, Aanu et al. (2015) studied the 
effect of AC financial expertise on the quality of financial reporting in Nigeria. They 
extracted data from the 15 deposit money banks for the period (2003-2012). The 
dependent FRQ was represented by the total accrual quality and audit reporting lag. 
They employed the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in their analysis. The study found 
a negative significant association between the AC size and FRQ of the banks in 
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Nigeria in both of the models. Also, Abubakar (2016)  examined the influence of 
corporate governance, audit quality, and real activity manipulation in Nigeria. He 
used 15 banks in the NSE for the period of 2004 to 2013. The dependent variable 
was represented by cash flow manipulation. A generalised least squares (GLS) 
regression was employed to analyse the relationship between the variables. The 
findings of the study show a negative significant impact between AC size and cash 
flow manipulation. 
Abata and Migiro (2016) studied the corporate governance and EM of some selected 
companies in Nigeria. The population of the study consisted of 63 listed companies 
from the manufacturing and banking sectors in which 24 companies were used. The 
data were collected from the firms‟ annual reports for the period of 2008 to 2013. 
After running a panel multiple regression, the result from the random model reveals 
that AC size was negatively associated with EM. Additionally, Chi-Chi and Friady 
(2016) examined corporate governance and FRQ in Nigeria. They utilised a sample 
of five companies listed in the NSE for the period of ten years from 2006 to 2015. 
They employed the Jones model (1991) as a proxy for FRQ. The study reveals a 
negative significant impact between AC size and DA. On the contrary, Umobong and 
Ibanichuka (2017) observed that AC size is negatively and significantly related to 
FRQ. 
Additionally, Miko (2016) examined the influence of the corporate governance, firm 
attributes and EM of the listed companies in Nigeria. He utilised a sample of 81 
listed non-financial firms for the period of 2009 to 2013 and employed accrual 
models as measures of EM. The study reveals that AC size is negatively and 
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significantly associated to discretionary accruals. This implies that a larger number 
of AC members is more effective in minimising EM. However, the study considered 
only DA measures as proxies for EM. Therefore, there is the need to consider other 
measures of earnings manipulations in Nigeria, for example, income smoothing, 
particularly in light of the recent argument which reveals that firms have exhibited a 
significant increase in income smoothing after the IFRS (Ahmed, Neel & Wang, 
2013; Chen, Tang, Jiang & Lin, 2010; Hail & Wysocki, 2010; Kaserer & Klingler, 
2008). 
Furthermore, it is observed that Felo et al. (2015) and Shirazi and Salehi (2016) 
covered the period of the years from 1995 to 1996 and 2013 to 2014, respectively, 
whilst Leong et al. (2015) covered only one year, 2010. These periods may be 
considered too short because a two year or a single period would not be enough for 
generalisation of the findings. Additionally, the sample sizes used by some of the 
studies may be considered too small. For instance, Abubaker (2015) used 15 
companies from a single sector, whilst Chi-Chi and Friady (2016) adopted a ten-year 
period with only five companies. Therefore, a study with a small sample size may 
not represent a real population and, as such, the findings thereof may not be used in 
any generalisation. For that reason, there is the need to consider current changes in 
regulations with a relatively larger population. 
2.7.2 Audit Committee Independence 
Most of the global regulations require that a larger of proportion of AC members 
ought to be independent directors (SOX Act, 2002). The most anticipation is that, an 
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independent AC would provide better financial report monitoring. Since, they have 
no depending interest in compromising objectivity (Yang & Krishnan, 2005).  Thus, 
the AC ought to be independent for it to function effectively (Collier & Zaman, 
2005).  However, studies on AC independence and FRQ have inconsistent findings. 
For instance, Klein (2002) studied the AC, the board of director characteristics, and 
EM. She employed a sample of 692 public US companies and used a modified Jones 
model to extract the DA as a proxy for EM. The finding reveals a negative 
significant association between abnormal accruals and the existence of independent 
AC members.  Her finding is similar to that of  Bédard et al. (2004) who conducted a 
study on the impact of AC expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive EM in 
the US. They utilised a sample of firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange. 
They adopted the modified Jones model (1995) as a measure of abnormal accruals. 
The finding shows that AC independence is negatively correlated with income 
increasing and income decreasing EM. 
Additionally, Sharma and Kuang (2014) utilised a sample of 94 firms listed in the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange Market for a two-year period 2005 to 2006 and 
considered the effect of a voluntary AC and aggressive EM in New Zealand. The 
finding reveals a negative significant correlation between AC independence and EM. 
The result of the study indicates that AC independence mitigates the likelihood of 
aggressive EM. In the same vein, Amar (2014) considered the listed companies in 
France and studied the influence of AC independence on EM. The study reveals that 
AC independence is negatively and significantly related to EM. This suggests that 
AC independence is effective in mitigating earnings manipulation. The above results 
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are consistent with most prior literature in developed economies, which established 
that independent AC members are more effective in reducing accounting 
manipulations and improving financial reporting process. This may be as a result of 
the fact that the markets in developed economies like the US, UK, New Zealand, and 
Australia, amongst others, are highly regulated and, as such, their findings hereof 
may be almost similar. More recent studies include that of Gao and Huang (2016) 
who examined the nature of odd and even numbers of directors in the AC and 
corporate earnings quality in the US. The findings of the study reveal that AC 
independence in even numbers in the AC is positively significant with restatements. 
Prior studies in some of the emerging markets provide evidence on the relationship 
between AC independence and FRQ. For instance,  Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015) 
examined the effect of internal and external audit qualities, AC attributes, ownership 
concentration, and earnings quality in Malaysia. They maintained a sample of 508 
companies for the period of 2009 to 2012. The dependent variable was proxied by 
the DA extracted from the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995) and Yoon 
et al. (2006). After running a multivariate regression, the findings of the study 
revealed that AC independence was positively and significantly related with DA in 
the first model, but not significant in the second model. This is supported by Marzuki 
et al. (2016)  who documented that AC independence is positively and significantly 
associated with earnings conservatism. More so, Fuad (2016) examined the effect of 
the AC characteristics on the real EM of the listed firms in Indonesia for the period 
of 2012 to 2014. The study reveals that AC independence has a positive significant 
association with real EM. Recently, Setiany et al. (2017) examined AC attributes and 
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voluntary financial disclosure in Indonesia. The study shows that AC independence 
has a positive significant influence on voluntary financial disclosure. More recently, 
Poretti et al. (2018) examined whether autonomous directors in the AC have 
influence over the market reaction of Western Europe. They employed a sample of 
companies from 15 European countries for the years 2006 and 2014. They show that 
the more the proportion of autonomous directors in the companies‟ ACs, the higher 
the market reactions to earnings pronouncements. They suggest that more 
autonomous audit committees serve as substitutes for weak institutions to enhance 
the reliability of their earnings pronouncements. In addition,  Amin, Lukviarman and 
Setiany (2018)  explored the influence of board attributes on earnings quality in 
Indonesia. They reveal that AC independence has a negative significant relationship 
with DA. 
Furthermore, Khalil and Ozkan (2016) extracted a unique data set of Egyptian non-
financial firms for the period of 2005 to 2012 and examined the impact of board 
independence audit quality and EM. A performance adjusted measure of DA by 
Kothari et al. (2005) was used to estimate the dependent variable. The findings from 
a multivariate analysis reveal that AC independence is negatively and significantly 
related to DA. This is confirmed by the recent finding of Jerubet, Chepng‟eno and 
Tenai (2017) who examined the AC attributes and FRQ of the listed firms in Kenya. 
They employed Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Kothari et al. (2005) as measures of 
FRQ and thus, reveal a negative significant impact between AC independence and 
FRQ. This is supported by Azzoz and Khamees (2016) and Saleem and Alzhobi 
(2016) who found a negative significant impact between AC independence and DA. 
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On the contrary, Inya, Psaros and Seamer (2018) examined the role of corporate 
governance in minimising management misbehaviour in Thailand. They utilised a 
sample of 61 listed firms in the Thai Stock Exchange market. The study shows a 
positive but nonsignificant relationship between AC independence and the possibility 
that management will misbehave.  On the other hand, Ismail and Kamarudin (2017) 
show that AC independence supports the deceptive proponent of creative accounting 
practices by proving an inverse association between the AC independence and 
income smoothing behaviour of firms. 
In Nigeria, Kibiya et al. (2016a) examined whether regulatory changes matter on 
FRQ. They utilised a secondary source of data collection and took a sample of 101 
firms listed on the NSE for a five-year period of 2010 to 2014. The dependent 
variable, FRQ, was proxied by the DA extracted from McNichols‟ (2002) model. 
The finding shows that AC independence has a negative significant correlation with 
the DA in both pre-and post-Code of Corporate Governance 2011. This indicates that 
the existence of independent directors in the AC constrain managers‟ opportunistic 
behaviour. Kantudu and Samaila (2015) studied the influence of the board 
characteristics and the AC on the FRQ of companies in Nigeria. The findings of the 
study reveal that an independent AC significantly impacts on the FRQ of the firms in 
Nigeria. Again, Ormin et al. (2015) studied the effect of the AC, meetings, 
attendance, and FRQ in Nigeria. They employed a secondary method of data 
collection and obtained information from Nigerian banks for the period of ten years 
from 2003 to 2012. The result of the random model from the study shows that ACI 
has a negative significant impact on FRQ. More recently, Akhor and Oseghale 
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(2017) examined the AC attributes and financial reporting lag of the listed banks in 
Nigeria. They utilised a sample of nine banks for the period of 2011 to 2015. The 
study reveals a positive significant influence between AC independence and FRQ. 
This shows that a larger proportion of independent directors in the AC delays the 
reporting period of financial statements in Nigerian banks. This was observed by 
Akeju and Babatunde (2017) who studied the influence of the corporate governance 
and FRQ of the listed firms in Nigeria.  They took a sample of 40 firms listed in the 
NSE for the period of 2006 to 2015. The study reveals that AC independence has a 
positive significant association with FRQ. This shows that an increase of 
independent directors in the AC improves FRQ. 
2.7.3 Audit Committee Meetings 
Previous literature argued that the frequency of AC meetings reduces the degree of 
financial restatements by frequently meeting with the internal audit which will make 
them remain informed and acquainted with the accounting and auditing issues 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Raghunandan,  Read & Rama, 2001). In the same vein, Hamdan 
et al. (2013) and  Habbash and Alagla (2015) contended that more frequent meetings 
reduces DA and enhances FRQ. This supports the findings of  Sultana (2015) who 
undertook a study in Australia for the period of 2004 to 2012. He examined the 
influence of AC characteristics and accounting conservatism. The results indicate a 
positive significant correlation between AC meetings and accounting conservatism. 
On the contrary, a recent study of Katmon and Farooque (2015) examined the 
influence of the internal governance mechanisms on the EM management of the 
listed firms in the UK. They took a sample of 145 firms for the period of four years, 
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2005 to 2008. Their findings show a positive significant relationship between AC 
meetings and EM. This shows that more frequent meetings are associated to higher 
EM. 
 
More so, Ika and Ghazali (2012) studied the effectiveness of the AC and timeliness 
of the financial reporting in Indonesia. They found that AC effectiveness, including 
the frequency of meetings, minimise the audit reporting lead time. A recent study by 
Shirazi and Salehi (2016) shows that AC meeting is negatively and significantly 
related to financial disclosure quality. Additionally, Haji and Anifowose (2016) 
examined AC and integrated reporting practices. They adopt a GLS to run the 
multivariate regressions. The study found that AC meetings have positive significant 
impact on integrated reporting. However, the time frame of the study can be 
considered too short as the study period of three years may be too small for 
generalisation.  Similarly, Marzuki et al. (2016) determined whether the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (2007) has influence over EM. They utilised a 
secondary source of data and took a sample of 3,183 Malaysian firms for two periods 
of pre- MCCG (2007) ranging from 2004 to 2006 and post- MCCG (2007) ranging 
from 2007 to 2009. The result of the study reveals that AC meetings have positive 
significant impacts on earnings conservatism. More recently, Shankaraiah and Amiri 
(2017)  examined AC quality and FRQ in India. The study reveals that AC meetings 
have negative significant impacts on the FRQ proxy by DA. This is affirmed by 
Kolsi and Grassa (2017) who examined whether governance mechanisms influence 
the EM of Islamic banks. They took a sample of 26 Islamic banks from five United 
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Arab Emirate nations for the period of 2004 to 2012. Their findings show that AC 
meetings have negative significant influence on discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Furthermore, studies in Nigeria, such as Ibrahim et al. (2016), used 20 manufacturing 
firms listed on the NSE in 2008 to 2013 and examine the relationship of AC 
attributes and real activities manipulations. They adopted the Roychowdhury (2006) 
model to proxy for real activates manipulation. The result indicates a positive 
significant impact between AC meetings and real activities manipulations. This has 
been confirmed by the study of Dabor and Dabor (2015) who found a negative 
significant correlation between the AC meetings and the discretionary loan loss 
provisions of the Nigerian banks. Furthermore, Mbobo and Umoren (2016) examined 
the influence of the AC characteristics on the FRQ of listed companies in Nigeria. 
They took a sample of ten listed banks for the period of 2006 to 2013. The study 
reveals that AC meetings have positive significant relationships with FRQ proxied by 
the IFRS qualitative characteristics. Eze (2017) studied corporate governance and 
earning management in Nigeria after adopting the modified Jones Model (1995); the 
study shows a positive significant impact between AC meetings and DA. This is 
affirmed by Umobong and Ibanichuka (2017) who examined the AC attributes and 
the FRQ of the listed firms in Nigeria. They utilised a sample of listed food and 
beverage firms for the period of 2011 to 2014. The study reveals that AC meetings 
are positively and significantly related to FRQ. More so, Dakata, Kamardin and 
Delima (2017) examined the influence of the AC attendance and the EM of the listed 
firms in Nigeria. They used a sample of 14 companies for the period of 2012 to 2014, 
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and EM was represented by the Modified Jones Model (1995). The study shows that 
AC attendance has an inverse relationship with EM. 
2.7.4 Audit Committee Financial Accounting Expert 
An AC financial expert is a person who has knowledge of the GAAP and financial 
reporting and is able to evaluate the overall application of such principles with 
reference to the accounting estimate, accruals, and revenue (Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
2002). He/She should also be a person who has experience in the preparation of 
audits and appraisals of financial reports that exhibit a breadth level of complexity in 
accounting issues and has general understanding of AC functions (Trautman, 2013). 
Prior studies on financial accounting experts and FRQ include: Mcdaniel et al. 
(2002) who examined the impact of financial literacy and financial experts on FRQ 
in the US. They found that having financial expertise on the AC may potentially 
enhance the communication about FRQ and raise the constancy of the evaluations of 
the overall reporting quality. Felo et al. (2003) confirmed a positive significant 
relation between the AC accounting expert and the FRQ of the US firms. They 
contended that mandating a larger proportion of experts in the AC rather than 
requiring only one expert could be beneficial to the investors. 
More so, Defond et al. (2005) examined whether financial expertise on the AC is 
valued in the market. They utilized a sample of 702 outside directors appointed in 
509 firms in the US for the period of ten years from 1993 to 2002. The findings 
reveal a positive significant association between AC accounting experts and 
abnormal returns. The finding is supported by Agrawal and Chadha (2005) who 
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studied corporate governance and accounting scandals and examined 318  listed 
firms in the US. The findings of the study show that AC accounting experts reduce 
the tendency that a firm has to restate its earnings. In addition, Krishnain and 
Visvanathan (2008) found a positive significant association between the AC financial 
accounting experts and the accounting conservatism of the US listed firms. Similarly, 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) examined 770 US firms and studied the 
influence of  the characteristics of AC accounting experts. They found that AC 
accounting experts is positively correlated with accruals quality. Huang and 
Thiruvadi (2010) examined the association between AC characteristics and financial 
fraud. They took a sample of 218 listed firms in the US for the year 2003. The study 
reveals that AC financial accounting experts are negatively associated with financial 
fraud. This indicates that members of the AC with financial accounting knowledge 
are more likely to prevent financial fraud in the US firms. 
More recently, Sultana, Mitchell and Zahn (2013) used 494 listed firms in Australia 
and studied the relationship between AC financial accounting experts and earnings 
conservatism. The study reveals that an AC financial accounting expert is significant 
in recognising and enhancing FRQ. Badolato, Donelson and Ege (2014) studied the 
influence of the AC financial experts over the EM in the US. They utilised a sample 
of 29,073 firm year observations for the years 2001 to 2009. After using the 
accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals as measures of EM, the study found 
that the ACFAEs with high status reduced the levels of EM.  Furthermore, Liu et al. 
(2014) studied the relationship between the AC accounting expertise and the non-
negative earnings of the EM of the firms in the US. They employed the Kothari et al. 
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(2005) model as a measure of EM. The findings of the study show that the AC 
accounting expert is positively and significantly related to an expectation that 
management will meet or beat earnings targets. 
Fuller (2015) studied the influence of audit reporting choice and AC monitoring 
strength on the managers‟ financial disclosure decisions in Georgia. The finding of 
the study shows that the strength of the AC proxied by AC financial accounting 
knowledge is positive and significant when the audit oversight is strong. It has been 
deduced that most of the above findings support the resource dependence theory 
which presumes that AC members with financial expertise are more effective in 
scrutinising the activities of management and mitigating managers‟ opportunistic 
behaviours of EM. 
Additionally, Ittonen, Tronnes and Vahamaa (2016) explored how the AC constrains 
EM in US companies. They used the discretionary loan loss provision as a proxy for 
EM. The finding from the analysis reveals that audit the AC accounting expert has a 
negative significant impact on discretionary loan loss provision. This suggests that a 
higher proportion of financial accounting experts in the AC constrains managers‟ 
manipulations of earnings.  At the same time, by studying the influence of the 
number of professionally certified accounting experts on the AC and confidence in 
the earnings in the US, Levitan, Dubofsky and Sussman (2016) found that if the 
number AC financial accounting experts increases, there is a general tendency for 
confidence in the earnings to also improve the FRQ. More recently, Lisic, Myers, 
Seidel and Zhou (2017) studied the influence of AC accounting experts in ensuring 
auditors‟ independence. They utilised a sample of companies listed in the US for the 
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period of 2004 to 2013. The study reveals that the AC accounting expert is 
negatively related with auditors‟ dismissals following an adverse internal control 
weakness. This means that AC accounting experts induce auditors to be more 
approachable and transparent in their evaluation of internal control weaknesses. On 
the other hand, a recent study of Carrera, Sohail and Carmona (2017) examined audit 
committee and FRQ in the US. They used a sample of 13,668 firm-year observations 
for the period of 2001 to 2010. The study reveals a positive significant relationship 
between AC financial accounting experts and DA. This indicates that, increasing the 
proportion of AC members with financial accounting expertise decreases FRQ. 
From emerging economies, Saleem and Alzhobi (2016) studied audit quality and EM 
in Jordan.  The data for the study was extracted through a secondary source from the 
Amman Stock Exchange for the period of four years from 2007 to 2010. The 
dependent variable was proxied by the DA extracted from the Modified Jones model 
(1995). The findings show that there is a negative significant impact between the AC 
financial accounting expert and the DA of the listed companies in the Arman Stock 
Exchange market. Recently, Juhmani (2017) examined 31 listed companies in 
Bahrain for the period of 2012 to 2014 and found that the AC financial accounting 
expert has a negative significant impact with DA. 
It can be argued that most of the above studies were conducted in developed 
economies which have different characteristics and are highly regulated compare to 
emerging economies like Nigeria. For that reason, there is the need to reexamine this 
variable and see the likely effect it may have on financial reporting in developing 
countries, particularly Nigeria. However, despite the recommendation of the SEC 
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Code of Corporate Governance (2011) for possessing at least one member of the AC 
who is an expert and has existing knowledge in accounting and financial 
management, most of the studies in Nigeria ignore financial accounting expertise as a 
proxy for AC, but rather consider all the attributes of expertise related to financial 
knowledge as one. Therefore, this study will consider financial AC expertise as a 
variable and examine its likely influence over FRQ in Nigeria. 
2.7.5 Audit Committee Legal Expert 
AC legal experts are the directors with legal backgrounds amongst the members of 
the AC. It is expected that members of the AC with legal backgrounds prepare the 
AC members to be more careful about legal risks that are linked to inaccurate or 
inadequate aggressive financial reporting. Hence, legal expertise in the AC could 
assist in ensuring better FRQ since the quality of financial reporting can be related to 
legal liability threats and their legal backgrounds require them to be more vigilant to 
such threats (Krishnan et al., 2011). Similarly, Dezoort (1997) used a survey method 
to explore the audit committees‟ oversight responsibilities in the US. He found that 
members of the AC appreciate the benefits of having divergent expertise areas, such 
as accounting, auditing, and law. 
Studies on AC legal expertise and FRQ are limited. The few that have been found 
include: Baxter and Cotter (2009) who used 309 firms in Australia to examine the 
influence of AC and EM before the mandatory AC requirement in 2003; and, they 
adopted the Jones model (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) as measures of 
earnings quality. The findings reveal that the AC legal expert is negatively and 
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significantly associated to EM in both models. This suggests that legal experts in the 
AC reduce the magnitude of earnings manipulation provided by the management. 
Krishnan et al. (2011) considered the increase of legal experts on the AC in the US 
and examined the association of legal expertise on corporate AC and FRQ. They 
took a sample of 1,000 firms for the three years of 2003 to 2005. They adopted the 
performance adjusted model by Kothari et al. (2005) and the Jones model (1991) as 
measures of FRQ. The study reveals a negative significant impact between the AC 
legal expert and DA. This indicates that legal expertise acts as a monitor rather than a 
mere signal to financial reporting. More recently, Jintawattanagul et al. (2016) 
studied the mediating role of the accruals quality on the AC attributes and the cost of 
equity of 272 listed firms in Thailand for the period of 2010 to 2012. The study 
reveals a negative non-significant relationship between AC legal experts and quality 
of accruals. On the other hand, Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017) examined AC and 
FRQ in India. They utilised a sample of 133 firms for the period of 2002 to 2012.  
The result from the study shows that AC legal experts have a negative significant 
impact on DA. 
In Nigeria, to the best of the researchers‟ information, no study has explored the 
correlation between AC legal expertise and FRQ. Even though none of the Codes of 
the CG in Nigeria has explicitly discussed the composition of legal experts on the 
AC, the SEC Code of Corporate Governance (2011) stressed that the first 
responsibility of the AC to is to determine whether the accounting and reporting 
procedures of the company are in agreement with the legal provisions and approved 
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ethical practices. Therefore, this study has incorporated legal expertise as one of the 
constructs of the AC in order to examine its influence on the FRQ in Nigeria. 
2.7.6 Female Audit Committee Member 
It has been argued that women exhibit more effective communication capabilities 
and perform better than men in group problem-solving requiring consensus (Good & 
Wood, 1995). It is also contended that women are highly rated in terms of 
assimilating transformational leadership fashion (Amran, Saad, Abdullah & Ibrahim, 
2016). On the other hand,  the Nigerian government has passed into law a National 
Policy on women under the directorship of the Global Instrument on the Convention 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (Ekpe et al., 2014). This has been 
done with a view to address the issue of gender equality that has been a debatable 
topic all over the world. The objective of this policy is to consider men and women 
as partners in development, and more essentially to challenge any structure that 
creates gender-based inequalities in the country (Ekpe et al., 2014). Previous studies 
on gender diversity in psychology and sociology research have documented that 
females are more risk antagonist, careful, and decent than men (Gold, Hunton & 
Gomaa, 2009).  
Most of the prior studies on AC and FRQ ignore women directors as part of the 
surrogate of AC characteristics. However, Huang and Thiruvadi (2010) examined the 
association between AC characteristics and financial fraud in the US. They show that 
the proportion of women in the AC committee improves the AC diligence which 
promotes the financial reporting process. In addition, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) 
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examined AC gender differences and EM in the US. They used a sample of 320 
companies for the period of 2003. They adopted Ashbaugh et al. (2003) as a measure 
of EM. They found that a female AC member mitigates EM by increasing the 
negative income decreasing DA. This is affirmed by Firoozi et al. (2016) who report 
a positive significant association between female AC members and FRQ. Similarly, 
Dobija, Hryckiewicz and Skorulska (2016) studied how women on monitoring 
boards enhance the value of the FRQ in Poland. They took a sample of 66 firms for 
the period of seven years from 2009 to 2015 and used the audit reporting lag as a 
measure of FRQ. Their finding reveals that giving women a voice increases their role 
in influencing the FRQ. At the same time, Martinez et al. (2016) studied the 
influence of female directors and FRQ in Spain. They maintained a sample of 920 
firm year observations for the period of 2004 to 2011. The findings reveal that the 
proportion of female directors (independent female directors on AC and AC chair 
female directors) enhances further transparency by ensuring that auditors report 
uncertainty and the scope of the limitation of the qualification in their financial 
statements. This is affirmed by a recent study of García-Sánchez, Martínez-Ferrero 
and García-Meca  (2017) who utilised 159 listed banks from nine European countries 
and examined the effect of gender diversity and financial expertise on EQ. The result 
shows that a female AC member with financial accounting expertise is negatively 
correlated with discretionary non-loss provisions, and this implies higher accounting 
quality. This is confirmed by Lara et al. (2017) who studied the roles of women 
directors on the accounting quality of the listed companies in the UK. Their results 
show that the proportion of women on the board enhances earnings quality. They 
further argued that gender bias is negatively correlated to earnings quality. 
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Similarly, Lenard, Yu, York and Wu (2017) examined the influence of female 
leadership on the occurrence of fraud litigation of the listed companies in the UK for 
the period of 2007 to 2013. This study shows that the presence of women on the 
board reduces the  occurance of finanacial fraud ligation.  More recently, Zalata, 
Tauringana and Tingbani (2018)  examined the influence of the  gender of experts in  
AC over the earnings  of the listed firms in the US. They employed a sample 
consisting of 5660 observations for the period  from 2007 to 2013. Their findings 
show that the percetange of female experts in the audit committee reduces the 
likehood of earnings manipulation. 
From the emerging markets, Abdullah and Ku-Ismail (2016) examined the effect of 
women directors, family ownership, and EM in Malaysia for the period of five years 
from 2008 to 2011. The dependent variable was proxied by the DA extracted from 
the Kothari et al. (2005) model. The finding of the study shows a negative 
relationship between women AC members and DA. This is consistent with the 
findings of Hoang, Abeysekera and Ma (2017) who examined the influence of board 
diversity on EQ. They utilised a sample of the listed companies in Vietnam for the 
period of 2005 to 2010. The study reveals a positive significant relationship between 
board diversity and EQ. 
In addition, Ammer and Ahmad-Zaluki (2017) studied the importance of gender 
multiplicity in exhibiting the quality of the EM forecast in Malaysia. They utilised a 
sample of 190 listed firms in 2002 to 2012. The study shows that female AC 
members enhance shareholders‟ protection and improve the monitoring role of the 
AC on managers. This is affirmed by Oluoch, Muturi and Florence (2017) who 
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examined the influence of AC diversity on the FRQ in Kenya. They took a sample of 
72 state corporations for the period of 2005. Their findings show that female 
participation in the AC improves FRQ. 
In Nigeria, Ahmed and Che-Ahmad (2016) used 14 listed banks to examine the 
influence of board attributes and audit reporting lag for the period of 2008 to 2012. 
The study reveals a positive significant effect between the proportion of females on 
the board and the audit reporting lag. More so, Eze (2017) examined the effect of 
corporate governance on EM. They utilised a sample of six food product companies 
for the periods of 2003 to 2014. The study reveals that the proportion of women on 
the board is negatively associated with EM. Kibiya, Che-Ahmad and Amran (2016c) 
studied women directors and the FRQ of the firms in Nigeria. The study shows a 
positive but non-significant association between women directors and FRQ. 
However, looking at the findings of Abdullah and Ku-Ismail (2016), it can be argued 
that the period covered by the study needs to revisit the more current periods to 
include current changes in the country‟s regulations, for example, the more recent 
version of the Code of Corporate Governance in Malaysia issued in 2012. More so, 
Ahmed and Che-Ahmad (2016) used 14 listed banks, and  Eze (2017) employed six 
food product firms only.  Whilst, Oluoch et al. (2017) used the single period of 2005. 




2.7.7 Audit Committee Stock Ownership 
Ownership structure indicates the percentages of equity possessed by particular 
individuals, families or institutions. It represents the type of ownership that exists in 
an organisation (Imoleayo, Eddy & Oluku, 2017). The ownership structures in 
Nigeria are represented by directors‟ ownership, family ownership, institutional 
ownership, and foreign ownership. Studies conducted on ownership structures and 
FRQ show that the ownership structure has a significant influence on the financial 
reporting practices in Nigeria Adam & Bala, 2015; Farouk & Hassan, 2014; 
Imoleayo et al., 2017; Iyaniwura & Iyaniwura, 2014). However, none of the above 
studies has examined AC stock ownership in Nigeria. Consequently, this study has 
incorporated AC stock ownership because it is shown to be a good motivator in 
making AC members more watchful, passionate, and vigorous in their monitoring 
responsibilities (Kibiya et al., 2016c). 
AC stock ownership represents the ratio of shares possessed by the AC members. It 
has been argued that the more shares directors own, the stronger their ambition is to 
work to increase the value of the entity's stock (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). 
Agency theory posits that equity ownership by directors reduces the tendency of 
agency problems. Since, increasing the AC equity ownership decreases the 
likelihood of preventing negative earnings surprises. Which indicates that share 
investment aligns the interests of members of the AC with the interests of other 
shareholders (Vafeas, 2005, p.1109). Therefore, AC stock ownership has a 




Prior studies on AC and FRQ have documented significant evidence on the 
association between AC stock ownership and FRQ. For instance, Mangena and Pike 
(2005) considered some recommendations on the AC in the UK to examine the 
influence of AC equity, size, and expertise on provisional financial disclosures. After 
utilising 262 sampled firms, the result shows a negative statistical relationship 
between AC stock ownership and the level of interim disclosure. This indicates that a 
larger proportion of AC shares reduces the level of interim disclosure of a firm. A 
study of Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth and Neal (2009) is aimed at answering the 
unanswered question. That is, whether the SOX law of having a 100% independent 
AC is essential to accomplish the benefits of improving the AC oversight. They 
studied a sample of 208 firms in the US that were highly financially distressed in the 
year 1994. They found that AC equity possession is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the possibility that the auditor provides a going concern report for 
financially distressed firms and auditor dismissals. 
Similarly Yang and Krishnan (2005) show a positive significant relationship between 
AC stock ownership and total DA. This indicates that the ratio of the shares 
possessed by the AC increases the tendency of managers engaging in the unethical 
practices of EM. This is confirmed by Lin et al. (2006) who were motivated by the 
high profile financial accounting scandals in the US and examined the impact of AC 
effectiveness on EM. Their finding shows that AC equity possession is negatively 
associated with the chance that a firm will restate its earnings. In addition, Campbell, 
Hansen, Simon and Smith (2015) studied the influence of stocks held by the AC 
during post SOX in the US. They found that AC stock holdings have a positive 
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significant relationship with the probability of meeting or beating analyst earnings 
predictions. 
From the emerging market, Hamdan et al. (2013) examined the influence of the AC 
characteristics and earnings quality in Jordan. They extracted data from a secondary 
source using 50 firms for the period of 2004 to 2009. They adopted Richardson,  
Sloan,  Soliman  and Tuna‟s (2005) model and the Modified Jones model (1995) as 
proxies for earnings quality. The findings show that AC equity ownership is 
negatively and significantly related to both Richardson et al.‟s (2005) model and the 
Modified Jones model (1995) as measures of EM. 
In Nigeria, Kibiya et al. (2016a) examined the effect of the AC independence, 
expertise, equity and FRQ in Nigeria. They employed a secondary source of data 
collection and took a sample of 101 firms listed on the NSE for the five-year period 
from 2010 to 2014. The dependent variable FRQ was represented by the DA 
extracted from McNichols‟ (2002) model. The finding of the study shows that AC 
stock ownership is negatively and significantly associated with DA. This indicates 
that a higher proportion of the AC equity possession in Nigerian firms reduces the 
magnitude of EM.  More so, Kibiya et al. (2016b) examined the effect of AC 
independence, stock ownership, financial expertise, and FRQ. They considered 101 
listed companies for the period of 2010 to 2014. The study reveals a positive 
significant relationship between AC stock ownership and FRQ. This suggests that 
increasing the percentage of the shares held by the AC enhances their monitoring 
function and improves the FRQ. 
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2.7.8 Audit Committee Tenure 
Prior studies argued that the longer the directors have to serve on the board, the more 
they accumulate knowledge and experience thus, making them more effective 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991).  Similarly, Beasley (1996) contended that the longer 
the directors have served on a company's board, the more extra knowledgeable they 
are expected to be about the company's practices, and thus have better intelligence to 
help in safeguarding the investors interests and decrease the financial reporting fraud. 
Additionally, Yang and Krishnan (2005) utilised a sample of 896 firm-year 
observations for the period of 1996 to 2000 to study the influence of the AC and the 
quarterly EM in the US. After they adopted the Jones (1991) model, they found that 
AC tenure is negatively associated with EM. The results suggest that the longer the 
directors stay in the AC the better they act in mitigating EM. Firoozi et al. (2016) 
examined the impact of foreign directors on AC and FRQ in Canada. A secondary 
source for the collection was utilised. Data was extracted from the listed companies 
in the Canadian Compustat for 2008 to 2012.  The findings of the study show that 
AC tenure has a positive significant impact on FRQ. In addition, Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) revealed a negative significant correlation between the average tenure of the 
directors on the AC and accruals quality. This corroborates the findings of Liu and 
Sun (2010) who examined the role of directors‟ tenure on the effectiveness of the 
independent AC. They maintained a sample of the listed companies in the US for the 
period of 1998 to 2005. The result shows that AC tenure has a negative significant 
relationship with EM. This is in line with the argument that long-tenured directors 
have more skills and experience to effectually monitor the FR process. 
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From the emerging market, Thoopsamut and Jaikengkit (2009) studied the influence 
of  the AC, audit firm size, and quarterly EM of the Thai listed companies. The study 
reveals a negative significant impact between AC tenure and EM. More so,  
Jintawattanagul et al. (2016) examined the mediating role of accruals quality on the 
AC characteristics and the cost of equity of the listed firms in Thailand. They found a 
negative insignificant association between AC tenure and accruals quality. A recent 
study of Setiany et al. (2017) explored the effect of AC characteristics on voluntary 
financial disclosure. They utilised a sample of 100 firms listed in Indonesia for the 
period of 2009 to 2012. The study reveals a positive significant relationship between 
AC tenure and financial disclosure. This suggests that the longer tenure of the 
directors in the AC improves FRQ. 
However, literature on AC tenure and financial reporting is limited. At the same 
time, in Nigeria, previous studies on the AC characteristics and FRQ have ignored 
audit tenure as one of the proxies of AC. Therefore, since prior literature have 
documented the importance of directors to serve longer on the board and established 
evidence on how the length of time on the board enhances FRQ, there is the need to 
study this variable in different economies and to examine its likely influence on 
FRQ. 
2.7.9 Audit Committee Chairperson 
The AC chair is one of the members of the AC who has the utmost responsibility for 
supervising the financial reporting process. He/she has a high likelihood of being 
liable in the event of financial failure than other members of the AC (Schmidt & 
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Wilkins, 2013). It has been argued that the AC chairs are regarded as the chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of the AC (Ernst & Young, 2011, p. 8). Thus, they are 
very pivotal in establishing a relationship between the AC and the board of directors 
as well as with the internal and external auditors  (Schmidt & Wilkins, 2013). 
However, Section 359 (4) of the CAMA (2004) stipulates that the AC shall comprise 
a mixture of equal representation of directors and shareholders. This uniqueness of 
the AC formation in Nigeria makes the chairmanship of the committee to be handled 
by either a director or a shareholder. Therefore, the AC chair has a superior 
responsibility than other AC members for financial reporting let-downs, and thus 
plays an essential role in supervising the financial reporting and, basically, 
influencing the efficacy of the AC (Bromilow & Keller, 2011). 
Prior studies have documented that the AC chair plays a significant role in the AC 
and is considered as a person who is a custodian in directing a group of people 
(Ernest & Young, 2011). These roles include, amongst others, to ensure that 
sufficient information goes to and from the AC and to ensure a clear relationship 
between the committee and management, as well as with the internal/external 
auditors (Tanyi & Smith, 2015).  In this vein, Tanyi and Smith (2015) studied how 
the amount of the AC chair‟s status and other AC financial expert status held by the 
committee‟s chairman affects his capacity to supervise a firm‟s financial reporting 
process. They documented a negative significant relationship between the number of 
AC chair positions and financial reporting fraud. They also contended that 
companies with busy AC chairs have considerably higher levels of discretionary 
accruals, and are more probable to meet or beat the earnings targets. They suggested 
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that the AC chair‟s busyness decreases the oversight and monitoring role of the AC 
on the financial reporting process.  
More so, Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) examined whether the AC is a 
management watchdog or personal colleague of the CEOs. They employed a sample 
of the listed firms after the Sarbanes Oxley Act for the five years from 2004 to 2008. 
They showed that companies whose AC had social ties to the CEO acquire less audit 
services and are involved more in earnings management. They also suggested that 
such companies‟ auditors are, as well, less probable to provide going-concern 
opinions or to expose internal control feebleness due to the existence of social ties. 
Hogan, Schmidt and Thompson (2015) examined the influence of the AC 
responsibility over the implications of litigation.  They showed that AC chairs are 
less likely to be termed as defendants than other AC members. Recently, Ghafran 
and Yasmin (2018) studied the influence of the AC chair‟s monitoring, and financial 
and experiential expertise over the audit report lag. They utilised a sample of 987 
firms for the period of 2007 to 2010.  They found that the AC chair‟s monitoring, 
tenure, and experiential know-how have inverse significant relationships with the 
audit reporting delay. They suggested that more effective AC chairs are effective in 
fast-tracking financial reporting timeliness. Recently, Ghafran and Yasmin (2018) 
study the influence of AC chair monitoring, financial and experiential expertise on 
the audit report lag. They utilize a sample of 987 firms for periods of 2007 to 2010.  
They find that AC chairs monitoring; tenure and experiential know-how have inverse 
significant relationship with the audit reporting delay. They suggest that more 
effective AC chairs are effective in fast-tracking financial reporting timeliness. 
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Moreover, Qu (2018) explored whether AC members and chairs display individual-
specific „„styles‟‟ that influence firms‟ financial reporting practices. He conducted a 
survey with different respondents in US firms. His findings provide evidence that AC 
chairs vary from ordinary members in a number of ways: First, AC chairs are mostly 
the financial experts of the AC.  Moreover, AC chairs are mostly in charge of more 
official duties, including the schedule for the committees‟ meetings, setting the 
agendas, collaborating with the internal and external auditors, and assessing the 
performance of the ordinary members. Third, he also documented that the AC chairs 
are regularly more probable to have had special ties with the managers before joining 
the committee. This makes them less effective in performing their oversight duties. 
However, studies on the AC in Nigeria have examined different attributes of the 
committee, but they have failed to explore the uniqueness attributed to the formation 
of the AC in Nigeria that is composed of an equal representation of shareholders and 
directors. Consequently, this study has examined how the influence of the AC chair 
(either a director or a shareholder) affects the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. The summary of some of the empirical studies on the relationship between 
AC characteristics and FRQ is attached in Appendix C. 
2.8 Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on Audit Committee 
The AC plays an essential role in CG practices by supervising the quality of the 
audit. Therefore, an effective and independent AC that has relevant expertise is 
assumed to improve the approaches to the audits,  which enhances audit quality and, 
in turn, improves the FRQ (Cohen et al., 2002; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Sulaiman, 
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2017).  As such, better audits are imperative for the reliability of the financial reports 
and are believed to protect the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Sulaiman, 2017). In the light of the above, it is expected that audit quality can stand 
as a middle variable (mediator) that can be influenced by the AC which, in turn, 
improves the FRQ. This is because a mediator acts as a middle variable that 
symbolises the productive instrument in which the predictor construct is able to 
account for the outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes & Scharkow, 2013; 
Wu & Zumbo, 2008).  A simple mediation model exists when the predictor variable 
is premised to cause the mediator and, in return, the mediator causes the outcome 
variable (Wu & Zumbo, 2008). This means that a change in the AC will bring about 
a change in the audit quality and a change in the audit quality will bring about a 
change in the FRQ. Thus, the mediation effect of audit quality can be based on the 
complementary effect hypothesis which suggests that the AC is expected to enhance 
the audit quality proxy which, subsequently enhances FRQ. This assumption 
provides that external auditors add to the monitoring of FRQ provided by the AC. 
The complementary hypothesis explains the demand aspect of audit which is linked 
to the agency theory that presumes that audit efforts are needed to decrease agency 
conflicts arising from the interests of the equity holders and managers (Menon & 
Williams, 1994; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Therefore, if it is presumed that more 
powerful boards will engage better auditors who, in turn, potentially will be more 
effective monitors of the managers and ensure that appropriate financial reports and 
disclosure exist (Carcello et al., 2002). Similarly, the auditor is required to 
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communicate with the AC on all major issues associated with the audit, and with 
ethical standards (Beattie, Fearnley & Hines, 2013). 
2.8.1 Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Quality 
Previous literature suggests that internal governance mechanisms and external audits 
can be substituted for each other, which implies that greater internal control will be 
attributed to lower audit fees. However, their empirical findings do not support this 
opinion (Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2002; Hay et al., 
2008). On the other hand, prior studies on the causal effects of  internal governance 
and external audits always propose that they are complementary; in that, improving 
internal governance is associated with higher audit quality (Alves, 2013; Miettinen, 
2008). This is affirmed by Sulaiman (2017) who examined the influence of  the 
oversight of audit quality in relation to the AC in the UK. He found that the function 
of the AC in relation to audit quality comprises a thorough assessment of the 
presentation of the external auditors during the interaction and communication 
between the two parties. He further demonstrated that the AC acts as an effective 
monitoring device when supervising the audit quality. He also contended that the 
behaviour of the AC in supervision are in four key areas (independence, 
appointment, remuneration, and effectiveness of the audit process) associated to 
audit quality, as suggested by the UK Code of CG, which delivered mixed findings.  
More so, AlQadasi and Abidin (2018)  studied the influence of the internal corporate 
governance effectiveness over the audit quality of the listed firms in Malaysia. Their 
finding supports that there is a complementary link between a firm‟s governance and 
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the audit fees. This indicates that a better internal governance mechanism purchases a 
higher audit quality in their demand for greater assuarance. 
The foregoing arguments were also empirically documented by Lee and Mande 
(2005) who studied the association between the AC characteristics and the audit and 
non-audit service fees in the US. They utilised a sample of 780 listed companies in 
the year 2000. The findings show that the AC effectiveness proxied by AC 
independence, meetings, and financial experts are positively related to audit fees and 
negatively related to the possibility that the auditor will issue a qualified opinion. 
This has been affirmed by the study of Boo and Sharma (2008) who examined the 
relationship between internal governance mechanisms and audit service and non-
audit service fees in the US. They utilised a sample of 469 listed firms in the US for 
the period of 2001. Their result shows that AC independence is positively and 
significantly related to audit fees and Big 5 auditors. More so, Ben Ali and Lesage 
(2013) studied the influence of the nature of controlling shareholders over the audit 
price of the listed companies in France. They utilised a sample of 244 firms for the 
period of 2006 to 2008. The study shows that there is a positive significant 
relationship between institutional shareholdings and audit fees. This indicates that 
institutional shareholders serve as monitors by demanding higher audit quality in 
exchange for greater audit effort. 
On the contrary, Ittonen, Miettinen and Vähämaa (2010) examined the influence of 
the female AC members on audit fees. They employed a sample of 500 companies in 
the US. The study reveals that female AC chairs are associated with lower audit fees. 
They argued from a preview of the demand perspective that female AC chairs 
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decrease the desire for the assurance delivered by external auditors. On the other 
hand, from the supply-side perception, AC members and female chairs may reduce 
audit fees by influencing the audit assessment risk or by enhancing the effectiveness 
of the internal control system or by generally improving the credibility of the 
financial reports. This is affirmed by Xiang, Qin and Peterson (2015) who examined 
gender diversity in AC and audit fees. They took a sample of Chinese listed firms for 
the period of 2004 to 2007. The study reveals a negative significant relationship 
between AC gender and audit fees. It implies that an AC consisting of men and 
women is associated with lower audit fees. 
In contrast, it has been argued that low audit fees force the audit team to decrease 
tests, which will adversely affect audit quality (Cohen et al., 2007). Similarly, the 
agency theory can also explain the complementary effect and substitution effect 
hypotheses of the audit. The complementary effect hypothesis assumes that external 
auditors play a significant function in corporate governance which serves as a 
complementary mechanism for enhancing the legal protection of outside 
shareholders (Huang, 2006; Choi & Wang,  2003). This will, in turn, reduce the 
agency complicity between the company‟s insiders and outside shareholders. Since 
outside shareholders depend heavily on external auditors‟ monitoring efforts (Ball et 
al., 2000). Consequently, a more active AC will demand higher external audit efforts 
with an exchange for higher audit fees in order to protect the corporate reputation, 
promote shareholders‟ interests, and strengthen the credibility of the financial 
reporting (Carcello et al., 2002; Huang, 2006). The substitution effect hypothesis 
suggests that for some entities, a high quality external auditing acts as a substitute for 
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legal protection to minimise agency conflicts between company insiders and outside 
shareholders in a weak legal environment (Choi & Wang, 2003). In that, such entities 
in a weak legal environment will have a high demand for better auditing than 
companies in a strong legal environment (Gomes, 2000; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
On the other hand, an inverse relationship between governance devices and audit 
quality could be anticipated if good governance can substitute for external auditing, 
leading to a decrease in audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). From the foregoing, it is 
observed that an effective AC will appeal for a higher level of assurance. This is 
possible by influencing external auditors to provide higher quality audits by hiring 
Big 4 auditors and by paying them higher audit fees which, in turn, will improve 
FRQ. 
Furthermore, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) examined how auditors value AC 
expertise by taking the instance of accounting versus non-accounting experts. The 
study reveals that AC meetings and size are positively and significantly associated 
with audit fees. This indicates that an active AC demands greater efforts on the part 
of auditors and thus, is associated with higher fees. Similarly, Hoitash and Hoitash 
(2009) examined the influence of the AC on external auditors in the US. The study 
shows that audits of AC size, AC meetings, and AC financial accounting experts 
have positive significant relationships with audit fees.  In addition, Cohen, Hoitash, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2014) argued that AC accounting experts require more 
audit assurance by paying higher audit fees. They empirically found that AC 
financial accounting and supervisory experts are significantly and positively related 
to audit fees. This was observed by the recent study of Kim, Segal, Segal and 
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Yoonseok (2016) who explored the three-sided relationship between AC 
characteristics, audit inputs, and FRQ. They utilised a sample of the listed companies 
in the US for the period of 2001 to 2006. The study reveals a positive significant 
influence between AC size, financial accounting experts, and audit fees. 
Similarly, Redmayne et al.  (2011) used 204 firms during the period of 1998 to 2000 
and examined the relationship between the AC and the audit fees in the public sector 
in New Zealand. The study found a positive statistical relationship between AC 
formation and audit fees. In addition, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) studied the 
association of external audit fees, AC characteristics, and internal audits.  They 
employed a sample of 401 listed companies in Australia. The AC was proxied by AC 
meetings, AC independence, and AC financial expertise. Their result shows that a 
higher audit fee is related to AC existence. They contended that a higher audit fee is 
associated with more frequent meetings of the AC. They also argued that audit fees 
are associated with the committees‟ expertise when both meetings and independence 
are low. They further suggested that AC independence and expertise perform a 
complimentary function in enhancing the effectiveness of the AC with regards to 
audit quality. However, they suggested that such a relationship is clearly complex 
and, therefore, calls for further research. 
Additionally, Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) examined the influence of 
corporate governance over audit fees. The study shows a positive significant 
relationship between AC effectiveness (consisting of AC size, meeting 
independence, and financial expertise) and audit fees. This is an indication that an 
effective AC performs better monitoring which produces more audit coverage and 
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pays higher audit fees. This further suggests that a larger AC that is composed of at 
least one member with financial expertise, all independent non-executive directors, 
and meets frequently in a year incline to pay higher audit fees. This is done to 
increase the audit coverage required by such an AC to improve audit quality. More 
recently, Aldamen, Hollindale and Ziegelmayer (2016) examined the influence of 
female AC members on the audit fees of listed firms in Australia.  They utilised a 
sample of 624 firms in 2011. The study reveals a positive significant association 
between female AC members and audit fees. This suggests that female representation 
on the AC increases audit fees in demanding for more audit efforts. This is confirmed 
by the most recent study of Lai, Srinidhi and Tsui (2017) who examined the effect of 
board gender diversity on audit fees in the US. The results indicate that female AC 
members demand higher audit quality by paying higher audit fees than the male 
directors in the AC. Lai et al. (2017) examined the effect of board gender diversity 
on audit fees in the US. The study shows that a female AC is positively related to 
audit fees and is more likely to hire specialist auditors than the male directors. 
Furthermore, Marini et al. (2016) examined the effect of family companies, AC and 
audit fees. They utilised a sample of 216 listed firms in Malaysia for the year 2009. 
The study shows that AC independence, diligence and size are positively and 
significantly related to audit fees. 
In Nigeria, Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016) examined the influence of board 
diversity over the audit fees of the listed firms. They used unbalanced data with a 
sample of 65 and 58 companies for the period of 2010 to 2011, respectively.  The 
findings show that board diversity has a positive significant influence over audit fees. 
 
 105 
This implies that an active board will be more cautious in their monitoring function 
and, accordingly, make additional demands in an audit effort. Similarly, Naser and 
Hassan (2016), explored the determinants of audit fees amongst the listed companies 
in Dubai. They maintained a sample of 22 companies for the period of 2011. The 
study reveals a positive significant association between AC independence and audit 
fees. 
Therefore, regulatory authorities and investors often question the job of both AC and 
external auditors because the audited financial statements have been proved to be 
false and misleading in many of the recent financial scandals, such as Enron and 
WorldCom. For that reason, since, the AC chooses the external auditor whereas the 
external auditor reports to the AC, there is possibility that both two monitoring 
devices may operate jointly to limit earnings manipulation and improve FRQ (Alves, 
2013). Thus, a more active, expert, and independent board may demand distinctively 
higher quality audits in order to safeguard its reputation capital, evade legal liability, 
and encourage investor interest, which requires greater assurance, by paying higher 
audit fees in exchange for higher audit efforts (Carcello et al., 2002). Thus, it is 
expected that the AC increases audit quality which will, in turn, enhance financial 
reporting. The summary of some of the empirical studies on the relationship between 
AC characteristics and audit quality is attached in Appendix D. 
2.8.2 Audit Quality and Financial Reporting Quality 
Audit quality has been defined as greater assurance of high FRQ. For instance, 
DeAngelo (1981 p. 186) defined audit quality as the “market-assessed joint 
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probability that a given auditor will both detect a breach in the client’s accounting 
system, and report the breach”. Thus, better auditing is recognised for its 
independent assurance of the trustworthiness of the financial statements, which 
enhances investors‟ protection and improves their confidence. Audit quality 
enhances FRQ by improving the credibility of the financial reports (DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014; Gaynor et al., 2016). DeFond and Zhang (2014) argued that audit 
quality is a continuous construct of FRQ. They also contended that FRQ is a function 
of audit qualty. This implies that audit quality and  FRQ are jointly determinable 
outcomes. Therefore, several proxies have been employed by various researchers as 
measures of audit quality. However, there is an inconclusive argument on which 
measures are best and, thus little methodical direction on the comparability of one 
surrogate versus another (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Gaynor et al., 2016). 
Consequently, DeFond and Zhang (2014) classified audit quality into perception-
based, input-based, and output-based measurements. The perception-based 
measurements comprise the Big 4 auditors, earnings responses, and stock market 
reactions. The output-based measurements include restatements, audit opinions, 
accruals quality, accounting conservatism, market reactions, Big 4 auditors, and audit 
fees. On the other hand, the input-based measurements consist of audit fees, audit 
firm size proxied by Big 4 auditors, and audit fees. However, some of these 
measurements have been criticised because they fail to capture poor audit quality, for 
example, restatements. 
In light of the foregoing, this current study has used audit fees and Big 4 auditors as 
proxies for audit quality because of the following reasons: 
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i. They are the only constructs that appear in all of the classifications. 
ii. Audit firm size represented by Big 4 auditors is a strong proxy for audit 
quality because larger auditors are believed to have strong motivations and 
better competencies to deliver high quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981). 
iii. They have  relatively greater construct validity (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
iv. Audit fee is a distinctive construct because it captures audit effort that is 
naturally related to audit quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Gaynor et al., 
2016). 
v. Audit fee is a unique construct that is an outcome of both the demand and 
supply hypotheses. That is, an auditor cannot single-handedly increase audit 
fees for extra effort without a corresponding increase in audit quality (Cohen 
et al., 2002; DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
vi. Audit market in Nigeria is vastly concentrated around Big 4 auditors thus, 
Big 4 auditors are associated to higher audit fees (Asien, 2014). 
The foregoing arguments are tested by most of the previous literature on audit quality 
and FRQ. They show that a high audit fee and engagement of Big 4 auditors are 
associated with lower EM and a higher quality of financial reporting. For instance, 
Franke, Johnson and Nelson (2002) studied the effect of audit fees and EM in the 
US. The study reveals that audit fees and Big 5 auditors have negative significant 
relationships with EM. This is affirmed by Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato 
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(2007) who applied 13,860 firm-year observations and determined the influence of 
audit fees and audit quality in the US. The findings reveal a negatively significant 
correlation between audit fees and DA. Mitra, Deis and Hossain (2009)  examined 
the relationship between the audit fees and FRQ of the Big 5 client firms in US. They 
employed a sample of 6,852 firm-year observations for the period of 2000 to 2005. 
Their finding reveals that audit fees reduce the likelihood of abnormal accruals and 
thus, increase earnings quality. Carmona, Momparler and Lassala (2015) studied the 
influence of audit fees and audit quality in Spain. The finding indicates that the audit 
fee has a negative and significant association with abnormal accruals. More so, Big 4 
auditors also have a negative but insignificant relation with DA. On the other hand,  
Gao and Huang (2016) and Bamahros and Bhasin (2016) contended that Big 4 
auditors have positive significant  influence on unexpected accrual and restatement. 
Alzoubi (2016) confirmed that EM is significantly lower amongst firms that purchase 
the service of Big 4 auditors than firms that acquire non-Big 4 auditors. 
Recently, Asthana, Khurana and Raman (2018) explored how fee competition 
amongst Big 4 auditors effect audit quality in the US. They reveal that fee 
competitions are cherished as a vital mechanism for enhancing the quality of audits 
in the much concentrated US audit market. In addition, Knechel, Mintchik, Pevzner 
and Velury (2018) explored the influences of extensive trust and public cooperation 
on the Big 4 auditors and audit fees amongst different countries in the world. They 
show that societies with higher trust and public cooperation are more likely to put a 
high price on a robust audit function and demand higher audit services. They 
documented that the existence of Big 4 auditors is robust in nations with higher 
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levels of public cooperation and thus, countries with higher trust and public 
cooperation pay higher audit fees. This premise recommends that nations with higher 
pervasive trust or higher public cooperation stress higher prices on the audit services 
and thus, be ready to pay higher audit fees. Al-Dhamari, Al-Gamrh, Ismail and 
Ismail (2018) studied the association between the related party transactions and audit 
fees of the listed firms in Malaysia. They reveal that audit fees are higher for 
companies that embark on related party transactions comprising the procumbent and 
sale of assets, merchandise, and services. 
From emerging markets, Saleem and Alzhobi (2016) conducted a study on audit 
quality and EM in Jordan.  The study established that audit quality is inversely 
related to EM. The result from the random model reveals that the audit fee has a 
negative significant influence on DA. They further stress that EM is more minimal in 
companies that engage the service of Big 4 auditors than firms that hire non-Big 4 
auditors. Similarly, Bamahros and Wan Hussin (2015) examined non-audit services, 
audit firm tenure, and EM by utilising a sample of 525 public firms in Malaysia in 
2009. The findings of the study show that the audit fee has a negative insignificant 
association on the total and current discretionary accruals. 
Furthermore, Abidin and Ahmad-Zaluki (2012) examined the influence of auditor 
industrial specialisation and reporting lag. They employed a sample of 873 listed 
firms in Malaysia for the year 2007. They found that Big 4 auditors are negatively 
and statistically related to the audit reporting lag. This implies that companies that 
are audited by Big 4 auditors have a greater propensity for faster reporting. Whilst 
auditor specialists are not significantly related to faster reporting.  More so, Al-
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Rassas and Kamardin (2015) examined the influence of external audit qualities and 
AC characteristics in Malaysia. The dependent variable was proxied by the DA 
extracted from Dechow et al. (1995) and Yoon, et al. (2006).  After running the 
multivariate regressions, the findings of the study revealed that the audit fee was 
negatively and significantly correlated with the DA in the second model, but not 
significant in the first model. From the foregoing, it is observed that audit fees can be 
a proxy for audit quality and, consequently, enhance FRQ. This is confirmed by the 
recent study of Nawaiseh (2016) who examined the impact of external auditors on 
EM in Jordan after running panel data; the study revealed a negative significant 
impact between audit fees and DA. 
In Nigeria, Aliyu, Musa and Zachariah (2015) studied the impact of audit quality and 
EM. They employed a sample of ten banks for the period of 2006 to 2013. The result 
from the OLS reveals a positive significant impact between audit fees and abnormal 
loan loss provisions. This indicates that auditors‟ financial dependence increases the 
rate of EM in Nigerian banks. Whilst Big 4 auditors are inversely and significantly 
related to abnormal loan loss provisions. This was observed by Eriabie and Dabor 
(2017) who examined the effect of audit quality and EM in Nigeria. They utilised a 
sample of 18 banks for the period of 2005 to 2010. The study showed that audit 
quality is negatively associated to EM. This has been affirmed by Ndubuisi and 
Ezechukwu (2017) who examined the determinants of audit quality amongst the 
listed banks in Nigeria. They took a sample of 11 banks for the period of 2010 to 
2015. The findings reveal that audit fees and audit firm size proxied by Big 4 audits 
have a positive significant influence over audit quality. 
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On the contrary, Okolie (2014) studied the influence of auditors‟ independence and 
EM. They applied a sample of 57 firms listed on the NSE for 2006 to 2011. The 
results from the random model indicate that the audit fee is significantly and 
negatively related to DA. This is consistent with the study of  Abdulmalik and Che-
Ahmad (2016) who examined the effect of audit fees, Big 4 auditors, and corporate 
governance FRQ in Nigeria. They extracted data from the annual reports of 89 listed 
firms for the periods of 2008 to 2013. They found that audit fees and Big 4 auditors 
have a negative significant impact with abnormal accruals. This suggests that the 
excessive fees paid to external auditors in Nigeria do not compromise their 
independence and that the Big 4 auditors reduce the extent of abnormal accruals of 
the Nigerian firms. This is confirmed by the recent study of Abdul-Rahman, 
Benjamin and Olayinka (2017) who studied the influence of audit fees and audit 
quality in Nigeria. They utilised a sample of the listed cement firms for the period of 
2010 to 2015. The study shows that audit fees have a positive significant association 
with audit quality. 
It can be observed that the inconsistency of the findings between the above studies 
may be due to the different sample sizes used by the authors or differences in the unit 
of analysis. This is because Aliyu et al. (2015) used only ten banks, which may be 
considered too small for the generalisation of the findings. Whilst, Okolie (2014) and 
Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016) adopted 57 and 89 listed non-financial 
companies, respectively. However, it can be argued that banks are offshoots of the 
financial sector which have characteristics and regulations different from other 
sectors of the economy.  Similarly, most of the above studies focused on the direct 
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correlation between audit quality and FRQ. Therefore, the present complex financial 
and economic environment requires the application of complex methods to examine 
the actual impact between audit quality and FRQ. The summary of some of the 
empirical studies on the relationship between audit quality and FRQ is attached in 
Appendix E. 
2.9 Literature Gap 
Apart from Abernathy et al. (2014)  who considered public accounting experts and 
Krishnan et al. (2011) who examined legal experts, little attention has been given by 
prior studies about  various kinds of  expertise in the AC. However, regulators and 
policy makers have focused on the effect of various kinds of financial expertise and 
their influence on AC effectiveness. This study has attempted to fill these gaps that 
exist in the literature by incorporating these types of expertise (financial accounting 
and legal expertise) and examining their influence on the FRQ in Nigeria. This is 
because there were considerable arguments by investors, regulators, and academic 
communities concerning the idea of whether only members with direct accounting 
skills would be considered as financial experts (Cohen et al., 2014). In addition, AC 
legal expertise has been chosen because legal expertise in the AC could assist in 
ensuring better FRQ since the quality of financial reporting can be related to legal 
liability threats, and their legal backgrounds require them to be more vigilant to such 
threats (Krishnan et al., 2011). Similarly, from the literature review, it has been 
discovered that prior studies in Nigeria did not explore AC tenure, AC chair, or some 
specific attributes of AC expertise (financial accounting experts and legal experts). 
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This study has attempted to fill these gaps from the Nigerian context by examining 
the influence of these variables on FRQ. 
Furthermore, prior literature that determined the influence of corporate governance 
or AC and audit quality on FRQ gave little attention to income smoothing as a 
measure of FRQ. Notwithstanding the fact that smoothed earnings are less 
informative to shareholders and other stakeholders. Since, they are of lower earnings 
quality (Ayres, 1994). For that reason, this study has employed Eckel's (1981)  
techniques of measuring income smoothing. However, Eckel (1981) used only one 
type of income (net income), Yang et al. (2012) used two categories of income 
(income from operation and net income), and Ashari et al. (1994) used three 
categories of income (income from operation, net income and income before 
extraordinary items). Yet, from the above mentioned studies only Yang et al. (2012) 
examined the influence of corporate goverance and income smoothing. Similarly, 
none of these studies have considered the relationship between AC characteristics 
and income smoothing of firms. Therefore, this study has examined the influence of 
AC characteristics on income the smoothing behaviour of firms. 
Overall, from the literature, there have been limited studies (to the best of the 
researcher‟s knowledge) that have used audit quality to mediate the relationship 
between AC characteristics and FRQ. For example, Miko (2016) examined the 
influence of the corporate governance, firm attributes, and EM of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. He employed accrual models as measures of EM. However, 
the study considered only the DA measures as proxies for EM. Therefore, there is the 
need to consider other measures of earnings manipulations in Nigeria, for example, 
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income smoothing, particularly in the light of the recent argument which reveals that 
firms have exhibited a significant increase in income smoothing after the IFRS 
(Ahmed, Neel & Wang, 2013; Chen, Tang, Jiang & Lin, 2010; Hail & Wysocki, 
2010; and Kaserer & Klingler, 2008). This has been affirmed by Chen et al. (2010) 
who found that there has been a lower magnitude of DA after the IFRS amongst 
firms from 15 European countries, but the firms were involved in more income 
smoothing in the post-IFRS periods. 
More so, in Nigeria, Ozili (2015) also contended that the listed banks in Nigeria 
smoothed reported earnings over time during the periods of voluntary IFRS adoption, 
and suggested that the IFRS adoption reduces the reliability of loan loss provisions. 
Additionally, most of the prior studies in Nigeria considered the moderation analysis, 
for instance, Miko (2016) considered the interaction of institutional shareholdings on 
the relationships between three attributes of AC (size, independence, and financial 
expertise) and FRQ. Consequently, this study has introduced audit quality to mediate 
the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ. However, the mediation 
analysis has provided a better explanation about how the influence of the AC affects 
audit quality which, in return, affects FRQ. However, the moderation analysis cannot 
establish this, because a moderator clarifies when a predictor variable most strongly 
or weakly causes a dependent variable; whereas, a mediator clarifies the procedure of 




2.10 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter highlighted issues related to FRQ and AC. The concept of FRQ, 
measures of FRQ, and FRQ in Nigeria were discussed in this chapter. The chapter 
also highlighted the concept of corporate governance as well as corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. The modifications and reforms of the Nigerian Codes of 
Corporate Governance were also discussed in this chapter. It also discussed the 
previous empirical studies on the association between AC characteristics and FRQ, 
audit quality and AC, and audit quality and FRQ in different economies from 
developed to developing countries, and closed with some similar studies in Nigeria. 
The chapter also discussed the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship 






THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Based on the earlier chapters, this chapter discusses the theoretical framework that 
supports the variables used in the study. In particular, the chapter highlights and links 
the agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, signaling theory, 
and feminist theory with the variables used in the study. Based on the foregoing 
theories, the supportive literature hypotheses were developed accordingly. Finally, it 
closes with the summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The foregoing chapter discussed the review of relevant literature. This section 
focuses on the review of relevant theoretical frameworks underpinning the variables 
of the study. As such, the prior literature provided in the previous chapter and the 
theoretical frameworks that will be discussed in this section were used to form the 
bases for the hypotheses development that were expected to be tested in the study. 
The theoretical frameworks that were adopted in this study were the agency theory, 
resource dependence theory (as the main theories), institutional theory, signaling 
theory, and feminist theory (as supporting theories). 
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3.2.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory has been widely used in managerial studies and it appears to be 
the dominant paradigm in several facets of corporate finance and, apparently, 
corporate governance research (Dedman, 2004; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997). The agency theory originated from the study of Berle and Means (1932). They 
investigated the concept of agency and its application towards the advancement of 
large companies. They argued that the interests of the management and directors are 
distinct from that of the owners of the firm. They applied the concept of the principal 
agent and explained the provenance of these conflicts. Similarly, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) advanced the study of Berle and Means (1932) to formally develop 
the concept of the agency theory. They contended that corporations are organised to 
reduce the cost of getting agents (agency costs) by complying with the interests of 
the principal. They generally acknowledged that managers and owners in any given 
situation have different goals and motivations which can be manifest in different 
ways. This indicates that there is always conflict of interest amongst the parties.  It 
has been argued that dissimilarities in the scope and nature of the information 
between managers and shareholders complicate the agency problem. Managers are 
often more engaged in the commercial activities for a longer period than the 
shareholders and, consequently, become more informed about the corporate activities 
than the owners which gives room for information asymmetry (Aboody & Lev, 
2000). Thus, the management might prioritise their own interests over the 
shareholders' interests of wealth maximising. 
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Similarly, agency costs arise because of the differences between ownership and the 
control from management, which is a consequence of information asymmetry 
between the management and the owners. However, it has been argued that 
managers‟ attempts to smooth the permanent variability of cash flow will result in 
less timeliness and less information on earnings figures. Whereas, less timeliness and 
less informativeness of  earnings figures indicates information asymmetry and less 
value relevance, respectively (Dechow et al., 2010).  The agency cost increases the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms that will provide assurance of the managements‟ 
performance in accordance with the contract (Huang, 2006). The agency theory 
presumes that monitoring devices have to align with the interests of the management 
and the owners in order to reduce the conflict of interest as well as any feasible 
managers' opportunistic behaviours that might arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Several governance devices can be employed to align the interests of the owners and 
managers. These include internal devices like boards of directors, ownership 
concentration, and external mechanisms like the external auditors and product market 
competition (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Hence, a perfect combination of mechanisms 
being employed can be considered a composite where the effectiveness of one 
mechanism relies on the effectiveness of the other (Davis & Useem, 2002). For 
instance, when external auditors observe that they cannot depend on an internal 
mechanism like board of directors or AC, to assist in controlling FRQ, they increase 
the audit effort by charging higher audit fees (Cohen & Hanno, 2000; Bédard, 
Chtourou & Courteau, 2004; Kaplan & Reckers, 1985). As such, the AC, together 
with the external auditors, can minimise the opportunistic reporting by management 
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(Defond & Jiambalvo, 1991). Therefore, it is expected that companies with strong 
ACs and purchase higher audit quality will have a lower likelihood of EM than 
companies without ACs and purchase less auditing services. 
3.2.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence theory was rooted from the publication of  Pfeffer and 
Salancik  (1978). Since then, the theory has been one of the prominent theories in 
strategic management, organisational theory and, more specifically, corporate board 
of directors (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). With reference to this theory, 
Pfeffer and Salancik  (1978) argued that organisation is linked to external resources. 
They contended that organisations rely on resources which are a fundamental of 
power. Then, those external resources become essential to the organisation which 
needs those resources proportionately. As such, organisations rely on several 
resources, such as materials, capital, and labour. The resource dependence theory 
also suggests that the board of directors enables companies to either reduce their 
dependence or gain resources. Thus, companies employ boards of directors to serve 
as mechanisms through which they incorporate important external organisations with 
which they are interdependent (Pfeffer, 1972). The theory considers the contribution 
of governance devices as a vehicle to aid a company in achieving its strategic 
objectives (Cohen et al., 2007). This is supported by Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold 
(2000) who postulated that management and investors may depend on the board as a 
vehicle to access and manage limited resources. The resource dependence theory also 
deduces that the directors‟ roles are more than just minimising uncertainty as they 
provide valuable expertise as well as advice in several strategic areas. 
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Advocates of the resource dependence theory consider the board of directors as an 
important organisational body that would provide crucial resources for the firm, 
protect the firm from environmental uncertainties, and minimise transaction costs in 
maintaining external relationships (Huse, 2005; Matthew, Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 
2003). This is supported by  Erakovic and Goel (2008) who confirmed that decision 
makers, such as management and the board, have an effective role in striving for 
external resources, minimising environmental uncertainties, and establishing 
numerous links with other companies. Therefore, Provan, Beyer and  Kruytbosch 
(1980) argued within the purview of the resource dependence theory that, having 
members on the boards who otherwise serve on the boards of various organisations, 
including the boards‟ ACs may be significant for the organisation's  survival. 
3.2.3 Institutional Theory 
The institutional theory is basically concerned with a company's interaction with the 
institutional environment, the impact of social expectations with the company, as 
well as the inclusion of these expectations as demonstrated in the organisational 
characteristics and practices (Martinez & Dacin, 1999). It recognises the functions of 
external pressures in architecting organisational activities and affirms the 
significance of legitimacy (Berrone, Gelabert, Fosfuri & Gomez-Mejia, 2007). The 
institutional theory focuses on a complete set of organisational acts, such as the 
institutional environment and ritualistic structures that function within this active 
display. The theory also posits that for understanding corporate governance at the 
time of a doubtful and uncertain environment, the AC and the board may emphasise 
symbolic and ritualistic roles. The ritualistic role is the AC‟s formal task to hire and 
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fire external auditors. The symbolic role relates to the redefinition of audit client to 
mean AC rather than corporate management (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 
2008).  
3.2.4 Signaling Theory 
The signaling theory originated from the work of Spence (1973). The theory was 
developed in order to describe behaviour in the labour market. According to the 
author, signals are alterable and thus, hypothetically subject to manipulation by the 
job applicant. He assumed that education is costly and that individuals invest in 
education when there is an adequate return (obtainable wage) and then, they are 
likely to select signals in order to maximise the alteration between offered wages and 
signaling cost.  He also contended that managers might not properly understand their 
employee‟s productivity whereas employees with higher abilities could signal their 
abilities to the employer in order to gain benefits in return. More so, the signaling 
theory postulates that managers disclose information in order to lessen information 
asymmetry and also to signal to outsiders that a company is doing better than its 
peers (Miller, 2002; Spence, 1973).  Though, it is also possible that underperforming 
firms may provide sound disclosure in order to lessen underperformance. However, it 
is possible that managers will deliver truthful information in spite of bearing the 
signaling cost. Since, managers‟ disclosure choices are also influenced by the 
marginal benefit to be gained from reducing the information asymmetry in the 
market (Abhayawansa & Abeysekera, 2009). More so, managers may smooth 
income to signal its projections about future performance in a situation where 
earnings forecasts are not obtainable (Albrecht & Richardson, 1990). 
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Another reason that makes firms smooth income is the incentive motive, because 
managers may wish to smooth earnings in order to satisfy the owners of the firms to 
secure a position within the firm (Koch, 1981). The signaling theory also postulates 
that directors who believe that their firm can perform better than other firms would 
want to signal this to the investors in order to attract more investments. These explain 
the information perspective of earnings management. In this situation, EM can be 
employed to send additional signals on the position of the company to outsiders. 
Adopting this theory to the present study, it was expected that a company with sound 
corporate governance practices could send signals to shareholders that the 
management is acting to maximise shareholder wealth. This would promote 
investors‟ confidence  which might lead to an increase in the firm‟s share price 
(Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid & Zimmermann, 2006). In addition, increasing the 
presence of independent non-executive directors on the board may signal to owners 
that the company has strong corporate governance which will eventually promote 
investors‟ protection (Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009). Therefore, adopting from the 
foregoing arguments, it may be deduced that a company with an effective AC 
(independent AC) can signal to the stakeholders that it has effective monitors and 
this will invariably promote investors‟ protection and improve their confidence about 
the credibility of the financial reports. 
3.2.5 Feminist Theory 
According to Fischer, Reuber and Dyke (1993) there are two perceptions in 
behavioural and entrepreneurial research on gender and sex. These include the liberal 
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feminist and social feminist theories. According them, the liberal feminist 
perspective originated from the liberal political philosophy. It is based on the 
presumption that women are equally talented and rational, hence, they are complete 
human beings like men. The theory posits that women are only deprived compared to 
men as a result of obvious discrimination and systemic influence that keep them 
away from receiving vital resources, such as business education and experience. The 
liberal feminist theory also suggests that if women were to be given equal 
opportunities, men and women would utilise their potentials rationally and more 
equally, and hence, the psychological dissimilarities would reduce and later 
disappear. One major implicit postulation of this theory is that women will develop 
to become more like men, since the genesis for any existing dissimilarity is presumed 
to be women‟s relative deprivation (Fischer et al.,1993). Studies that have been 
conducted to validate this theory have established little evidence that the obvious 
discrimination and systemic influence keeping women away from receiving vital 
resources, such as business education and experience, hinder their capabilities to 
succeeded in business (Belcourt, 1991). 
The social feminist perspectives, on the other hand, are of the view that women and 
men differ intrinsically as a result of differences in early and current socialisation. 
The social feminist theory also suggests that the inherent difference between women 
and men does not mean that women are inferior to men since men and women may 
develop differently, but with equally effective qualities (Fischer et al.,1993). Prior 
studies conducted on female socialised qualities and ethics are consistent with the 
social feminist theory. They contend that the little difference between men and 
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women has less influence on their business performance (Chrisman, Carsrud, 
DeCastro & Herron, 1990; Riding & Swift, 1990). Consequently, in light of the 
above-mentioned arguments, this study has adopted both the liberal feminist theory 
and the social feminist theory because it was expected that gender diversity in the 
AC did not mean that female directors in the AC are inferior to men, because women 
would have similar functions like their men counterparts in minimising EM and 
improving financial reporting quality. 
In light of the above-mentioned fact, this study has incorporated all of the five 
theories: the agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, 
signaling theory, and feminist theory, to underpin the relationship between the 
variables of AC characteristics (size, independence, meetings, financial accounting 
expertise, legal expertise, female, stock ownership, tenure and chair), the mediator 
audit quality, and the dependent variable of FRQ. The agency theory and resource 
dependence theory were employed to guide the interrelationship between AC and 
FRQ. This is because the theories have been used by prior studies to explain how AC 
can improve FRQ (Abernathy et al., 2014; Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Bédard et al., 2004; Yang & Krishnan, 2005). However, only a 
few of the prior studies have combined both the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory. Additionally, most of the studies on AC did not use multiple 
theories (Brennan & Kirwan, 2015). Thus, there is need for theoretical pluralism in 
the study of the AC (Gendron, 2009). This is because, most of the previous studies 
on the AC mostly, explicitly or implicitly, adopt the agency theory to underpin their 
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variables of interest from the AC (Brennan & Kirwan, 2015; Carcello, Hermanson & 
Ye, 2011). 
The institutional theory and agency theory have been adopted to explain the 
interrelation between audit quality and AC, and how these causal effects influence 
FRQ.  In addition, the signaling theory has been used to save as the supportive theory 
in light of the arguments that a company with sound corporate governance practices 
can send a signal to shareholders that the management is acting to maximise 
shareholder wealth (Beiner et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009) and this promotes 
investors‟ confidence about the credibility of the financial reports. More so, the 
social feminist theory has been employed to underpin the female AC members 
because it was expected that female directors in the AC would have similar functions 
like their men counterparts in minimising EM in and improving financial reporting 
quality. Consequently, the framework of the study was in line with the objectives of 
the study as depicted in Figure 3.1.  The diagram incorporates all the variables of the 
study consistent with the agency theory, resource dependence theory, signaling 
theory, feminist theory and the institutional theory. The motivation of the present 
study has been to determine the relationship between the AC characteristics and FRQ 
in Nigeria. There are studies on AC and FRQ in Nigeria.  However, there has been a 
lack of studies that incorporate such characteristics of AC (size, independence, 
meetings, financial accounting expert, legal expert, female, stock ownership, tenure, 
and chair) in the Nigerian firms. As such, the study has become necessary in Nigeria. 
More so, the study is amongst the pioneers that examine the mediating role of audit 
quality between AC characteristics and FRQ. 
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Figure 3.1  
Conceptual Framework of the Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the Link between AC Characteristics and FRQ
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3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Previous studies have explained the impact of AC characteristics on FRQ. The five 
theories: agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, signaling 
theory, and feminist theory underpinning the study have also established 
explanations on the influence of AC characteristics and FRQ. Therefore, the 
hypotheses development of the study has been based on these theories and some of 
the empirical findings from prior literature. 
3.3.1 Audit Committee Size and Financial Reporting Quality 
With respect to the resource dependence theory, AC size has been considered to be 
highly resourceful, thereby improving the FRQ as a result of the diverse skills, 
expertise, and experiences they share amongst themselves (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; 
Hillman et al., 2000). This could be the potential reason why some prior literature 
argued that a larger AC size is more effective in monitoring management. This is 
confirmed by the findings of Felo et al. (2003) and Leong et al. (2015) who 
documented that AC size is negatively associated with EM and positively related to 
the financial reporting of US firms. In this dimension, the expectation has been that 
the larger the size of the AC, the more resourceful it will be in mitigating earnings 
manipulations and improving the FRQ of a firm. This is supported by some recent 
studies that documented a negative significant association between AC size and DA 
(Azzoz & Khamees, 2016; Mishra & Malhotra, 2016). This validates the findings of 
Liu and Sun (2010) who studied the role of directors‟ tenure on the effectiveness of 
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an independent AC. Their result shows that AC size has a negative significant 
relationship with EM. This suggests that a larger AC is effective in mitigating EM. 
More so, a recent study by Setiany et al. (2017) examined the AC attributes and 
voluntary financial disclosure in Indonesia. The study revealed that the AC size had a 
positive significant influence on the voluntary financial disclosure of the firms.  
Mohammed, Ahmed and Ji (2017) revealed a positive significant association 
between AC size and accounting conservatism.  In addition, Ismail and Kamarudin 
(2017) contended that AC size revealed an inverse association between income 
smoothing behaviour of firms. This supports the deceptive proponent of the creative 
accounting practiced by firms.  
 
In Nigeria, recent studies conducted by Abubakar (2016), Chi-Chi and Friady (2016), 
Abata and Migiro (2016) found a negative significant association between AC size 
and EM. This also validates the result of  Miko (2016) who revealed that AC size is 
negatively and significantly associated to discretionary accruals. This implies that, a 
larger number of AC members is more effective in minimising EM. Despite the fact 
that the proponents of the agency theory argued that smaller boards are more 
effective monitoring mechanisms and more decisive (Jensen, 1993; Leong et al., 
2015; Lin et al., 2006; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 2005). Recent empirical 
evidences have shown that larger AC are more likely to reduce EM and in return 
improves FRQ (Azzoz & Khamees, 2016; Mishra & Malhotra, 2016). Furthermore, 
the negative relationships found between the AC size and EM in Nigeria indicates 
that the larger AC size improved the FRQ. Thus, consistent with resource 
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dependence theory it was expected that larger AC size would be negatively related to 
EM, but positively related to FRQ. This is because bigger AC may have diverse 
experience and have more ideas than smaller AC. This gives the bigger AC high 
likelihood of reducing the EM. In line with the foregoing, the study hypothesised 
that: 
H1: AC size has a positive association with the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
3.3.2 Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality 
Signaling theory posits that increasing the presence of the independent non-executive 
directors on the board may signal to owners that the company has strong corporate 
governance which will eventually promote investors‟ protection (Chen, Chen & Wei, 
2009). Previous studies on AC have documented that an independent AC plays a 
significant role in checkmating managers‟ opportunistic behaviours and enhancing 
FRQ (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Amar, 2014; Bédard et al., 2004; Khalil & Ozkan, 
2016; Klein, 2002; Sharma & Kuang, 2014; Shirazi & Salehi, 2016; Yang & 
Krishnan, 2005). Uzun et al. (2004) support the advocation of the illusive perspective 
where income smoothing is considered as an intolerable act in reporting earnings. 
They found that accumulating the proportion of independent directors in the AC 
reduces the likelihood of financial fraud through the use of income smoothing. This 
is confirmed by Ismail and Kamarudin (2017) who documented a negative 
significant relationship between AC independence and the income smoothing of the 
listed companies in Malaysia. 
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Fuad (2016) examined the effect of the AC characteristics on the real EM of the 
listed firms in Indonesia. The study revealed that AC independence had a positive 
significant association with real EM. More recently, Jerubet et al. (2017) examined 
the AC attributes and FRQ of the listed firms in Kenya. Their results showed a 
negative significant association between AC independence and FRQ. This is 
supported by Azzoz and Khamees (2016) and Saleem and Alzhobi (2016) who found 
a negative significant impact between AC independence and DA. On the contrary, 
Inya et al. (2018) examined the role of corporate governance in minimising the 
management misbehaviour in Thailand. Their study showed a positive but 
nonsignificant relationship between AC independence and the possibility that 
management would misbehave. This validated some studies revealing that AC 
independence has a positive influence on DA and restatements (Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2015; Gao & Huang, 2016). This indicates that a higher ratio of AC 
independence on the board is correlated with a higher level of abnormal accruals and 
the likelihood that firms restate their earnings. This was affirmed by the recent study 
by Poretti et al. (2018) which contended that the greater the percentage of 
independent directors in the companies‟ ACs, the higher the market reactions to the 
earnings pronouncements. They advocated that more autonomous audit committees 
serve as substitutes for weak institutions to enhance the reliability of their earnings 
pronouncements. Moreover, Amin et al. (2018) revealed that AC independence has a 
negative significant relationship with DA. 
Studies in Nigeria, such as Kantudu and Samaila (2015), argued that the AC 
independence improved the  FRQ of the oil firms. In addition, Ormin, et al. (2015) 
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confirmed that independent AC members reduces the magnitude of the working 
capital accruals.  Whilst Kibiya et al. (2016a) affirmed that AC independence 
reduces managers' earnings manipulations and improves financial reporting quality. 
More recently, Akhor and Oseghale (2017) argued that AC independence has a 
positive significant influence on the FRQ. This was observed by Akeju and 
Babatunde (2017) who confirmed that the AC independence had a negative 
significant association with DA. This showed that an increase in the number of 
independent directors in the AC improves FRQ. Consistent with the signaling theory, 
this study expects that the existence of the independent non-executive directors in the 
AC may signal to owners that the company has strong corporate governance which 
will protect their interest and in returns improves FRQ (Chen, Chen & Wei, 2009).  
Therefore, the study hypothesised that: 
H2: Audit committee independence has a positive association with the FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.3 Audit Committee Meetings and Financial Reporting Quality 
Consistent with the agency theory, Beasley et al. (2009) argued that members of the 
AC are committed to meaningful and substantive meetings which will, in turn, lead 
to better monitoring and improve the financial reporting process. Previous literature 
contended that the frequency of the AC meetings reduces the degree of financial 
restatements.  Since frequent meetings with the internal auditors will keep them 
informed and acquainted with the accounting and auditing issues (Abbott et al., 
2004; Raghunandan et al., 2001). In the same vein, Hamdan et al. (2013) and  
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Habbash and Alagla (2015) argued that more frequent meetings reduces DA and 
enhances FRQ.  In contrast, other studies report insignificant relations between AC 
meetings and DA (Bamahros & Wan Hussin, 2015; Habbash & Alagla, 2015; 
Kamolsakulchai, 2015). On the other hand, Katmon and Farooque (2015) observed 
that AC meetings have a positive significant relationship with EM, which implies 
that more frequent meetings are associated with higher EM. 
More so, Ika and Ghazali (2012) studied the effectiveness of the AC and the 
timeliness of financial reporting in Indonesia. They found that the AC effectiveness, 
including the frequency of meetings, minimised the audit reporting lead time. More 
recently, Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017)  examined the AC quality and FRQ in India. 
The study revealed that the AC meetings had a negative significant impact on the 
FRQ proxied by DA. This is affirmed by Kolsi and Grassa (2017) who examined 
whether the governance mechanisms influenced the EM of Islamic banks. Their 
findings showed that the AC meetings had a negative significant influence on the 
discretionary loan loss provisions. 
In Nigeria, a study by Dabor and Dabor (2015) documeted a negative significant 
influence between the AC meetings and discretionary loan loss provisions, whilst 
Ibrahim et al. (2016)  affirmed that the AC meetings increased the degree of the real 
EM of the listed non-financial companies in Nigeria Mbobo and Umoren (2016) 
studied the effect of the AC attributes and the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. They found that the AC meetings had a positive significant association with 
the FRQ. This has been confirmed by Umobong and Ibanichuka (2017) who found 
that an AC meetings have a positive significant relationship with FRQ. More so, 
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Dakata et al. (2017) studied the impact of the AC meetings on the EM of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. They revealed that the AC meetings had an inverse 
relationship with the EM in Nigeria. This proved the arguments that a more diligent 
and active AC enhances FRQ (Beasley et al., 2009). Consistent with the agency 
theory, it is expected that AC substantive meetings may lead to better monitoring and 
improve the financial reporting process. Based on the foregoing arguments, the study 
hypothesised that: 
H3: Audit committee meetings have a positive association with the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.4 Audit Committee Financial Accounting Expert and Financial Reporting 
Quality 
Consistent with the resource dependence theory, the function of the AC is to make 
resources, including expertise and experiences, that will enable the firm to gain 
competitive advantages, particularly in regards to FRQ. The AC expertise is an 
essential part of the governance devices that serves as a vehicle to aid a company to 
achieve its strategic objectives (Cohen et al., 2007; Pfeffer, 1972). By providing 
proper monitoring, this is expected to minimise agency problems as a result of 
management‟s opportunistic behaviours. 
An AC financial accounting expert is one of the important segments of expertise in 
the AC. Prior literature on AC financial accounting experts have established that a 
larger proportion of members with financial accounting expertise in the AC provides 
better monitoring of the managers‟ discretionary activities and enhances the FRQ of 
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the firms. For instance,  Agrawal and Chadha (2005) contended that accounting 
experts on the AC reduce the tendency of earnings restatements. Whilst Badolato et 
al. (2014); Baxter and Cotter (2009) and Ittonen et al. (2016) suggested that AC 
accounting experts minimise the levels of EM of firms and, consquently, improve 
financial reporting quality. Defond et al. (2005); Dhaliwal et al. (2010); Farber et al. 
(2016); Felo et al. (2003); and Mcdaniel et al. (2002) argued that accounting 
expertise on the AC enhances the quality of financial reports.  
 
Furthermore, Saleem and Alzoub  (2016) affirmed that AC accounting experts 
constrain the extent of the DA of firms. Similarly, Krishnain and Visvanathan (2008) 
and Sultana et al. (2013) contended that a larger proportion of financial accounting 
experts on the AC enhances the effective monitoring function and improves 
accounting conservatism when the board is characterised by strong governance. Fuad 
(2016) argued that AC financial accounting experts have positive significant 
associations with real EM. This validates the findings of Huang and Thiruvadi (2010) 
who examined the association between AC characteristics and financial fraud. The 
study showed that AC financial accounting experts were negatively associated with 
financial fraud. This indicates that the members of the AC with financial accounting 
knowledge were more likely to prevent financial fraud in the US firms. The 
proponents of resource dependence theory argued that AC accounting experts are the 
most active financial experts in improving the audit committee‟s monitoring role 
(Cohen et al., 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). This is 
because accounting expertise may be more relevant for members of AC than any 
other expertise, since „„best practices‟‟ recommend that members of AC are 
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accountable for tasks that demand a high degree of accounting sophistication 
(DeFond et al., 2005). Thus, it is observed that increasing the percentage of 
accounting experts on the AC increases the likelihood that the AC will detect 
accounting manipulations performed by managers. And, subsequently, increases the 
possibility that the AC will improve the FRQ of firms. Consistent with the resource 
dependence theory, the study hypothesised that: 
H4: Audit committee financial accounting expertise has a positive association with 
the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.5 Audit Committee Legal Expertise and Financial Reporting Quality 
Under the perception of the resource dependence theory, Cohen et al. (2008) 
contended that a focal point on the resource dependence manifested through the 
organisation and industry skills of the non-accounting expertise on the AC can 
improve the audit committees' ability to examine whether accounting procedures 
correctly reflect the basic financial substance of the business activities, which will 
advance to a higher FRQ. Previous studies on AC legal experts argued that legal 
expertise acts as a monitor rather than a mere signal to financial reporting. For 
instance, Baxter and Cotter  (2009) confirmed that legal experts on the AC 
significantly reduce the DA. This has been confirmed by Krishnan et al. (2011) who 
indicated that legal expertise acts as a monitor rather than a mere signal to financial 
reporting. Since, they are more informed on the legal liability threats and their legal 
backgrounds require them to be more vigilant to such threats. It can be contended 
that increasing the presence of directors with legal backgrounds in the AC can reduce 
the DA and enhances the FRQ of companies. Because their legal experiences make 
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them more acquainted with litigation and legal liability threats relating to financial 
reporting. 
More recently, Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017) examined the AC and FRQ in India. 
The result from their study showed that the AC legal experts had a negative 
significant impact on the DA. In line with the resource dependence theory, it is 
expected that AC members with valuable expertise other than accounting expertise 
can contribute in improving FRQ (Cohen et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Thus, 
the study hypothesised that: 
H5: Audit committee legal expertise has a positive association with the FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.6 Female Audit Committee Member and Financial Reporting Quality 
It has been argued that females are more risk antagonistic, careful, and decent than 
men (Gold et al., 2009). The social feminist theory also suggests that the inherent 
difference between women and men does not mean that women are inferior to men 
since men and women may develop differently but with equality effective qualities 
(Fischer et al.,1993). Thus, a larger proportion of women directors enhances the audit 
committees' effectiveness and monitoring activities (Ittonen et al., 2016). Prior 
studies on AC gender contended that the presence of female directors in the AC 
reduces EM and increases the likelihood that auditors report uncertainty and the 
scope limitation of the qualification in the financial statements (Dobija et al., 2016; 
Firoozi et al., 2016; Ittonen et al., 2016; Abdullah & Ku-Ismail, 2016; Martınez et 
al., 2016; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). 
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Huang and Thiruvadi (2010) examined the association between AC characteristics 
and financial fraud. They showed that a higher proportion of women in the AC 
committee improves AC diligence which promotes the financial reporting process. 
More so, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) contended that a female AC member mitigates 
the EM by increasing the negative income, decreasing the DA. This supports the 
argument of Dobija et al. (2016) who affirmed that giving women a voice increases 
their role in influencing FRQ. This is further confirmed by Abdullah and Ku-Ismail 
(2016) who suggested that increasing the proportion of female directors in the AC 
decreases the likelihood of DA. 
More recently,  Sánchez et al. (2017) utilised 159 listed banks from nine European 
countries and examined the effect of gender diversity and financial expertise on EQ. 
The result shows that the female AC member with financial accounting expertise was 
negatively correlated with the discretionary non-loss provisions, and this implies a 
higher accounting quality. This is confirmed by Lara et al. (2017) who studied the 
roles of women directors on the accounting quality of the listed companies in the 
UK. Their results showed that a larger proportion of women on the board enhanced 
earnings quality. They further argued that gender bias was negatively correlated to 
earnings quality. Similarly, Lenard, Yu, York and Wu (2017) examined the influence 
of female leadership on the occurrence of fraud litigation in the UK. The study 
showed that the presence of women on the board reduced the occurance of finanacial 
fraud ligation. This is consistent with the findings of Hoang et al. (2017) who 
examined the influence of board diversity on EQ. The study revealed a positive 
significant relationship between board diversity and EQ. Further studies by Ammer 
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and Ahmad-Zaluki (2017) examined the importance of gender multiplicity in 
exhibiting the quality of EM forecast in Malaysia. The study showed that female AC 
members enhanced the shareholders‟ protection and improved the monitoring role of 
the AC on the managers. This is affirmed by Oluoch et al. (2017) who examined the 
influence of the AC diversity on the FRQ in Kenya. Their findings showed that 
female participation in the AC improved the FRQ. Moreso, Zalata et al. (2018)  
contended that a higher percentage of female experts on the audit committee reduced 
the likehood of earnings manipulation. 
In Nigeria, Dakata et al. (2016) contended that female AC members had the same 
functions as female directors in minimising the EM performed by the managers. This 
is empirically confirmed by Eze (2017) who argued that a high ratio of females on 
the board mitigates DA. Similarly, Ahmed and Che-Ahmad (2016) documented that 
a larger percentage of female directors on the board increased the audit reporting lag 
and improved the FRQ of the Nigerian banks. More so, Kibiya et al. (2016c) found a 
positive but insignificant relationship between women directors and FRQ. It has been 
observed that the insignificant relationships documented by some of the above 
studies may be due to low proportions of women‟s representation on the board. This 
may further be attributed to insufficient sample sizes being adopted. For instance, 
Eze (2017) used a sample of six food product firms only. However, considering the 
above argument, if a large sample size is used, it may improve the variability of the 
women‟s representation on the board. Consistent with the social feminist theory, it 
was expected that female AC members would have similar functions like their men 
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counterparts in minimising EM and improving financial reporting quality. Based on 
the above arguments, the study hypothesised that: 
H6: Female audit committee members have a positive association with the FRQ of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.7 Audit Committee Stock Ownership and Financial Reporting Quality 
In line with the agency theory, equity ownership by directors reduces the tendency of 
agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control (Mangena & 
Pike, 2005). Because, increasing AC equity ownership decreases the likelihood of 
preventing negative earnings surprises. Which indicates that, AC shares aligns the 
interests of the members of the AC with the interests of other shareholders (Vafeas, 
2005; Yermack, 2004). Therefore, AC stock ownership has been found to play a 
significant influence in the oversight monitoring function of the AC (Kibiya et al., 
2016b).  
Prior studies on AC stock ownership has shown that a larger proportion of equity 
possessed by the AC reduces DA (Hamdan et al., 2013; Vafeas, 2005). Yang and 
Krishnan (2005) contended that the AC stock ownership significantly reduced the 
DA established by the management of the US companies. This is empirically 
confirmed by Rose, Mazza, Norman and Rose (2013) who argued that stock-holding 
directors have a high tendency of opposing managers' attempts to manipulate 
earnings. In addition, Lin et al. (2006) acknowledged that the AC stock ownership 
reduces the likelihood that a firm would restate its earnings in the US.  In addition, 
Campbell et al. (2015) studied the influence of stocks held by the AC during post 
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SOX in the US. They found that the AC stock holdings had a positive significant 
relationship with the probability of meeting or beating the analyst earnings 
predictions.  However, prior studies argued that possession of equity by the AC can 
erode their monitoring ability because this may compromise their independence in 
the decision-making process (Mangena & Pike, 2005). Since they will be more likely 
to increase their value as a result of share price increase (Sharma & Kuang, 2014). 
Both the foregoing studies were conducted using data from developed countries (the 
US and New Zealand). Therefore, their findings might not be extended to the 
Nigerian context. 
Recently, in Nigeria, Kibiya et al. (2016c) examined the effect of AC independence, 
stock ownership, financial expertise, and FRQ. The study revealed a positive 
significant relationship between AC stock ownership and FRQ. This suggests that 
increasing the percentage of shares held by the AC enhances their monitoring 
function and improves FRQ. From the foregoing, it has been deduced that most of 
the findings of the studies revealed that increasing the percentage of the equity held 
by the AC members constrains the opportunistic behaviours of the management. 
Therefore, consistent with the agency theory it is expected that AC stock ownership 
can play a significant influence in the oversight monitoring function of the AC by 
reducing agency cost.  Thus, this reduces the EM and increases the likelihood of 
having quality financial reports. Therefore, the study hypothesised that: 
H7: AC stock ownership has a positive association with the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
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3.3.8 Audit Committee Tenure and Financial Reporting Quality 
Advocates of the agency theory suggest that long tenure of AC increases the 
likelihood of negative earnings surprise avoidance (Vafeas, 2005). Within the 
context of the same agency perspective,  Beasley (1996) argued that, the longer that 
the directors serve on the board, the more likely they will reduce financial statement 
fraud. This is because the longer they stay on the board, the more knowledgeable and 
experienced they will be about the company‟s practices; and thus, they will become 
more effective in minimising financial reporting fraud (Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991). This notion has been supported by previous studies on AC tenure 
which documented that the longer the directors stay on the AC, the better they act in 
mitigating the manager‟s discretion to manipulate earnings and hence, improve FRQ 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Firoozi et al., 2016; Yang & Krishnan, 2005).  Bedard et al. 
(2004) explored the influence of AC characteristics on EM. They showed that EM is 
less likely to occur in the firm with long-tenured autonomous directors on the AC. 
Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) revealed that long serving directors on the AC are 
positively related to FRQ, signifying that long serving directors are more active in 
monitoring financial reporting.  However, some prior literature argued that prolonged 
board tenure of autonomous directors may possibly create a social relationship with 
the managers which might be established over time (Vafaes, 2003). Nevertheless, 
this finding has been criticised for adopting small sample and using single period 
(1996 only), which renders the evidence obtained from the study insufficient and 
warrants further  research (Liu & Sun ,2010). 
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In response to the above, Liu and Sun (2010) examined a large sample of 7,700 firm 
year observations in the US for the period of 1998 to 2005. They showed that AC 
tenure had a negative significant relationship with EM. This is in line with the 
argument that long-tenured directors have more skills and experience to effectually 
monitor the FR process. This validates the findings of Thoopsamut and Jaikengkit 
(2009) who studied the influence of the AC, audit firm size, and quarterly EM of the 
Thai listed companies. A recent study of Setiany et al. (2017) revealed a positive 
significant relationship between AC tenure and financial disclosure. This suggests 
that the longer tenure of directors in the AC improves FRQ. 
It has been observed that AC members who have been in the AC for longer periods 
are more acquainted with and exposed to the entity‟s financial reporting process and 
this, in turn, will have a direct effect on FRQ. In line with the above findings, the 
study hypothesized that: 
H8: AC tenure has a positive association with the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
3.3.9 Audit Committee Chair and Financial Reporting Quality 
In line with the agency theory, it has been contended that AC chairs are heavily 
active monitors (Beasley et al., 2009). Thus, the AC chairs are recognised as the 
chief executive officers (CEOs) of the AC (Ernst & Young, 2011, p. 8). 
Consequently, they are very crucial in establishing a liaison between the committee 
and the board of directors or the internal and external auditors  (Schmidt & Wilkins, 
2013). Thus, the AC chair has greater responsibility than other AC members for 
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financial reporting issues and thus, plays a vital role in supervising the financial 
reporting and, basically, influencing the efficacy of the AC (Bromilow & Keller, 
2011). 
Prior literature argues that AC chairs play a momentous role in enhancing AC 
effectiveness. They are considered as custodians in steering a group of people (Ernest 
& Young, 2011).  This insinuation is practically affirmed by the study by Tanyi  and 
Smith (2015) who showed a negative significant relationship between the number of 
AC chair positions and financial reporting fraud. They argued that companies with 
busy AC chairs have considerably higher levels of discretionary accruals, and are 
more probable to meet or beat earnings targets. They also contended that AC chairs‟ 
busyness reduces the oversight and monitoring roles of the AC on the financial 
reporting process. Similarly, Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) revealed that 
companies whose AC chairs have social ties to the CEO acquire less audit services 
and are involved more in earnings manipulations. They suggested that such 
companies‟ auditors are less probable to provide going-concern opinions or to expose 
internal control feebleness due to the existence of social ties. In addition, Hogan, 
Schmidt and Thompson (2015)  documented that AC chairs are less likely to be 
termed as defendants than other AC members. 
More so, a recent study by Ghafran and Yasmin (2018) revealed that AC chairs‟ 
monitoring, tenure, and experiential know-how have an inverse significant 
relationship with the audit reporting delay. They advocate that more effective AC 
chairs are more active in fast-tracking financial reporting timeliness. Moreover, a 
recent study by Qu (2018) showed that AC chairs vary from ordinary members in a 
 
 144 
number of ways: First, AC chairs are mostly the financial experts of the AC.  
Second, AC chairs are mostly in charge of more official duties, including creating the 
schedule for the committees‟ meetings, setting the agenda, collaborating with the 
internal and external auditors, and assessing the performances of the ordinary 
members. He also documented that AC chairs are regularly more probable to have 
special ties with managers before joining the committee. This makes them less 
effective in performing their oversight duties. 
In Nigeria, there is limited empirical evidence on the influence of AC chairs on 
financial reporting quality. Despite the fact that Section 359 (4) of the CAMA (2004) 
stipulates that the AC shall comprise a mixture of an equal representation of directors 
and shareholders. This uniqueness of the AC formation in Nigeria makes the 
chairmanship of the committee be handled by either a director or a shareholder. 
However, studies on the AC in Nigeria have failed to explore the uniqueness of the 
AC formation in Nigeria which is composed of an equal representation of 
shareholders and directors. Consequently, this study has examined how the influence 
of the AC chair (either a director or a shareholder) affects the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. Consequently, it was expected that the AC chair would be 
more likely to influence financial reporting processes than other AC members. 
Consistent with the agency theory it is expected AC chair can influence the motives 
for monitoring the financial reporting process (Sharma et al.,  2009). In line with the 
above arguments, the study hypothesised that: 
H9: AC chairs have a positive significant relationship with the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
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3.3.10 Audit Committee Size and Audit Quality 
Consistent with the resource dependence theory, it has been argued that more 
directors on the boards are positively associated with audit fees to guarantee better 
assurance  (Jizi & Nehme, 2018). Previous literature argued that a larger AC has a 
higher probability of promoting its status and power in an entity, thus it will demand 
a higher audit quality (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). This has been supported by 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) who found that AC size is positively and 
significantly associated with audit fee. Similarly, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) showed 
that the AC size has a positive significant relationship with audit quality proxied by 
audit fees and going-concern. This indicates that a larger AC is more likely to 
demand extensive audit coverage from the external auditors by paying higher audit 
fees. More so, Zaman et al. (2011) showed that a larger AC enhances audit quality in 
exchange for payment of higher audit fees. This has been observed by the recent 
study by Kim et al. (2016) who argued that a larger number of AC members is 
associated with a higher increase in audit fees, which acclaims that an increase of one 
member to an AC brings about an extra increase in audit fees in their effort to 
enhance external monitoring. More so, Marini et al. (2016) contended that larger 
sizes of the AC demand a greater audit assurance, and hence, support the demand 
side of the audit for more audit efforts which leads to higher audit fees.  
On the other hand, Akhalumeh, Agweda and Ogunkuade (2017) examined the 
influence of corporate governance and audit quality in Nigeria. They found that the 
board size was positively and significantly associated with the audit quality proxied 
by the Big 4 auditors. This showed that a larger board demanded greater audit 
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assurance by engaging the service of Big 4 auditors. Ejeagbasi, Nweze, Ezeh and 
Nze (2015) examined the influence of corporate governance and audit quality in the 
Nigerian banks. They found that board size was positively and significantly 
associated to the audit quality proxied by Big 4 auditors. They argued that a larger 
board demanded greater audit assurance by engaging the service of Big 4 auditors. 
More so, Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) explored the determinants of the audit fees 
of the listed companies in Nigeria. They showed that a larger board size was 
associated with higher audit fees.   
Nevertheless, it has been argued that strong internal governance mechanisms and 
external audits can be substituted for each other, which suggests that greater internal 
control including the AC may be related to lower audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). 
However, many empirical evidences do not support this notion (Abbott et al., 2003; 
Carcello et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2002; Hay et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2016). For 
instance it has been argued that lower audit fees force the audit team to reduce audit 
tests, which has adverse effect on audit quality (Cohen et al., 2007). Thus, consistent 
with the resource dependence theory, it is expected that larger AC size will be more 
willing to demand for greater audit assurance since they have been considered to be 
highly resourceful and effective monitors in reducing opportunistic management 
behaviour (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Therefore, larger AC sizes require a higher level of 
audit assurance and this enable them support the auditor‟s demand for more audit 




H10a: AC size has a positive relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.11 Audit Committee Independence and Audit Quality 
It has been argued that an AC that is independent of the management does not have a 
private or financial dependence on the managers. Hence, within the context of the 
agency theory, Abbott et al. (2003) and Carcello and Neal (2003) contended that an 
independent AC may be more ready to disagree with managers on different issues. 
Throughout the assessment of the audit programme and outcomes thereof, an 
independent AC may demand an extended audit scope in order to dodge being linked 
to a financial misstatement and reserve its reputational capital. Prior studies argued 
that companies with an effective AC with the majority of whom are independent  
directors pay high audit fees in order to protect the company's reputation and 
promote the interests of the investors (Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002). It 
has been contended that independent directors on the AC perform more of a 
monitoring role since they are independent of the management. This makes them 
require a high quality audit and be more willing to decrease the propensity for 
financial fraud and EM (Beasley, 1996; Hudaib & Cooke, 2005). This is affirmed by 
Lee and Mande (2005) who revealed that the AC independence was positively and 
significantly related to the audit fees of the listed firms in the US. In addition, Boo 
and Sharma (2008) showed that the AC independence was positively and 
significantly related to the audit fees in the US. This is in line with the demand 
hypothesis which proposes that an independent AC demands greater assurance from 
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the external auditors to guarantee the effective oversight of the financial reports and 
to safeguard their capital reputation. 
More so, Zaman et al. (2011) contended that independent non-executive directors in 
the AC are willing to pay higher audit fees in demand for greater audit effects. The 
explanation for this is, an AC that is composed of independent non-executive 
directors intends to pay higher audit fees to improve audit quality. This is confirmed 
by Marini et al. (2016) who argued that when there is a larger proportion of 
independent directors in the AC, it demands a greater audit assurance, consequently, 
supporting the demand side of the audit for more audit efforts which leads to higher 
audit fees. At the same time, Naser and Hassan (2016) explored the determinants of 
the audit fees amongst the listed companies in Dubai. They argued that increasing the 
presence of independent directors in the AC increased the audit fees to ensure better 
audit quality.  Rainsbury, Bradbury and Cahan (2009) explored the relationships 
between the AC, FRQ, and audit fees in an unregulated environment. They employed 
a sample of 87 firms listed in New Zealand for the year 2001. They showed that the 
AC proxied by AC independence had a slight influence on the audit fees. 
In addition, Jiraporn, Chintrakarn, Tong and Treepongkaruna (2018) explored 
whether board independence can be a substitute for external audit quality. They 
utilised a sample of 14,000 firm-year observations through 18 years. They revealed 
that companies with more independence of the board had less likelihood of engaging 
a Big 4 auditor. Suggesting that a robust board with a greater proportion of 
independent directors gained more active governance and thus, did not require as 
much from the external auditors. However, proponent of the demand-based  
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perspective contends that companies that have strong governance require external  
auditors  to  increase  audit  efforts,  leading  to  higher  audit  fees and engagement 
of  Big  4  auditors  (Kim,  Kwak,  Lim  &  Yu,  2017;  Krishnan  &  Visvanathan,  
2009).  The demand-based perspective also confirms the complementary roles of  
ACs  with respect to audit quality. Therefore, it is expected that an independent AC 
would demand a higher quality audit  for  better financial reporting  processes.  
 
Recent studies in Nigeria support the foregoing argument, for instance,  Ejeagbasi et 
al. (2015) examined the influence of corporate governance and audit quality in 
Nigeria. They found that the AC composition was positively and significantly 
associated with the audit quality proxied by Big 4 auditors.  This is consistent with 
the findings of  Akhalumeh et al. (2017) who examined the influence of the corporate 
governance and audit quality in Nigeria. They found that board independence was 
positively and significantly associated with the audit quality proxied by Big 4 
auditors. Similarly, Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) revealed  that  a larger amount 
of AC independence was linked with higher audit fees in Nigeria. This indicates that 
a larger number of independent directors demand greater audit assurance by 
engaging the service of Big 4 auditors and making payment of high audit fees.  In 
line with the above arguments, the study hypothesised that: 
H10b: AC independence has a positive relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
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3.3.12 Audit Committee Meetings and Audit Quality 
Consistent with the agency theory, Abbott et al. (2003) contended that the AC that 
meets at least two times in a year is more likely to engage an indusry specialist 
auditor. Prior studies show that AC meeting frequency is positively related to audit 
fees (Lee & Mande, 2005). This was observed by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) 
who argued that AC meetings are positively and significantly associated with audit 
fees. Furthermore, Zaman et al. (2011) argued that higher AC diligence makes them 
more encouraged to require more audit quality by paying higher audit fees. This is 
affirmed by Marini et al. (2016) who contended that a more diligent AC demands a 
greater audit assurance and, as a result, supports the demand side of the audit for 
more audit efforts which leads to higher audit fees. This validates the findings of 
Zhang, Zhou and  Zhou (2007) who examined AC quality auditor independence and 
internal weakness. They found that an effective AC that meets frequently increases 
audit quality by hiring Big 4 auditors.  
In addition, Huse and Solberg (2006) found that AC meetings have a positive 
significant influence on the audit fee. This supports the demand hypothesis of greater 
audit assurance for higher audit quality. This suggests that an AC that meets 
frequently can aggressively and absolutely influence audit coverage throughout the 
numerous steps of the audit. This is because, more frequent meetings demonstrate 
board‟s more diligence in discharging its roles, which enhance the level of oversight 
of the FRQ. Thus, it is expected that more frequent AC meeting support the purchase 
of „differentially higher-quality audit services‟ (Carcello et al., 2002). Moreover, 
Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) revealed that  the board meeting frequency was 
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linked to higher audit fees in Nigeria. In line with the above arguments, the study 
hypothesised that: 
H10c: AC meetings have a positive relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.13 Audit Committee Expertise and Audit Quality 
Consistent with the institutional theory, Cohen et al. (2014) showed that the AC that 
has members with specific industry expertise is associated with higher financial 
reporting quality. Consequently, if management and AC members work on a similar 
board within the same industry in which the firm resides, this relationship may 
improve the committee‟s expertise and, subsequently, enhance its overall capability 
to act as effective monitors.  This has been affirmed by Lee and Mande (2005) who 
contended that a larger proportion of AC financial experts increased the audit fees of 
the listed firms in the US in their demand for better assurance. In addition, Cohen et 
al. (2014) argued that AC accounting experts required more audit assurance by 
paying higher audit fees. They found, empirically, that AC financial accounting and 
supervisory experts directly and significantly increases audit fees. This is affirmed by 
Kim et al. (2016) who contended that financial experts in the AC show a larger 
increase in audit fees, which recommends that an increase in the number of financial 
experts on the AC brings about an additional increase in audit fees in their effort to 
enhance the external monitoring. 
Abbot et al. (2003) contended that the AC may also demand extra audit procedures 
outside the original audit plan for those areas later showing greater amounts of 
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disagreement, uncertainty, or risk. Thus, the AC consisting of  a larger proportion of 
financial experts provides higher levels of audit assurance and possibly delivers 
stronger support for auditors during audit scope discussions with management 
(Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello & Neal, 2003). Since, AC members who have financial 
expertise offer additional support for external auditors when deliberating or 
negotiating auditing issues and audit coverage with management. Those experts 
allow AC members to better comprehend the auditing issues and risks, as well as the 
audit procedures planned to address these issues and risks (Abbot et al., 2003). 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) contended that the financial experts required more 
audit effort for better audit assurance in the listed firms in the US. This affirms the 
findings of  Jizi and Nehme (2018) who examined the role of board supervision on 
the audit fees of the US commercial banks. They found that the AC financial expert 
was positively associated with audit fees. In Nigeria, Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) 
revealed  that a larger proportion of board expertise was associated with higher audit 
fees in their demand for greater assurance. In line with the above arguments and in 
reference to the complementary hypothesis, the study hypothesised that: 
H10d: AC financial accounting experts have a positive relationship with the audit 
quality of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
However, there are limited studies that examine the influence of legal experts on 
audit quality,  but prior studies argued that the presence of legal expertise in the AC 
can assist in improving better financial reporting process. Since FRQ can be linked to 
legal liability threats, the experiences of legal experts may require them to be more 
watchful to such threats (Krishnan et al., 2011). Thus, this enables them to be more 
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willing to purchase high audit quality in order to avoid potential litigation and 
promotes financial reporting process. Therefore consistent with resource dependence 
theory, it is expected that diversity of expertise in AC including the legal expertise 
can enhance the audit committees' capacity to determine whether accounting ethics 
and procedure correctly reflect the basic financial elements of the business 
undertakings, which in return improve FRQ (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen et al.,2014). 
Therefore, the study hypothesised that: 
H10e: AC legal experts have a positive relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.14 Female Audit Committee Member and Audit Quality 
The liberal feminist theory also proposes that if women were given equal 
opportunities, men and women would utilise their potentials rationally and more 
equally. Thus, their psychological dissimilarities would reduce and later disappear 
(Fischer et al.,1993). Ittonen et al. (2010) contended that a female AC chair is 
associated with lower audit fees. They also stressed that, from the preview of the 
demand perspective, female AC chairs decrease the desire for the assurance 
delivered by the external auditors. On the other hand, from the supply-side 
perception, AC members and female chairs may reduce audit fees by influencing the 
audit assessment risk or by enhancing the effectiveness of the internal control system 
or by generally improving the credibility of the financial reports (Ittonen et al., 
2010). However, recent studies argued that female AC members demand greater 
audit efforts than their male counterparts. This has been affirmed by Aldamen et al. 
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(2016)  who posited  that a diverse gender in the AC will demand a higher audit 
quality in high risk circumstances which is attributed to higher audit fees. This makes 
the external auditors increase the level and scope of the audit efforts reflecting the 
demand side hypothesis. They found that female AC members demand greater audit 
efforts than their male counterparts. This suggests that female representation on the 
AC increases audit fees in demanding more audit efforts. A more recent study by Lai 
et al. (2017) showed that the female AC members demanded higher audit quality by 
paying higher audit fees than the male directors in the US firms. 
In another development, Eagly and Carli (2003) contended that women have to show 
extra abilities in order to gain managerial positions and be on corporate boards. In 
light of the foregoing, it was expected that gender diversity might enhance the 
efficiency of the company‟s boards and committees. Since, the social feminist theory 
suggests that the inherent difference between women and men does not mean that 
women are inferior to men since men and women may develop differently, but with 
equally effective qualities (Fischer et al.,1993). This is consistent with the finding of 
Huang, Huang and Lee (2014) who argued that a female CEO requires greater 
assurance from the external auditor by paying higher audit fees. In line with the 
above arguments and with reference to the complementary hypothesis, the study 
hypothesised that: 
H10f: Female AC members have a positive relationship with the audit quality of listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
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3.3.15 Audit Committee Stock Ownership and Audit Quality 
Under the preview of the agency theory, it is recommended that the demand for an 
independent external auditor is a consequence from a desire to lessen the 
management shirking that results from asymmetric information between shareholders 
and managers. The theory has been tested by some earlier studies (Abbott & Parker, 
2000; DeFond, 1992; Menon & Williams, 1994) and they  connected the agency 
theory to audit quality, board of directors‟ ownership structure, and AC.  Prior 
research on AC stock ownership have argued that a larger proportion of equity 
possessed by the AC decreases the DA (Hamdan et al., 2013; Vafeas, 2005). 
Ejeagbasi et al (2015) examined the influence of corporate governance and audit 
quality in Nigerian banks. They found that the ownership concentration was 
positively associated to the audit quality proxied by Big 4 auditors. In addition, 
Adam and Bala (2015) studied ownership structure and audit quality in Nigeria. 
Their study revealed a positive significant influence between directors ownership and 
the audit quality of the Nigerian banks. They suggested that a higher proportion of 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership enhanced their monitoring by 
providing greater audit assurance through engaging better auditors. Due to the fact 
that there is no study to the best of the researchers‟ knowledge that examined AC 
stock ownership and audit quality, the foregoing arguments have been applied, which 
established that a higher proportion of ownership structure (managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership) increases the demand for greater audit assurance in order 
to protect their resources. In line with the above arguments and in reference to the 
complementary hypothesis the study hypothesised that: 
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H10g: AC stock ownership has a positive relationship with the Audit quality of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.16 Audit Committee Tenure and Audit Quality 
Agency theory proponents argue that the longer directors serve on the board, the 
more familiar and knowledgeable they will be about the company‟s practices and 
thus, they become more effective in curtailing the likelihood of financial reporting 
fraud (Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas, 2005).  Prior studies 
contended that the positive influence of long serving board directors on monitoring 
effectiveness outweighs the negative influence, particularly when it comes to 
monitoring the financial reporting process. In that, long serving directors who are 
autonomous to the management have greater governance quality as they may be 
more cautious with reputational capitals and, consequently, purchase more audit 
efforts (Chan, Liu & Sun, 2013 Vafeas, 2003). This suggests that the external audit 
might be a complement to AC governance and, as a result, there might be a positive 
relationship between the percentage of long serving directors on the AC and audit 
fees. 
In addition, Chan, Liu and Sun (2013) argued that external auditors might put a price 
on AC effectiveness, for instance, AC governance may be a substitute for external 
auditing. In this situation, external auditors can spend less effort on clients with a 
higher proportion of long serving directors on the autonomous AC in situations 
where long serving directors have greater monitoring effectiveness. On the other 
hand, long serving directors might have a lower request for audit efforts. This will 
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lead to a negative relationship between the percentage of long serving directors on 
the AC and audit fees. However, it can be argued that AC long tenure reproduces 
higher monitoring effectiveness as long tenure directors are more active monitors, 
and they are more likely to request more audit efforts to ensure better monitoring 
effectiveness in order to reduce reputational losses (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Recent 
empirical evidence has confirmed that long-tenured directors are linked to higher 
audit fees in their demand for better assurance. For instance,  Lai et al. (2017) whose 
study showed that  long AC tenure demand higher audit quality by paying higher 
audit fees. In line with the above arguments, the study hypothesised that: 
 
H10h: AC tenure has a positive significant relationship with the audit quality of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.3.17 Audit Committee Chair and Audit Quality 
Consistent with the agency theory, it has been argued that the AC chair is the first 
person accountable for accomplishing several responsibilities of the committee 
(Beasley et al., 2009). This is because; the AC chair is responsible for setting the 
committee‟s meeting agendas (Beasley et al., 2009).  Prior studies on the AC chair 
have documented that the AC chair gains control over the AC, schedules the agendas 
and controls the information flow (Sharma, Naiker & Lee, 2009). This has been 
empirically observed by Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) who examined whether 
the AC is a management watchdog or personal colleague of the CEOs. They 
employed a sample of listed firms after the Sarbanes Oxley Act for five years 2004 to 
2008. They showed that companies whose AC has social ties to the CEO acquire less 
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audit services and are involved more in earnings management. They also suggested 
that such companies‟ auditors are less probable to provide going-concern opinions or 
to expose internal control feebleness due to the existence of social ties. Baatwah, 
Ahmad and Salleh (2016) examined whether the AC chair matters on the link 
between AC expertise and FRQ. They showed that an AC chair with financial 
expertise increases the committee‟s effectiveness by positively influencing a timelier 
financial reporting disclosure of firms. Consequently, the AC chair is a vital 
component of the AC that enhances the audit process (Beattie, Fearnley & Hines, 
2012). Thus, it was expected that the AC chairs would determine the precedence of 
the firms‟ audit teams and supervise the evaluation of the quality and scope of the 
firms‟ financial reports as well internal audit functions. 
Recently, a study of Qu (2018) showed that the AC chairs vary from ordinary 
members in a number of ways: First, AC chairs are mostly the financial experts of 
the AC.  Moreover, AC chairs are mostly in charge of more official duties, including 
scheduling for the committees‟ meetings, setting the agenda collaborating with the 
internal and external auditors, and assessing the performance of the ordinary 
members. Thus, in line with the agency theory, it has been contended that the AC 
chairs are the first to be questioned for achieving several responsibilities of the 
committee (Beasley et al., 2009). Then it is likely that they will be more willing to 
demand for greater audit effort from the external auditors by paying high audit. In 
line with the above arguments, the study hypothesised that: 
H10i: AC chairs have a positive relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. 
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3.4 Audit Quality and Financial Reporting Quality 
In line with the institutional theory, Cohen et al. (2008) contended that it is important 
to recognise the substance of the communication between diverse governance 
mechanisms and how these mechanisms use symbolic signals and actions to preserve 
their form to all pertinent mechanisms. Audit services improve the credibility of the 
financial reports and their reliability as a monitoring device. Thus, prior studies relate 
the agency demand for audit quality to variables such as client size and management 
share ownership (DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988). In line with the agency 
perspective, differences that exist between owners and managers result in 
information asymmetry between them. The agency theory posits that external 
auditors align the interests of management and owners in order to reduce the conflict 
of interest as well as any feasible managers' opportunistic behaviours that might arise 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because, shareholders employ auditors to provide 
information that is essentially useful in accomplishing a contract with the 
management (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). It is expected that auditing financial 
reports is recognised as a means to decrease agency cost. This is because, it has been 
argued that the external auditors reduced the propensity of income smoothing in 
Australasian firms (Adi, 2000). 
Previous literature on audit quality and FRQ shows that a high audit fee and the 
engagement of Big 4 auditors are associated to lower EM and a higher quality of 
financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2007). Franke et al. (2002) studied the effect of 
audit fees and EM in the US. The study revealed that audit fees and Big 5 auditors 
had negative significant relationships with EM. This is affirmed by Hoitash et al. 
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(2007) who revealed a negative significant correlation between audit fees and DA. 
Mitra et al. (2009)  argued that both audit and non-audit fees reduce the likelihood of 
abnormal accruals and thus, increase earnings quality. Carmona et al. (2015) 
indicated that the audit fee has a negative and significant association to abnormal 
accruals.   
More recently, Asthana et al. (2018) contended that fees competitions are cherished 
as a vital mechanism for enhancing the quality of the audit in the much concentrated 
US audit market. Moreover, Knechel et al. (2018) argued that societies with higher 
trust and public cooperation are more likely to put a price on a robust audit function 
and demand higher audit services. They also contended that the existence of Big 4 
auditors is robust in nations with higher levels of public cooperation, and thus, 
countries with higher trust and public cooperation pay higher audit fees. This premise 
recommends that nations with higher extensive trust or higher public cooperation 
stress a higher price on the audit services and thus, be ready to pay higher audit fees.  
Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) revealed that audit fees are higher for companies that 
embark on related party transactions comprising the procumbent and the sale of 
assets, merchandise, and services. It has also been contended that firms that are 
audited by Big 4 auditors exhibit less EM than those audited by Non-Big 4 auditors 
(Abernathy et al., 2014; Alves, 2014; Khalil & Ozkan, 2016; Abdullah & Ku-Ismail, 
2016; Saleem  & Alzoub, 2016). This suggests Big 4 auditor are more likely to 
enhance FRQ of firms. More so, Alzoubi (2016) argued that EM is significantly 
lower amongst companies that engage the service of Big 4 auditors than companies 
that are audited by Non-Big 4 auditors. 
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From the emerging markets, Saleem and Alzhobi (2016) found that the audit quality 
was negatively related to EM. Their findings revealed that the audit fee had a 
negative significant relationship with the DA. They further confirmed that the EM 
was lower in the firms that had acquired the service of the Big 4 auditors compared 
to the firms that had acquired the service non-Big 4 auditors.  Recently, Wan Hussin 
et al. (2018) explored the influence of the lead appointment partner workload, tenure 
of partner-client, and audit reporting lag in Malaysia. They revealed that Big 4 
auditors were associated with a shorter reporting lag. 
In Nigeria, Aliyu et al. (2015) found that the auditors‟ financial dependence 
increased the rate of the EM of the banks. The findings revealed that the audit fees 
and the audit firm size proxied by the Big 4 auditors had a positive significant 
influence over the earnings quality. More so, Eriabie and Dabor (2017) showed that 
audit quality is negatively associated to EM. This has been affirmed by Ndubuisi and 
Ezechukwu (2017) who found that the audit fees and Big 4 audits had a positive 
significant relationship with the audit quality. In contrast, Okolie (2014) argued that 
the audit fee significantly decreased the DA of the listed firms in Nigeria. This has 
been confirmed by Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016) who contended that audit 
fees and Big 4 auditors reduced abnormal accruals.  This establishes that a payment 
of a high audit fees to external auditors in Nigeria do not impair their independence. 
More recently, Abdul-Rahman et al. (2017) showed that the audit fees had a positive 
significant association with the audit quality of the listed cement firms in Nigeria. 
It can be contended that a higher audit fee is associated with higher audit effort 
which, in turn, results in better monitoring and greater FRQ. On the other hand, 
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companies that are audited by Big 4 auditors have a lower tendency of EM. This is 
affirmed by Cohen et al. (2007) who showed that there is a negative significant 
association between Big 4 auditors and DA. 
Overall, as proposed by the institutional theory, it was expected that merging the AC 
to work with the external auditor would enhance the monitoring of the financial 
reporting process. This is because, the AC is considered to be a formal structure that 
is employed by an organisation in a ceremonial way, but the actual monitoring of the 
organisation is determine by other external factors, for example, external auditors in 
this context. This presumption is popularly known as "decoupling" (Escobar & 
Demeritt, 2017; Baker, Bedard & Hauret, 2014; Fourcade & Savelsberg, 2006). In 
line with the above, the study hypothesised that: 
H11; Audit quality has a positive impact on the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
H12; Audit quality mediates the relationship between the AC characteristics and the 
FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
3.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has provided the theories that elucidated the relationship between AC 
attributes and FRQ, AC attributes and audit quality, as well as audit quality and FRQ. 
The chapter explained how audit quality can mediate the relationship between AC 
attributes and FRQ.  And, it finally presented a detailed explanation of the theoretical 
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framework that served as a basis for the development of the hypotheses of the study. 






The chapter also explains the methodology of the research. These include the 
description of research design, population, sampling, and sources of the data 
collection. It also discusses the variable measurements and definitions, model 
specifications, and technique of the analysis; and finally, the chapter ends with the 
summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Research Method and Design 
The research design is considered as a blueprint or a master plan that explains the 
approaches and processes for gathering and investigating the requisite information 
(Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin, 2010). Thus, the most frequently employed 
research designs in business studies include the descriptive and explanatory research 
designs (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010; Zikmund et al., 2010). Conversely, the 
appropriateness of the type to be employed is basically influenced by the nature and 
precision of the research problem. A descriptive research design is performed in 
specific circumstances where only a slight amount of knowledge in regards to the 
type of problem exits. Thus, it is adopted to offer a more precise description of the 
problem (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010; Zikmund et al., 2010). On the contrary, an 
exploratory research design is used to source information on a specific problem at 
hand. Consequently, it does not offer conclusive results; thus, it is used to facilitate 
comprehension of a new phenomenon, that necessitates a further study to be 
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performed to obtain verifiable and convincing evidence. The explanatory research 
design is also described as hypothesis testing which is performed to further establish 
a precise knowledge and explanation of the kind of relationships there are amongst 
the variables being examined (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010; Zikmund et al., 2010). Thus, 
this current study has employed the explanatory research design as it has examined 
and described the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between AC 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. 
4.2.1 Population and Data Source 
The population included 170 companies listed in the NSE as of 31 December 2016. 
The study covered the period of five years from 2012 to 2016. The choice of the 
period (2012 to 2016) was as a result of the reform of the SEC (2003) Code of 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria effective from 2011, which serves as a guide to AC 
variables. This is because the Code provides the requirements about the composition 
of the AC in Nigeria. The period also included the aftermath of the accounting 
scandals by Cadbury Nigeria PLC, in 2006; African Petroleum PLC, in 2009; 
Intercontinental Bank, Oceanic Bank, Afri Bank, Fin Bank, and Union Bank PLC, in 
2009; and the most recent by Stanbic IBTC PLC, in 2015. The choice of a five-year 
period was to determine an optimum duration that managers manipulated earnings 
because a study comparing earnings of two successive periods cannot conclude that 
the managers manipulated accounts to smooth income (Ben Rejib Attia, 2012).  The 
dependent variable, FRQ, was measured by using the income smoothing technique 
and the DA. The data for income smoothing and DA were extracted from the 
Thompson Reuters DataStream, whilst the AC characteristic variables were found in 
 
 166 
the annual reports of the listed companies.  Table 4.1 contains the breakdown of the 
population by industry. 
Table 4.1 
Detailed Distribution of Firms Listed by NSE as at 31 December 2016 
Industries Number  
Agriculture 5 
Conglomerate  6 
Construction/ Real Estate 7 
Consumer Goods 23 
Financial Services  55 
Health Care 11 
ICT 9 
Industrial Goods  15 
Natural Resources 4 




4.2.2 Sampling Technique 
The study has considered all the listed companies for the period of the study except 
for financial services due to their distinct characteristics and regulations. After 
subtracting the 55 listed financial services from the total population of 170 listed 
companies, 115 companies remained. Thus, a filtering criterion was applied in the 
following manner in order to arrive at the final sample: A company must have 
published its accounts for the period of the study. It must have provided all the 
information that was required on the variables of the study. Finally, any company 
that was listed after 2013 was excluded from the sample. 
In line with the above criteria, Table 4.1 highlights the breakdown of the sample 
designs by firms and firm-year observations. The initial sample was 170 firms, 
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consisting of 850 firm-year observations. Out of these, 55 firms, involving 275 firm-
year observations from the financial services were excluded, leaving a total of 575 
firm-year observations. In addition, 15 firms consisting of 75 firm-year observations 
were excluded because they were delisted by the NSE in 2016. Out of the remaining 
firms, 12 firms with 60 firm-year observations did not provide complete information. 
Consequently, a final sample of 88 firms, comprising 440 firm-year observations was 
employed. 
Table 4.2  
Sample Computation for Firms that Meet the Filtering Process 
Sample computation for 
year 2012 to 2016 
Firms Firm-year observations 
Total population 170 850 
Less:    
Financial Services  55 275 
Total Non-financial 
Service Firms 115 575 
Less:   
Firms Delisted by NSE IN 
2016  15 75 
Firms that did not provide 
complete information  12 60 
Final sampled firms  88 440 
Source: NSE, 2016 
4.3 Variable Measurement 
The current study considered three groups of variables. The first group was the 
dependent variable (FRQ); this comprised the discretionary accruals and income 
smoothing. Secondly, were the independent variables, consisting of the AC 
characteristics (AC size, independence, meetings, financial accounting expertise, 
legal expertise, female AC members, AC stock ownership, AC tenure, and AC 
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chair), and finally, the mediator group, which consisted of audit quality (audit fees 
and Big 4). 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Measures of FRQ have several dimensions. For that reason, choosing a measurement 
for the FRQ depends on the estimation and availability of data. For the purpose of 
this study, discretionary accruals and  income smoothing were used as proxies for 
FRQ, which were extracted from Kothari et al. (2005) and the income smoothing 
index developed by Eckel (1981). 
Following Krishnan et al. (2011); Khalil and Ozkan (2016); Abdullah and Ku-Ismail 
(2016); and Kothari et al. (2005), Kothari et al. (2005) model was chosen because of 
its advantages over the conventional DA models like the Jones model and its 
modified version for controlling the impact of performance when measuring the DA. 
As such, the inclusion of the performance construct in the model improves the 
accuracy or reliability of the inferences derived from researches on earnings quality, 
and it also minimises the issue of heteroscedasticity and misspecification errors that 
are attributed to accrual models (Kothari et al., 2005; Abdullah & Ku-Ismail, 2016). 
The residuals of the model represent the DA. This is estimated as: 
TACi,t/TAi,t-1 = β1(1/TAi,t-1) + β2(∆REVi,t-∆RECi,t/TAi,t-1) + β3(∆PPEi,t/TAi, t-1) + 
β4ROAi,t-1 + εit…..…………………………….………………………….………(1) 
Where TAC = Total accruals measured as Net income-Cash flow from the operation, 
TAi,t-1 = Lag of total assets of a firm, ∆REV = Changes in revenue from current year 
to last year, ∆REC = Changes in receivables from current year to last year, PPE = 
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Gross property plant and equipment at the end of the year, and ROA = Return on 
asset. 
Eckel's (1981) model is determined by the coefficient variation (CV). It is based on 
the assumption that an intentionally smoothed profit can be the consequence of real 
profit smoothing or artificial smoothing methods. Real income smoothing reflects 
managers' actions carried out to control genuine economic transactions or events. 
Whilst artificial income smoothing is the consequence of accounting manipulations 
carried out by managers to smooth income (Eckel1981; Yang et al., 2012).  
Therefore, this model focuses on recognising artificial income smoothing rather than 
real income smoothing because the former alters the representation of the economic 
reality. Thus, the model presumes that the variability in sales are the consequence of 
real income smoothing. On the other hand, the variability of income is the 
consequence of artificial income smoothing; as such, a company is categorised as an 
income smoother if: 
Income Smoothing Index =   < 1 ………………………..………………. (2) 
Where ∆S = one year change in sales, ∆I = one year change in income, and CV = 
coefficient variation =   
The rationale behind the above technique is that if the variability in income is less 
than the variability in sales, then the company is expected to artificially smooth 
earnings. In general, a firm is classified as a profit smoother when its ratio of 
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coefficient variation of sales to coefficient variation of income is less than one.  
Following Eckel (1981), many prior studies have adopted this method in identifying 
the presence of income smoothing. These include, Ashari et al. (1994); Carlson and 
Bathala (1997); Michelson, Jordan-wagner and Wooton (1995); and Yang et al. 
(2012). The reason for the choice of this technique is that it objectively and 
statistically distinguishes between smoothers and non-smoothers. More importantly, 
contrary to other income smoothing techniques, for instance Atik (2009), Godfrey 
and Jones (1999), and Moses (1987), Eckel's index estimates the incidence of 
earnings smoothing without applying subjective judgment, earnings predictions, 
expense determination or modelling of expected income (Ashari et al., 1994; 
Albrecht & Richardson, 1990). It was argued that the specification of an expectation 
model is ambiguous and thus, inadequate specifications may bring about inferences 
that are attributed to random errors (Ashari et al., 1994). Similarly, the classificatory 
model may result in the misspecification of a company smoothing income since 
examining income of two successive periods cannot generalise that managers distort 
accounts to smooth income as a temporal rise or reduction in income may be due to 
chance (Ben Rejib Attia, 2012). Hence, Eckel‟s model incorporates the aggregate 
effect of multiple potential smoothing variables instead of only one by examining 
earnings variability with sales variability as a control for the real income smoothing 
and naturally smoothed income stream. 
Therefore, income streams have been examined in this study; using net income (NI). 
Following Ashari et al. (1994); Carlson and Bathala (1997);  Michelson, et al. 
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(1995); Yang et al. (2012); and Albrecht and Richardson (1990), net income from an 
operation is equal to operating income less depreciation and amortisation. 
Table 4.3  
Summary of the Dependent Variables Measurement 
Variable Acronyms Measurement 
Kothari et al. (2005) 
Discretionary accruals 
DA Measured by the absolute 
value of residual from 
Kothari et al. (2005): 
(Abdullah & Ku-Ismail, 
2016, Krishnan et al., 









Coefficient variation of 
change in income divide 
by coefficient variation of 
Change in sales. A firm is 
categorized as income 
smoother if its CV∆I/ 
CV∆S < 1 (Albrecht & 
Richardson, 1990; Ashari 
et al.,1994; Carlson & 
Bathala, 1997; Yang et al., 
2012). Thus, a dummy 1 
was assigned to a firm 
classified as income 
smoother and otherwise 0. 
 
4.3.2 Independent Variable 
For the AC characteristics, different measures have been used to measure the 
individual characteristics of the AC. Some studies used dummy variables (0 and 1), 
for example, Cohen et al. (2014); Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011); Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010); and  Sultana et al. (2013). Other studies used the total numbers of individual 
constructs or ratios of constructs to the total number of AC members, for example, 
Nelson and Devi (2013); Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007); and Sultana (2015). 
 
 172 
Consistent with prior studies (Abernathy et al., 2014; Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002; 
Krishnan et al., 2011; Yermack, 2004), this study used the total number of AC 
members in some of the attributes of the committee and the percentages of some 
characteristics to the total number of AC members. In line with Al-Rassas and 
Kamardin (2015), Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), and Carcello et al. (2002), 
audit fees was measured as the natural logarithm of the total fees for audit services. 
Consistent with Abernathy et al. (2014) and Cohen et al. (2014), BIG4 is measured 
as a dummi variable of 1 when a firm is audited by BIG4 auditors and 0 when a firm 
is audited by non-BIG4 auditors. The details of the measurements of the independent 
variables and their definitions are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4  
Summary of Independent Variable Measurement 
Variable Acronyms Measurement 
AC Size ACS Total number of AC members 
on the board (Sultana et al., 






Ratio of  number of  
independent non-executive 
directors on audit committee to 
the total number of audit 
committee (Bala & Kumai, 
2015; Krishnan et al., 2011; 
Miko, 2016; Sultana, 2015) 
 




Number of meetings held by 
audit committee during the year 
(Abernathy et al., 2014; Sultana, 
2015; Xie et al., 2003) 
 





Ratio of AC members who 
qualified as professional 
accountants with (ANAN or 
ICAN) to the total number of 
audit committee (Abernathy et 







Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Variable Acronyms Measurement 
AC legal expert       ACLE Ratio of AC members with legal 
background such as Bachelors 
of Laws,  Masters in Laws, 
members of Nigerian Bar 
Association  to the total number 
of AC members (Abernathy et 
al., 2014; Krishnan et al., 2011) 
 




A dummy variable one (1) if 
there is at least one female AC 
member on AC and otherwise 
zero (0) (Martınez et al., 2016; 
Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011) 
 





Natural log of number of  shares 
held by  AC (Kibiya et al., 
2016b) 
 
AC tenure                      ACT Average tenure of AC members 
(Abernathy et al., 2014; 






Measured as 1 if the AC is 
chaired by a shareholder and 0 
when the AC is chaired by a 
director (Mohammed, Che-
Ahmad & Malek, 2018; Sharma 
et al., 2009) 
Mediator (Audit Quality) AUQ Proxy by Audit Fees and Big4 
 




Natural logarithm of audit fees 
for the year  (Abernathy et al., 
2014; Carcello et a., 2002) 
 




Dummy variable indicating 1 if 
a firm is audited by big 4 and 0 
otherwise (Abernathy et al., 
2014; Cohen et al., 2014) 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
The study used some variables as a control for the firms‟ specific attributes and 
governance attributes that have been used by prior studies on AC and FRQ 
(Abernathy et al., 2014; Badolato et al., 2014; Beasley, 1996; Fodio et al., 2013; 
Krishnan et al., 2011; Saleh et al., 2007; Sultana, 2015). Specifically, the control 
variables of this study included board financial expertise (BF), board independence 
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(BI), firm size (FS), leverage (LEV), firm age (FAGE) and sales growth 
(SGROWTH). 
Consistent with Baxter and Cotter (2009); Krishnan et al. (2011); and Badolato et al. 
(2014), the study controlled for two governance attributes were BF (measured as 
percetange of directors with financial and accounting expertise to the total number of 
directors on the board) and BI (mesaured as percentage of independent directors to 
the  number of directors on the board), which have been argued to have significant 
influence on monitoring effectiveness and promoting financial reporting process 
(Carcello & Neal, 2003; Klein, 2002). Thus, it has been expected that directors with 
financial expertise outside the AC could contribute in enhancing FRQ because of 
their knowledge and skills. This is because financial experts source information not 
only from financial reports, but also from a diverse range of other resources which, 
in turn, improves FRQ (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Marzuki et al., 2016). Hence, this 
study has presumed that BF has a positive significant association with FRQ. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that a larger ratio of independent directors on the 
boards reduces the likelihood of earnings managemet and improves the FRQ of firms 
(Alves, 2014; Beasley, 1996; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2005; Klein, 
2002). In line with the above, the study has predicted a positive significant 
relationship between BI and fiinancial reporting quality. 
Similarly, consistent with Abernathy et al. (2014); Davidson et al. (2005); Klein 
(2002), Krishnan et al. (2011); and Vafeas (2005), the study also controlled for firm 
size (FS) measured as the natural logarithm of total assets and for leverage (LEV) 
measured as total debt to total equity ratio. It has been argued that larger firms are 
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associated with higher financial reporting quality since they are more closely 
monitored in the market (Bala & Kumai, 2015; Beasley, 1996; Fodio et al., 2013; 
and Klein, 2002). Therefore, this study expects a positive significant relationhip 
between FS and FRQ. Additionally, prior studies contended that highly leveraged 
firms are associated with a higher level of accruals or asymmetric timeliness of 
accruals which, in turn, limits the quality of financial reporting (Davidson et al., 
2005; Klein, 2002; Krishnan et al., 2011; Sultana et al., 2013). Since firms that have 
financial deterrents are more likely to engage in an income increasing EM to prevent 
possible loss, thus financial constraints lower the quality of their financial reporting 
(Park & Shin, 2004). Therefore, this study has assumed a negative significant 
relationship between LEV and FRQ. Consistent with Sun et al. (2011) and Chen et 
al. (2010) the study expects a positive relationship between SGROWTH and FRQ. 
Finally, following Gao and Huang (2016), Leung, Srinidhi and Xie (2017) the study 
controlled for Firm age (AGE) and has assumed a positive  relationship between 
older firms and FRQ. The details of measurement of the control variables and their 
definitions are shown in Table 4.5. The details of the measurement of the control 








Table 4.5  
Summary of Control Variables Measurement 
Variable Acronyms    Measurement 
Board expertise BE Percentage of board 
members with financial 
knowledge to total number 
of board members (Bala & 





BI Percentage of independent 
directors on the board 
(Krishnan et al., 2011; 
Sultana, 2015) 
 
Firm Size FS Natural logarithm of total 
asset (Krishnan et al., 
2011; Sultana, 2015)  
 
Leverage LEV Long term debt to total 
assets (Jizi & Nehme, 
2018; Krishnan et al., 
2011) 
 
Firm age FAGE Measured as year of 
observation minus year of 
listing (Kouaib & Jarboui, 
2017; Gao & Huang, 
2016) 
 
Sales growth SGROWTH Change in sales divided by 
previous sales (Collins et 
al., 2017; Huang et al., 
2017) 
4.4 Data Analysis Technique 
The data for this study were panel data which consisted of two attributes (cross 
sectional and time series). The reason for the adoption of panel data was because the 
study examined data for different companies over a period of a number of years. 
Furthermore, descriptive and inferential statistics were used in analysing the data. 
Descriptive statistics provide a detailed explanation of the nature of the data. A 
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correlation was used to determine the linear relationship amongst the variables of the 
study. A regression analysis was employed to determine the influence of AC 
characteristics and quality of financial reporting as well as the mediating effect of 
audit quality on the relationship between AC attributes and quality of financial 
reporting. The study also conducted some robustness tests using Stata to enrich the 
reliability and validity of the statistical inferences. These included the normality test, 
multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity, and serial correlation test. 
4.4.1 Normality Test 
The normality test is one of the assumptions that requires a normal distribution of the 
disturbance term. It should be noted, however, that this normality applies to the 
predictor variables (Gujarati, 2004). Data that are normally distributed may enable 
the generalisation of the finding from the population.  However, a high variance from 
the normal distribution may result in a misleading conclusion. Prior studies used 
several devices that can be employed to determine the normality of a distribution, 
these include skewness and kurtosis or using some items of descriptive statistics, 
such as simple mean, median or standard deviation. 
4.4.2 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test is a diagnostic test that is usually conducted to check the 
presence of collinearity or otherwise among the predictors. This is usually conducted 
using correlation. The correlation only shows the possibility of the existence of 
multicollinearity through the use of correlation matrix which according Gujarati 
(2004) the association between the predictors must not exceed 0.8. Where the 
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correlation is more than 80% that may pose suspicious of the presence of 
multicollinearity. Then, a further test is recommended to confirm the existence of 
multicollinearity and this is usually done through variance inflation factor (VIF).  An 
average value of less 10 and a tolerance value of less 1 from the VIF test indicate 
nonexistence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2004). 
4.4.3 Homoscedasticity Test 
One of the significant linear assumptions is homoscedasticity. It represents a 
situation in which the random disturbance in the association between the predictor 
variables and the explained variable is constant across all the values of the predictor 
variables. On the contrary, heteroscedasticity is the violation of this assumption. 
Heteroscedasticity exists in a situation where random disturbance differs across all 
the values of a predictor variable. However, the presence of heteroscedasticity 
always distorts the significance of the statistical inference (Gujarati, 2004; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
4.4.4 Regression Analysis Model 
This study employed a multivariate multiple regression which is normally applied in 
modelling the association between a set of dependent variables and multiple 
predictor variables (Krzanowski, 2005). For income smoothing on Eckel‟s Model 
(1981), following Ashari et al. (1994); Carlson and Bathala (1997); and Yang et al. 
(2012), a binary logit regression was employed because they are represented by 
dichotomous variables (1 and 0). As stated in Chapter One, the study has been aimed 
at examining the influence of AC characteristics and FRQ and also determining the 
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mediating effect of audit quality on the association between the AC characteristics 
and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
4.4.5 Testing the Mediation 
Different methods have been employed in testing the mediation affect, but the most 
widely used are the multiple regression and structural equation model (SEM) (Li, 
2011).  For the purpose of this study, a multiple regression was used. The reason for 
the adoption of a multiple regression was that it was considered to be more 
appropriate, especially when dealing with a categorical dependent variable. This is 
because the measurements in a model may have an influence on the estimation of the 
mediation effect (Li, 2011). Thus, multiple regression provides an option for 
categorical regression (logistic or probit regression) during estimation. However, the 
most frequently applied methods of estimation in SEM presume that the latent and 
observed variables are continuous. Also, they do not consider multicollinearity (Li, 
2011). Thus, Kenny (2016) stressed the importance of checking the presence of 
linearity, multicollinearity, normality, and heteroscedasticity before starting a 
mediational analysis. 
Different approaches have been employed in testing the mediation effects under 
multiple regression. These include the causal steps developed by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), product of coefficients and difference of coefficient methods, and Sobel Test 
(Hayes, 2009). Therefore, this study has adopted the causal steps approach and Sobel 
Test to test the direct and mediating effects, respectively. It has been argued that 
combining both the causal steps approach and Sobel test, which tests the product of 
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coefficients and confidence interval for the mediated effect, produce a more 
comprehensive analysis than using any single method (Holmbeck, 1997). The reason 
for the adoption of the causal steps approach and the Sobel test was that the former 
has been used to prove the mediated effect whilst the latter has been used to test the 
confidence interval of the mediation effect. It has been contended that failure to 
prove the mediation effect will lead to a false positive conclusion; whereas, the 
consequence of failure to test for the confidence interval includes both false positive 
and false negative conclusions (Holmbeck, 2002). 
4.4.6 The Causal Steps 
This explains a sequence of relationships that serve as conditions to prove a mediated 
effect. These include (a) the outcome variable Y must be significantly correlated with 
the predictor variable X. (b) the mediating variable M must be significantly 
correlated with the predictor variable X. (c) the outcome variable Y must be 
significantly correlated with the mediating variable M. (d) the impact of the 
independent variable X (β) on the outcome variable Y should be less in absolute 
terms compared to the impact in (a) (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes, 2009). These 
conditions explain the framework and hypotheses of this study  thus, leading to four 
multiple regression equations on each model of the study.  However, some 
researchers argue that these conditions must not necessary be met before mediation 
takes place since the relationship is not necessary or sufficient for causation (Hayes 
& Rockwood, 2017).  However, more emphasis should be given to conditions a and 
b (Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998). This methodology has been adopted by prior 
studies (Baraibar-Diez & Luna-Sotorrío, 2018; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2017; 
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Jintawattanagul et al., 2016; Kouaib & Jarboui, 2017). As explained above, the 
models are estimated below based on Eckel‟s Model (1981) and Kothari et al.‟s 
Model (2005), representing FRQ (proxied by EM). 
Model 1a (H1-H9):  
FRQit = β0 + β1ACSit + β2ACIit+ β3ACMit + β4ACFAEit + β5ACLEit + β6FACMit + 
β7ACSOit + β8ACTit β9ACCit + β10BEit + β11BIit + β12FSit + β13LEVit +β14FAGEit + 
β15SGROWTHit +εit……..…………………………………………….……. (3) 
Model 1b (H10a-H10i) 
AUQit = β0 + β1ACSit + β2ACIit+ β3ACMit  + β4ACFAEit + β5ACLEit + β6FACMit + 
β7ACSOit + β8ACTit β9ACCit + β10BEit + β11BIit + β12FSit + β13LEVit +β14FAGEit + 
β15SGROWTHit +εit ………………...………………………………………..(4) 
Model 1c (H11) 
FRQit = β0 + β1AUQit + β2BFit + β3BIit + β4FSit + β5LEVit + β6FAGE+ 
β7SGROWTH+εi…………………..………………………….….….…..……..(5) 
Model 1d (H12) 
FRQit = β0 + β1ACSit + β2ACIit+ β3ACMit + β4ACFAEit + β5ACLEit + β6FACMit + 
β7ACSOit + β8ACTit β9ACCit + β10AUQit + β11BEit + β12BIit + β13FSit + β14LEVit 
+β15FAGEit + β16SGROWTHit +εit ……………………………………….........(6) 
After the above conditions were applied, the Sobel Test was also employed to test the 
confidence intervals of the mediated effects using the formula below: 
z =                                                              Sb*SC =  




FRQ = financial reporting quality represented by DA = Discretionary accruals from 
Kothari et al.‟s Model (2005), IS = Smoothing index (Eckel, 1981), ACS = AC size, 
ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial accounting 
expert, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = Female AC members, ACSO = AC stock 
ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, QUQ (Mediator proxied by audit 
fees and Big4), BE = Board financial expertise, BI = Board independence, FS = Firm 
size, LEV = Leverage, SGROWTH = Sales growth, FAGE = Firm age, β0 = 
Intercept, β = Coefficients, z = confidence interval, βc = Unstandardised parameter of 
the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, βb = Unstandardised 
parameter of the relationship between the independent variable and mediator , Sb = 
Standard residual of the mediator, SC  = Standard residual of the predictor variable, i = 
firm, t = time, and ε = Error term. 
4.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has provided information on the research design employed by the study, 
the population, and the selection of the sample of the study. The chapter also 
discussed the data sources and measurement of the variables.  It also contained the 
specifications of the models of the study as well as their explanations. This has been 
aimed at examining the mediating effect of audit quality on the association between 




FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS I (DA) 
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND 
DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS: THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF 
AUDIT QUALITY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results and analyses of the first segment of objectives one 
to four of the thesis, which were: 1) to determine the influence of the audit 
committee characteristics on the FRQ proxied by EM measurement using DA of the 
listed companies in Nigeria, 2) to determine the effect of the audit committee 
characteristics on the audit quality (AUF and BIG 4) of the listed companies in 
Nigeria, 3) to assess the effect of the audit quality on the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria, and 4) to examine the mediating effect of the audit quality on 
the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ of the listed companies 
in Nigeria. The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 5.1 contains the 
overview of the chapter, 5.2 explains the population, sampling criteria and the post 
estimation tests of the data employed in this study. Section 5.3 shows the descriptive 
statistics connected to the regression variables. Section 5.4 contains the univariate 
analysis of the regression variables. Section 5.5 explains the findings of the 
multivariate analysis by itemising the relationships between the AC characteristics 
and FRQ (proxied by DA), AC characteristics and audit quality (represented by the 
AUF and BIG 4), and audit quality and DA, and the mediating effect of audit quality 
on the relationships between the AC characteristics and DA. An additional analysis is 
provided in Section 5.6 and, finally, the chapter ends with a summary. 
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5.2 Population of the study 
The population comprised a total number of 170 firms listed on the NSE market as of 
the 31st December 2016. Table 4.1 reveals that the total number of 170 firms were 
from 10 dissimilar sectors of the NSE. It is deduced from Table 5.1 that financial 
services occupied the highest number of firms, having 55 firms representing 32.35%. 
Next to financial services were the consumer goods and services, having a total 
number of 23 firms representing 13.53%, respectively.  Next was industrial goods 
with 8.82%, followed by oil and gas, having 7.06%, health care with 6.47%, ICT 
with 5.29%, construction and real estate with 4.12%, conglomerates with 3.52%, 
agriculture with 2.94%, and finally, natural resources with the lowest figure of 
2.35%. 
Table 5.1 
Detailed of Samples Firms Listed by the NSE in 2016 
Industries No. of 
Firms 
% Obs. 
Agriculture 5 4.35 25 
Conglomerate  6 5.22 30 
Construction/ Real Estate 7 6.09 35 
Consumer Goods 23 20.00 115 
Health Care 11 9.57 55 
ICT 9 7.83 45 
Industrial Goods  15 13.04 75 
Natural Resources 4 3.48 20 
Oil and Gas 12 10.43 60 
Services 23 20.00 115 
Total 115 100 575 
Source: NSE, 2016 
5.2.1 Sample Size and Selection Procedure 
Table 5.2 depicts the breakdown of the sample selection by firms and firm-year 
observations with their respective percentages. The initial sample was 115 firms 
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consisting of 575 firm-year observations. Out of these, 15 firms consisting of 75 
firm-year observations (13.04%) were excluded because they were delisted by the 
NSE in 2016. Move over, 12 firms with 60 firm-year observations (10.43%) did not 
provide complete information. Consequently, a final sample of 88 firms comprising 
440 firm-year observations (76.53%), for the period from 2012 to 2016, was 
employed. 
Table 5.2  
Sample Computations for the Firms 
Sample 
computation for 




Total Sample 115 575 100 
Less:     
Firms Delisted by 
NSE IN 2016 
 15 75 13.04 
Firms that did not 
provide complete 
information 
 12 60 10.43 
Final sampled firms  88 440 76.53 
 
5.2.2 The Post-Estimation Test 
An analysis that involves a number of units and cross-sections requires an 
examination to prove the quality of the raw data. This includes various assumptions, 
such as normality, multi-collinearity, linearity, and homoscedasticity.  As suggested 
by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Pallant (2011), these assumptions are tested to 
obtain more reliable inferences from a given data set. The following subheadings 




Outliers are observations from a dataset with exceptional characteristics different 
from the other observations (Hair, Barry, Babin & Anderson, 2014). To control the 
outliers in the data for this study, all of the continuous variables with exceptional 
observations were winsorised at 5% of the top and bottom. Dixon (1980) suggests 
that winsorisation of the dataset provides more steady results and trimmed means.  
Previous studies, such as Barth Landsman, Lang and Williams (2012), Farber et al. 
(2016), Ittonen (2010), Kothari (2001) and Yang and Krishnan (2005), have used 
winsorisation to alleviate outliers in the data. 
5.2.4 Normality Test 
Normal distribution is a vital condition in regression analysis. Nevertheless, it is 
equally vital to note that the OLS estimator is reliable and asymptotically normal 
whether or not the normality assumption is achieved (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Furthermore, normally distributed data when employing financial facts is almost 
impossible since the distribution is indiscriminately randomly distributed amongst 
and within firms (Wooldridge, 2013). Fortunately, the non-normality does not have a 
significant impact on the results of the OLS regression in a moderately large sample 
study (Wooldridge, 2013). Unluckily, “there are no general prescriptions on how big 
the sample size must be before the approximation is good enough” (Wooldridge, 
2013, p. 157). However, Tabachnick and Fedell (2013) suggested that a deviation 
from skewness and kurtosis for a study of more than 200 will not make an outright 
difference.  In spite of these theoretical justifications, an additional test of normality 
was conducted. First, a histogram kdensity test for normality was performed. This 
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was also supplemented by the Jarque-Bera normality test for residuals. Figure 5.1 
provides the result of the histogram kdensity test for normality and the Jarque-Bera 
normality test for residuals. The results of the histogram kdensity test for normality 
indicate that the data was relatively normally distributed. Whereas, the p-value of 
0.103 from the Jarque-Bera normality test for residuals also indicates that the data 





















5.2.5 Heteroscedasticity and Model Selection Criteria 
The second post-estimation test is homoscedasticity. It explains the homogeneity of 
the variance. Since panel data was used for the study, this may have led to errors that 
were clustered and presumably correlated overtime. Also, this may have affected the 
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outcome of the criterion variable and the predictor variables, thus leading to 
misleading inferences (Petersen, 2009; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Kim, 2013). Hence, 
there was need to control that. Consequently, fixed the effect regression and the 
random effect regression were run. The Hausman Test of all the models suggests that 
the random regression was more suitable for the data since the p-values were not 
significant (0.591, 0.1182, 1.000, 0.149, and 0.5947). This indicates that no 
company‟s specific attributes affected the criterion variable. A further test, the 
„Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effect‟ (LM Test) was 
performed to see if there was a statistical variance amongst the units in the panel.  
The test results disclose that the random model was more suitable for this study. The 
fact that the results from the „Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg tests for 
heteroscedasticity‟ for all of the models except one (AUF and DA) reveal significant 
p-values (0.001, 0.009, 0.070, 0.036, and 0.001) may have caused the standard errors 
to be biased. As a corrective measure, these models were re-estimated using 
heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors as suggested by Hayes and Cai 
(2007) and Wooldridge (2013). Following the above procedures, no violation of 
homoscedasticity was assumed and the inferences were made based on this 
estimation for all the models since the robust function corrects the problem of bias in 
the standard errors, and provides estimates that are more efficient, and also provides 
reasonably accurate p-values (Williams, 2015). This estimate was also adopted by 
prior studies, such as  Al-Rassas (2015), Chen et al. (2010),  Gao and Huang (2016), 
Krishnan et al. (2011), Lai, Srinidhi and Tsui (2017) and Sultana (2015). 
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5.2.6 Multi-collinearity Test  
This is a diagnostic technique that is usually conducted to check the presence of 
collinearity or otherwise amongst the predictors. This is widely conducted using 
correlation. The correlation only shows the likelihood of the existence of multi-
collinearity through the use of a correlation matrix, for which, according to Gujarati 
(2004), „the association between the predictors must not exceed 0.8‟. Where the 
correlation is more than 80%, it may pose suspicions of the presence of multi-
collinearity. Then, a further test is recommended to confirm the existence of multi-
collinearity, and this is usually done through the use of the variance inflation factor 
(VIF).  An average value of less than 10 and a tolerance value of less than 1 from the 
VIF test indicate the nonexistence of multi-collinearity (Gujarati, 2004). The 
existence of such a problem decreases the fitness of the regression model, thus 
lessening the predictive power of any predictor variable to the extent to which it is 
linear to other predictor variables (Pallant, 2007). Two assumptions were employed 
to check for the incidence of multi-collinearity problems in this study. The first 
approach focused on the values of tolerance and the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). 
The second technique was used by checking the values of the correlation between 
one predictor variable and another (Pallant, 2007; Wooldridge, 2013). Table 5.3 
presents the correlation matrix for the variables of the study. Overall, the results 
show that multi-collinearity may have posed a threat to the research variables. The 
highest correlation amongst the predictor variables was 51% between the audit fee 
(AUF) and the firm size (FS). This may reflect a strong correlation since Gujarati 
(2003) considered a correlation above 50% to be a strong correlation. Luckily, Hair 
et al. (2014) opined that a correlation of less than 90% may not be a problem for 
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estimation. Consequently, this correlation between the AUF and the firm size did not 
pose a threat to the estimation model with any serious multi-collinearity problem. 
Table 5.3 reveals that the ACS and ACI were positively correlated with the DA. 
Though these correlations were not significant, the negative coefficient of both the 
ACS and ACI may reflect the nature of their relationship. 
The ACMs and ACFAEs were found to be negatively correlated with the DA. This is 
deduced from their coefficients at the 10% and 5% levels of significance. This 
suggests that the ACMs and ACFAEs had inverse relationships with the DA, though 
these relationships can best be described by regression since correlation does not 
cause causation. The ACLEs and FACMs had positive correlations with the DA at 
the 1% level of significance. This can serve as an initial clue of the effect of legal 
experts and female AC members on the DA. It is also revealed in Table 5.3 that the 
ACSO and ACT had positive but insignificant correlations with the DA. The ACC 
had a negative correlation with the DA. This is observed from the correlation 




Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the AC characteristics, Audit quality and discretionary accruals 
Variable DA ACS ACI ACM ACFAE ACLE FACM ACSO ACT 
DA 1         
ACS -0.088 1        
ACI -0.015 0.065 1       
ACM -0.095* 0.48 *** 0.033 1      
ACFAE -0.152** 0.035 0.113* -0.046 1     
ACLE 0.13 *** 0.24 *** 0.055 0.14 ** -0.026 1    
FACM 0.21 *** 0.23 *** 0.04 0.23*** 0.068 0.30*** 1   
ACSO 0.006 0.04 -0.048 0.101 -0.012* -0.040* -0.005 1  
ACT 0.101 0.13 ** 0.125 0.067* 0.006 0.17** 0.12** -0.073 1 
ACC -0.065* -0.21 *** 0.13 **  -0.13 0.121 0.013* -0.13** -0.084 -0.096* 
BI -0.114 0.010* 0.14** 0.100* 0.19*** -0.18** -0.039* 0.020* 0.062 
BE -0.020* 0.45 *** 0.083 0.28*** 0.079* 0.051* 0.051* 0.045 0.084 
FS -0.111 0.100* -0.025 0.096* 0.03 0.028 0.044 -0.085 0.100* 
LEV -0.027* 0.032* -0.028 0.045 0.008 -0.037 0.025 -0.149* 0.03 
FAGE -0.045 -0.065 -0.098 0.102 0.065 -0.105 -0.033 -0.069 0.037 
SGROWTH -0.002 -0.075 -0.051 -0.116 -0.003 0.007 -0.061 -0.04 -0.021 
AUF -0.155** 0.31 *** 0.034 0.113* 0.20*** -0.007 -0.027 -0.083 0.053 
BIG4 0.022 -0.007 0.114 -0.071 0.21*** 0.059 0.16** 0.086 -0.13** 
 
ACC BI BE FS LEV FAGE SGROWTH AUF BIG4 
ACC 1         
BI -0.045 1        
BE -0.011 0.185* 1       
FS 0.095* -0.098* 0.21** 1      
LEV -0.048 0.031 0.229* 0.401 1     
FAGE 0.089 0.042 0.13** 0.199 0.061* 1    
SGROWTH -0.075 0.042 -0.14** -0.147 -0.178* -0.09** 1   
AUF -0.17** 0.074 0.30** 0.506 0.271 0.17*** -0.0149 1  
BIG4 -0.037 0.093* 0.18** 0.175 0.055* 0.062 -0.0516 0.21** 1 
Note table: DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO 
= AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise,  FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth AUF = audit 
fees and BIG4  = Big4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) , * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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To further substantiate the likelihood of multi-collinearity amongst the predictors, the 
VIF test has been performed for each predictor variable. Table 5.4 designates the 
values of tolerance and the VIF for the AC characteristics, audit quality, and control 
variables. The tolerance values of less than 1 and VIF of less than 10, as depicted in 
Table 5.4, indicate that there was no evidence of any multi-collinearity issue amongst 
the independent variables. 
Table 5.4 
Collinearity Diagnostics of the AC Characteristics, Audit Quality and Control 
Variables 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
ACS 1.880 0.531 
ACI 1.080 0.925 
ACM 1.310 0.764 
ACFAE 1.110 0.900 
ACLE 1.280 0.781 
FACM 1.280 0.784 
ACSO 1.040 0.966 
ACT 1.090 0.921 
ACC 1.140 0.874 
BI 1.210 0.825 
BE 1.290 0.775 
FS 1.080 0.927 
LEV 1.060 0.947 
FAGE 1.080 0.923 
SGROWTH 1.060 0.945 
AUF 1.740 0.575 
BIG4 1.230 0.814 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = 
AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = 
leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth AUF = audit fees and BIG4  = Big4 auditors (KPMG, 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) and VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. 
5.2.7 Linearity 
Linearity assumes that a relationship between the outcome variable and the predictor 
variable should be linear. This relationship describes the extent to which changes in 
the predictor variable affect the outcome variable. In this study, the linearity 
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relationship was ascertained by comparing the standard deviation of the outcome 
variable with the standard deviation of the model‟s residual.  According to Hair et al. 
(2014) and Garson (2012), linearity is obtained when the standard deviation of the 
outcome variable is greater than the standard deviation of the model‟s residual. Table 
5.5 presents the standard deviation of the outcome variable with the standard 
deviation of the model‟s residual. Table 5.5 shows that the standard deviation of the 
outcome variable was greater than the standard deviation of the model‟s residual.  
Thus, the linearity assumption was achieved. 
Table 5.5 
Standard Deviation of the Discretionary accruals and Model Residual 
Variable Standard Deviation 
Absolute Discretionary accruals 1.134 
Model Residual 1.043 
 
5.2.8 Model Specification Test 
The essence of the model specification test in the regression model is to ensure that 
the model is correctly specified. This postulation “assumes implicitly, if not 
explicitly, that the model used to test an econometric theory is correctly specified” 
(Gujarati, 2004, p. 73). He further established that a violation of this assumption may 
be the consequence of or a mixture of omitting important variables, variable 
measurement errors, inclusion of unnecessary variable(s) or selecting the wrong 
functional form, or by adopting an erroneous stochastic assumption about the 
variable of the model (Gujarati, 2004). In this study, the model specification test was 
conducted for all estimations using a link test. The assumption of this test is the 
confidence interval of the hatsq (Pregibon, 1980). The _hatsq is assumed to be 
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insignificant. Satisfying this condition as presented for every regression in the 
subsequent sections indicates that the regression models were correctly specified. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics Related to the Regression Variables 
Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics vis-à-vis the regression variables 
employed in addressing objectives one to four of this study. The absolute 
discretionary accruals had a mean value of 2.226 and a minimum and maximum of 
0.010 and 5.903, respectively. These values were lower than the figures reported in 
the studies of  Abdul Malik and Che-Ahmad (2016),  Eze (2017), Madawaki and 
Amran (2013), Okolie (2014) and Hassan and Ahmed (2012). The variations could 
be as a result of the differences in the sample sizes used by these studies. The ACS 
had a mean (average) of 5 members with a minimum and a maximum of 4 and 6 
members, respectively. The minimum 4 and maximum 6 members in the AC 
reported in this study implies that some firms had conformed with the 
recommendation of the CAMA (2004) in regards to having an equal representation 
of directors and shareholders in the audit committee. The result is similar to what 
was documented in the studies of  Eze (2017),  Kibiya et al. (2016a), Madawaki and 
Amran (2013), Miko (2016) and Moses et al. (2016). Comparatively, the result is 
relatedly different from what was reported by Abdullah and Ku-Ismail (2016) and 
Yang and Krishnan (2005). This could be as a result of the regulatory differences 
amongst the countries of the study. The table also reports an average of 43% 
representation of independent directors in the AC.  It also shows a minimum (25%) 
and maximum (50%) independent directors in the AC, respectively. This minimum 
figure of 25% representation of independent directors indicates a compliance with 
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the global recommendation of having at least one independent director in the AC. 
The figure was slightly similar to what was reported by Bala and Kumai (2015), 
Usman et al. (2017) and Abubakar (2016), but lower than the figure reported by 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) and Bamahros and Bhasin (2016). 
Table 5.6 
Descriptive Statistics between AC, Audit Quality and Discretionary Accruals. 
Var.      Med.       Mean    Min        Max     Std.D Skew Kurt 
DA 2.193 2.266 0.010 5.903 1.134 0.694 4.464 
ACS 6.000 5.473 4.000 6.000 0.861 -1.072 2.212 
ACI 0.500 0.430 0.250 0.500 0.094 -0.740 1.855 
ACM 4.000 3.791 3.000 5.000 0.624 0.180 2.420 
ACFAE 0.167 0.209 0.000 0.500 0.135 0.462 2.905 
ACLE 0.167 0.096 0.000 0.286 0.094 0.182 1.623 
FACM 1.000 0.543 0.000 1.000 0.499 -0.173 1.030 
ACSO 230000 3780000 12768 30000000 7910000 2.436 7.849 
ACT 5.000 5.107 3.000 8.000 1.437 0.209 2.142 
ACC 1.000 0.889 0.000 1.000 0.315 -2.471 7.105 
BI 0.714 0.715 0.060 0.923 0.112 -0.676 4.608 
BE 0.500 0.501 0.250 0.750 0.140 0.060 2.081 
FS 13000000 16300000 1152490 34000000 2100000 0.248 2.089 
LEV 0.002 0.011 0.000 0.072 0.019 2.223 6.866 
FAGE 24.000 23.818 4.000 42.000 13.288 -0.184 1.534 
SGROWTH 0.000 0.270 -5.256 7.508 2.636 0.842 5.013 
AUF 14000000 27427890 2000000 156178000 38879720 2.517 8.354 
BIG4 1.000 0.580 0.000 1.000 0.494 -0.322 1.104 
Residual -0.123 0.000 -2.623 3.481 1.043 0.665 4.214 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial 
expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, ACT = AC 
tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE 
= firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth AUF = audit fees and BIG4  = Big4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte). 
 
Table 5.6 also shows that the AC had meetings at least 4 times in a year. The result is 
similar to what was reported by Ogbaisi, Izedonmi and Dabor (2016), Lee and 
Mande (2005) and Haji and Anifowose (2016). This is not surprising, because the 
result is consistent with most of the universal recommendations on ACMs.  It is also 
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perceived from Table 5.6, that on average, there were 21% of the AC members with 
financial accounting expertise. Whilst some firms did not have any financial 
accounting experts in their ACs, other firms had up to 50% members with financial 
accounting expertise. This implies that some firms did not comply with the 
recommendation of the SEC Code of CG (2011) of having at least one member with 
management and financial accounting knowledge in the AC. This was similar to the 
results of  Bruynseels,  Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2015), Nelson and Devi (2013), 
and Moses et al. (2016). 
Table 5.6 also reports an average of 10% legal experts in the AC whilst at a peak 
some firms had up to 29% directors with legal backgrounds. This figure was 
relatively different with the results of Jintawattanagul et al. (2016)  and Krishnan et 
al. (2011). This may be as a result of the fact that the importance of the legal expert 
is yet to be explored in the Nigerian context. Similarly, Table 5.6 shows that some 
firms did not have women representation in their ACs. The result is lower than what 
was reported in previous studies (Carte, Simkins & Simpson, 2010; Ittonen et al., 
2010). The amount of ACSO ranged from 12,768 units to 30,000, 000 units with an 
average value of 3,780 000 units. The figure was different from that of Kibiya et al. 
(2016b). This may be as a result of the fact that the period covered by this present 
study was different from the period covered by Kibiya et al. (2016b).  As, Kibiya et 
al. (2016b) covered the period of 2010 to 2014.  The ACT scored an average of 5 
with a minimum and a maximum of 3 years and 8 years, respectively. 
Comparatively, the figure was similar to the results of Baxter (2007) and Cohen et al. 
(2014). Table 5.6 also describes that there were some firms that their ACs were 
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chaired by directors whilst the majority of the committees were chaired by the 
shareholders‟ representatives. This is one of the uniqueness characteristics of the AC 
composition in Nigeria as stipulated by the CAMA (2004) that members of the AC 
should be made up of equal representation of directors and shareholders. 
The mean value of one of the mediators, AUF, was ₦27 million (equivalent to 
76,000 USD). This indicates that, on average, the listed companies in Nigeria pay up 
₦27 million for auditing services. Table 5.6 also reveals a minimum and a maximum 
of the AUF to the tune of ₦2 million and ₦156 million (equivalent to 5555 and 433, 
333 USD), respectively. The wide disparity between the minimum and maximum 
was due to the fact that the companies that were audited by the Big 4 auditors in 
Nigeria paid excessively high audit prices compared to those audited by Non-Big 4 
auditors. Comparatively, the mean value was lower than that of Lai et al. (2017) and 
Kim et al. (2016) due to differences in the market operation. 
Considering the control variables, the BI had an average of 0.715, and a minimum 
(0.060) and a maximum (0.923), respectively. The BE had a mean value of 50% with 
a minimum (25%) and a maximum (75%), respectively. The FS scored a mean of 
₦16.3 billion, and a minimum and a maximum of ₦1.15 billion and ₦134 billion, 
respectively. The LEV had an average of 0.011 whilst some firms reported no 
leverage and others scored 0.072. The AGE marked an average of 24 years with a 
minimum and maximum of 4 to 42 years, respectively. The SGROWTH had a mean 
value of 0.270, and a minimum and maximum of -5.256 and 7.508, respectively. The 
next section provides the explanation of the corrections of the regression variables. 
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 This may also provide a signal that the ACC could influence the DA, which was 
expected to be validated with regression. The control variables, BE and LEV, were 
negatively correlated at the 10% level of significance. This may also have been 
preliminary evidence that these control variables, BE and LEV, would have negative 
associations with the DA. The Firm size (FS), Firm age (FAGE), and sales growth 
(SGROWTH) had negative correlations with the DA. However, these correlations 
were not significant, but the negative coefficient provided an initial justification of 
the direction of their relationship in the estimation model. 
Considering the first mediator, AUF, it was revealed that there was a negative 
correction with the DA which was significant at 5%. This signified that the AUF 
would possibly have a negative influence in the regression model. The second 
mediator, Big 4 auditor, was found to have a positive but insignificant correlation. 
This may suggest that Big 4 auditors might not be active in constraining the DA in 
the estimation model. 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis: Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the 
Relationship between AC Characteristics and Discretionary Accruals 
This section provides a statistical inference for the variables of the study that were 
tested to examine the mediating effect of the audit quality (AUF and BIG 4) on the 
relationships between the audit committee characteristics and the FRQ. The FRQ 
was proxied by EM measurement using discretionary accruals (DA). In order achieve 
this objective, two approaches of testing the mediation effect under multiple 
regressions were employed. These included the causal steps developed by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) and the Sobel Test. The study started with the causal steps to 
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determine whether the conditions of the mediation were met before applying the 
Sobel Test. The causal steps elucidate a sequence of relationships that serve as 
conditions to prove a mediated effect. These include: (a) the outcome variable Y 
must be significantly correlated with the predictor variable X, (b) the mediating 
variable M must be significantly correlated with the predictor variable X, (c) the 
outcome variable Y must be significantly correlated with the mediating variable M, 
and (d) the impact of the independent variable X (β) on the outcome variable Y 
should be less in absolute terms compared to the impact produced in model (a) 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes, 2009). The next sections present the sequences of the 
regressions in a descending order as proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). 
5.4.1 Regression Results and Discussion on the Relationship Between AC 
Characteristics and Discretionary Accruals 
This section tests the first segment of objective one of the thesis which was to 
determine the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria.  The section also tests the hypotheses, one to nine, (H1-H9) to 
examine the first condition of the mediation effect. In testing these hypotheses, the 
absolute discretionary accruals using Kothari et al. (2005) were adopted. For the 
purpose of the interpretations, the indicators, such as the coefficient (β), robust 
standard error, t-values, and p-values were generated and presented. 
Table 5.7 presents the regression results of model one (A) of the relationships 
between the AC characteristics and the discretionary accruals (DA). From the 
regression results, it was found that the audit committee size (ACS) had a negative 
relationship with the DA. This was observed from the regression coefficient of -
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0.234 and p-value of 0.007, which were significant at 1%. This implies a larger 
number AC members is better to curtail the practices of earnings management in the 
form of the DA. As such, lower DA indicate better FRQ. The results support 
hypothesis one (H1) of this current study that presumed that, the ACS has a positive 
relationship with the FRQ. This supports the resource dependence theory which 
suggests that the AC size is considered to be highly resourceful, thus improving the 
FRQ as a result of the diverse skills, expertise, and experiences they share amongst 
themselves (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Hillman et al., 2000). This is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies which established that a ,larger AC size is more effective 
in monitoring management and thus their effective monitoring makes them more 
effective in enhancing the FRQ (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Hillman et al., 2000; Leong et 
al., 2015; Miko, 2016; Setiany et al., 2017). Moreover, previous studies in Nigeria 
have documented similar findings (Abata & Migiro, 2016; Chi-Chi & Friady, 2016; 
Fodio et al., 2013). 
The next AC characteristic used in the study was the audit committee independence 
(ACI). It is revealed from Table 5.7 that the ACI had a negative association with the 
DA. This was evident from the regression coefficient of (-0.220) and p-value of 
(0.715). Though, the coefficient was negative, it was statistically not significant at all 
levels. The result does not support hypothesis two (H2) of this study which assumed 
that the ACI has a positive relationship with the FRQ. The probable explanation for 
this result may be for the following reason. A possible explanation for this could be 
attributed to the connectedness of the independent directors with the CEOs. This is 
because CEOs usually appoint director because of their social networks (Bruynseels 
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et al., 2015). It is likely that the independent directors in the AC may have 
connections with the CEOs. This may impair their independence and thus, reduce 
their monitoring ability in the financial reporting process. This is because CEOs 
connection with the AC reduced the effectiveness of the committee in Nigerian firms 
(Sanda, Garba & Mikailu, 2011).  
Table 5.7 
Model One (A) Pool Regression of the Relationship between the AC Characteristics 
and FRQ (Discretionary Accruals) 
Variable         Coefficient Robust Std. Err.      T-Value            P-Value 
ACS -0.234 0.087 -2.700*** 0.007 
ACI -0.220 0.604   -0.360               0.715 
ACM -0.227 0.086 -2.640*** 0.009 
ACFAE -1.307 0.410 -3.190*** 0.002 
ACLE 1.514 0.605        2.500**               0.013 
FACM 0.540 0.113 4.800*** 0.000 
ACSO -0.028 0.062   -0.44               0.657 
ACT 0.022 0.033      0.660              0.508 
ACC 0.226 0.148      1.530              0.127 
BI -0.430 0.465      -0.930              0.355 
BE -0.270 0.382      -0.710               0.480 
FS 0.103 0.045         2.280**              0.023 
LEV -8.508 2.917          -2.920*** 0.004 
FAGE -0.004 0.004    -0.930               0.352 
SGROWTH -0.012 0.020          -0.620                 0.534 
Cons 2.969 0.773 3.840*** 0.000 
R2   0.150   
F-Stat  4.990   
P.Value  0.000   
Link Test(Hatsq)  0.630   
Hettest (Chi2)  10.420   
P-Value  0.001   
P.value  0.000   
HM Test (Chi2)  12.190   
P.value  0.591   
Note: DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = 
AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = 
leverage, FAGE = firm age and SGROWTH = sales growth, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. = significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 202 
Previous studies have documented similar findings on this relation (Cohen et al., 
2014; Kusnadi et al., 2016). Similarly, in Nigeria, Fodio et al. (2013) and Moses et 
al. (2016) documented a negative insignificant association between board 
independence and DA. 
Another AC attribute employed in this study was the audit committee meetings 
(ACMs). Table 5.7 shows that the ACMs was inversely and significantly related to 
the DA. This was inferred from the coefficient of (-0.227) and p-value of (0.009) 
which were significant at 1%. This means that the more frequent the AC meets, the 
more scrutiny and discussions they have on the financial reporting issues and thus, 
positively influence the FRQ. This supports the third hypothesis (H3) which 
presumed that the ACMs have a positive relationship with the FRQ. The finding is 
consistent with the agency theory which suggests that members of the AC are keen 
on meaningful and substantive meetings which will, in turn, lead to better monitoring 
of and enhance the financial reporting process. This validates the findings of prior 
studies which established that  more frequent AC meetings reduces the DA and 
enhances the FRQ (Abbott et al., 2004; Habbash & Alagla, 2015; Hamdan et al., 
2013; Kolsi & Grassa, 2017). The results also support the findings of Akhor and 
Oseghale (2017) and Ormin et al. (2015) who revealed a positive significant 
relationship between the ACMs and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
Audit committee financial accounting experts (ACFAEs) was the next AC 
characteristic used in this study. It was observed from Table 5.7 that the ACFAEs 
had a negative significant relationship with the DA. This was revealed from Table 
5.7 which reflects a regression coefficient of (-1.307) with a p-value of (0.002).  This 
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implies that members of the AC with financial accounting knowledge are more likely 
to prevent earnings manipulation in Nigeria. This confirms the evidence that the 
presence of AC members with financial accounting know-how in the AC provides a 
crucial role in enhancing monitoring and oversight functions and thus, improves the 
FRQ. The findings confirm the resource dependence theory on the AC expertise as 
the resource provider; where, the resources are recognised as know-how, skills, and 
experiences. The result also supports hypothesis four (H4) of the study which 
assumed that the ACFAEs have a positive relationship with the FRQ. This is 
consistent with the findings of  Badolato et al. (2014), Fuller (2015),  Juhmani 
(2017),  Levitan et al. (2016) and Lisic et al. (2017) who revealed that the audit AC 
accounting experts have a negative significant impact on the DA. In Nigeria, a 
similar finding was documented by Bala and Kumai (2015), Umar and Hassan 
(2017) who showed that there was a negative significant relationship btween the AC 
expertise and the DA. 
Next was the audit committee legal experts (ACLEs). Contrary to the research 
expectation, it was observed that the ACLEs were found to have a positive 
significant association with the DA. This suggests that the existence of a legal expert 
on the AC does not prevent managers from practicing earnings management in the 
form of DA. This has provided a justification for the rejection of hypothesis five (H5) 
of this study which presumed that the ACLEs have a positive relationship with the 
FRQ. The possible explanation for this could be as a result of the fact that legal 
directors do not have the specific training relating to financial reporting like financial 
experts (Krishnan et al., 2011). Thus, it is evident that the majority of the AC legal 
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experts in Nigeria do not have accounting expertise or experience. Thus, their 
inexperience of accounting may make them to be ineffective in curtailing financial 
accounting manipulation in form of DA. 
Table 5.7 also shows that the FACMs had a positive relationship with the DA. This 
was deduced from the regression coefficient of (0.540) and p-value of (0.000), 
indicating a 1% level of significance. This infers that the presence of at least one 
female director in the AC may not reduce the likelihood of managers‟ unscrupulous 
behaviours towards earnings which has an adverse effect on the FRQ. This has 
provided a basis for rejecting hypothesis six (H6) of this current study which 
established that the FACMs had a positive relationship with the FRQ. A possible 
explanation for this could be that, consistent with the liberal feminist theory, women 
are deprived compared to men as a result of the obvious discrimination and systemic 
influence that keep them away from receiving vital resources, such as business 
education and experience (Fischer et al.,1993). To corroborate this, it was evident 
from the sample firms that, only 54% of the compositions of the ACs in Nigeria had 
female directors and from those, the majority of them had only one female 
representative. The results also support the findings of Martınez et al. (2016) who 
suggested that the proportion of female independent directors on the board does not 
enhance the FRQ since they are unlikely to decrease the omission of information 
qualifications and error-non-compliance. In addition, a similar result was 
documented by Akhor and Oseghale (2017), Bala and Kumai (2015) who revealed a 
positive significant relationship between a female director on the board and the DA 
of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
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The Audit committee stock ownership (ACSO) was another AC variable used in this 
present study. It was found that the ACSO had a negative relationship with the DA. 
Though the result was negative, it was statistically not significant. This suggests that 
the number of shares possessed by the AC members may not substantially decrease 
the DA.  This contradicts hypothesis seven (H7) of the thesis which postulates that 
the ACSO has a positive significant relationship with the FRQ. The possible reason 
for this is that, consistent with Hamdan et al. (2013), the direct financial interests of 
the members of the AC may deprive them of the integrity of preventing the 
managers‟ alterations of the financial reports.  Another possible explanation for this 
is that, considering the numbers of shares that some of the members of the AC 
possess when compared with the overall outstanding equities of the firm, the 
proportion is expected to be very negligible. This evidence was obtained in the 
additional analysis when the ACSO was re-measured using percentage of AC shares 
(units of AC shares divided total number of shares outstanding to the firm). This may 
divest in them the power to make a meaningful contribution, particularly in 
preventing opportunistic managers‟ behaviours which is the key factor that motivates 
management to make deceptive financial reports. 
Another type of AC characteristic is the audit committee tenure (ACT). The results 
reveal that the ACT was positively and insignificantly related to the discretionary 
accruals. Contrary to the study‟s expectation, as hypothesised, the ACT had a 
positive relationship with the FRQ. The positive insignificant relationship with the 
DA implies that longer-tenured directors in the AC do not reduce earnings 
management and thus, may not guarantee better FRQ.  
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This might be as a result of the fact that the average AC tenure of eight years as 
evidence from the descriptive statistics could be too long. Because an exceptionally 
prolonged board service may possibly compromise independence since the oldest 
directors might be more probable to befriend management and thus, become less 
critical of the quality of its financial statements (Beasley, 1996; Vafeas, 2003). This 
is consistent with prior studies that documented a positive relationship between the 
length of the AC tenure to the possibility of dodging negative earnings surprises (Sun 
et al., 2011; Vafeas, 2003;  2005; Yermack, 2004). 
The audit committee chair (ACC) was an additional AC attribute employed in this 
present study. In contrast to the research expectation, the ACC was found to have a  
positive but insignificant relationship with the DA. This implies that, when the 
chairmanship of the AC is saddled in the hands of the shareholders, it does not 
guarantee better FRQ. A potential explanation for this is that as evidenced from the 
descriptive statistics, 89% of the AC chairs in Nigerian firms were shareholders. This 
is because CAMA (2004) recommends that the AC shall consist of representatives 
from both shareholders and directors. Thus, the presence of shareholders in the AC 
may reduce their monitoring role in the decision-making process, since shareholders 
may be more induce to increase their value as a result of share price increase 
(Sharma & Kuang, 2014). 
Considering the control variables, Table 5.7 shows that the BI was negatively but 
insignificantly associated with the DA. This suggests that the proportion of 
independent directors in the board may not constrain the mangers from practicing 
earnings management in the listed companies in Nigeria. This is in line with the 
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finding of Gao and Huang (2016) and Nelson and Devi (2013). In the same vein, the 
BE was not significantly related to the DA having a regression coefficient of (-0.270) 
and p-value of (0.480). Though the relationship was negative, the finding does not 
support the resource dependence theory and agency theory which propose that a high 
BE is important to enhance the board‟s monitoring as it leads to high financial 
reporting quality (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). 
The FS had a positive significant relationship with the DA at 5%. This implies that 
larger firms are more probable to manage earnings than smaller firms. The possible 
explanation for this is that, larger firms are under more pressures to meet or beat the 
analysts' expectations.  The finding is in line with the results of Barton and Simko 
(2002), Chen et al. (2010), Kim, Liu and Rhee (2003) and Nelson and Devi (2013) 
who reported a positive relationship between the FS and the DA. In addition, the 
study examined whether high leveraged firms had more incentive to distort earnings 
to avoid debt covenant violations. Contrary to this prediction, the LEV was found to 
be negatively and significantly related to the DA. This means that highly leveraged 
firms have a propensity to reduce the DA. This is consistent with the findings of 
Jelinek (2007) and Zamri Rahman and Isa (2013) who showed that an increase in 
leverage decreases opportunistic earnings management since leverage requires debt 
recompense, thus lessening the cash available to managers for non-optimal outlays. 
Sales growth (SGROWTH) was revealed to have a negative insignificant relationship 
with the DA. This implies that SGROWTH had no significant influence on the DA of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. The result is supported by the findings of Abbadi et 
al. (2016) and Sun et al. (2011). Whilst  Chen et al. (2010) found a negative 
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significant relationship between SGROWTH and DA. Firm age (FAGE) was also 
shown to have a negative insignificant relationship with the DA. This implies that 
FAGE does not matter in preventing earnings manipulation. This is consistent with 
the findings of Leung, Srinidhi and Xie (2017) and Gao and Huang (2016) who 
found a negative insignificant relationship between FAGE and DA. 
The comparison between the expected and the actual findings of the foregoing 
regression is presented in Table 5.8.  
Table 5.8 
The Summary of the Predicted and the Actual Results for on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and FRQ (Discretionary Accruals)  
HYPOTHESIS E.Sign A.Sign Decision 
H1: There is positive relationship between AC Size 
(ACS) and FRQ 
-ve -Sig. Supported 
H2: There is positive relationship between AC 
Independence (ACI) and FRQ 
-ve -Insig. Not 
supported 
H3: There is positive relationship between AC 
Meetings (ACM) and FRQ 
-ve -Sig. Supported 
H4: There is positive relationship between AC 
Financial Accounting Expertise (ACFAE) and FRQ 
-ve -Sig. Supported 
H5: There is positive relationship between AC Legal 
Expert (ACLE) and FRQ 
-ve +Sig Not 
supported 
H6: There is positive relationship between Female 
AC (FACM) and FRQ 
-ve +Sig Not 
supported 
H7: There is positive relationship between AC Stock 
Ownership (ACSO) and FRQ 
-ve -Insig. Not 
supported 
H8:  There is positive relationship between AC 
Tenure (ACT) and FRQ 
-ve +Insig. Not 
supported 
H9: There is positive relationship between AC Chair 
(ACC) and FRQ 
-ve +Insig. Not 
supported 
Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative, +veSig = positive significant, 
-veSig = negative significant, +veInsig positive insignificant, -veInSig negative insignificant supported. -veSig  is 
supported otherwise and  not supported. 
 
 
In summary, from the nine variables tested in the study, three variables supported the 
predicted hypotheses whilst the remaining six did not. In particular, from the 
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remaining six, four variables were insignificant whilst the remaining two revealed 
the opposite sign with the research anticipations. 
5.4.2 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between AC 
Characteristics and Audit Quality (using audit fees) 
This section tests the first segment of objective two of the thesis which was to 
examine the relationships between the AC characteristics and the audit quality of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. The section also tests the hypotheses (H10a-H10i) to 
determine the second condition of the mediation. In testing the hypotheses, the 
natural logarithm of the audit fee (AUF) was used as a proxy for audit quality. For 
interpretation purposes, indicators, such as the coefficient (β), robust standard error, 
t-values, and p-values were generated and presented. 
Table 5.9 presents the regression results of model 1 (B) regression one which 
explains the relationships between the AC characteristics and the AUF. It was 
observed from Table 5.9 that the ACS was revealed to have a positive significant 
relationship with the AUF. The results have provided a coefficient of (0.392) and a 
p-value of (0.000), indicating a 1% significance level. The insinuation of this finding 
is that, a larger AC has higher chance of increasing the AUF and thus, enhancing the 
audit quality of the listed companies in Nigeria. Consequently, the results support 
H10a which assumed that the ACS has a positive relationship with the audit quality of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. It is also consistent with the resource dependence 
theory and the demand hypothesis of audit quality which appeals for a higher AUF in 
anticipation of greater audit efforts. This confirms the findings of  previous studies 
(Kim et al., 2016; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009; Marini et al., 2016; Zaman et al., 
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2016) which documented that a larger ACS is allied to a higher increase in audit fees, 
of which the premise is that an accumulation of one member to an AC brings about 
an extra increase in the AUF in their struggle to enhance the external monitoring. In 
Nigeria, similar results were documented by Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) who 
showed that  larger board size  was related to higher audit fees. 
Table 5.9 also reveals that the ACI was found to have a positive but insignificant 
relationship with the AUF. This was deduced from the coefficient and p-value of 
(0.350 and 0.373), respectively. Though the result was positive, it did not support 
H10b. This implies that the proportion of the non-executive directors on the AC may 
not have a substantial influence on the audit fees of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
The explanation for this could be similar to the possible justification given on the 
result of the relationship between ACI and DA, which revealed a negative 
insignificant association. Thus, independent directors in AC that have networking 
with the CEOs may not be critical about financial reporting issues. This is because 
their relationship with the CEO may compromise their independence. The result is 
consistent with the findings of Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) who documented a 
positive insignificant relationship between the ACI and the AUF. In addition,  a 
similar result was documented by Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016b), and 
Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) who revealed that a larger  proportion of the board 






Model One (B) the Relationship between AC and Characteristics Audit Quality 
(using Audit fees) 
Variable              Coef.              Robust  
           Std. Err. 
         T-Values          P-Value 
ACS 0.392 0.053           7.430*** 0.000 
ACI 0.350 0.392     0.890 0.373 
ACM 0.018 0.071     0.260 0.794 
ACFAE 0.532 0.276       1.930* 0.055 
ACLE 0.789 0.389         2.030** 0.043 
FACM -0.163 0.077        -2.120** 0.035 
ACSO 0.043 0.012     3.560*** 0.000 
ACT 0.002 0.024     0.070 0.948 
ACC -0.651 0.165 -3.940*** 0.000 
BI 0.760 0.350         2.170** 0.030 
BE 1.011 0.266 3.810*** 0.000 
FE 0.372 0.027 13.610*** 0.000 
LEV 0.013 0.051     0.260 0.792 
FAGE 0.005 0.003        1.720* 0.087 
SGROWTH 0.036 0.015          2.460** 0.014 
Cons 0.362 0.489      0.740 0.460 
R-squared 0.603    
Linktest(F-Stats) 333.25    
            (P-Value) 0.000    
            (hatsq) 0.365    
Hettest (P-Value) 0.009    
Hausman Test 0.118    
LM Test 0.050    
Observations 440    
Note: AUF= Audit fees, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = 
AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock 
ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS 
= firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age and SGROWTH = sales growth, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.001 = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Table 5.9 also reveals that the ACMs have a coefficient and p-value of (0.018 and 
0.794), respectively. This recommends that the ACMs have a positive but 
statistically insignificant relationship with the AUF. It implies that meetings up to 
four times a year may assure a higher AUF. Thus, the result is not consistent with the 
study‟s predicted hypothesis, H10c, which assumed that the ACMs have a positive 
 
 212 
relationship with the audit quality.  A possible explanation for this result could be 
that, as evidenced from the descriptive statistics some companies meet up to five 
times a year. Thus, more recurrent meetings may lead to fatigue and tiredness, thus 
creating room for accommodating irrelevant discussions that are outside the scope 
and the overall objectives of the firms. This may cause the succeeding significant 
discussions to be ineffective in the long run. This was evident from the descriptive 
statistics which revealed that some companies met more frequently than the global 
recommendation of meeting of up to four times a year. The result is in line with the 
findings of prior studies (Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002) which revealed a 
positive insignificant relationship between the ACMs and the AUF. However, a 
similar result was documented by Salawu, Okpanachi, Yahaya and Dikki (2017), and 
Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) who showed that board meeting frequency was 
positively related to higher audit fees in Nigeria. 
The audit committee financial accounting experts (ACFAEs) was positively and 
significantly related to the AUF at a 10 level of significance. This means that an 
increase of one member with a professional accounting certificate on the AC will 
cause an additional increase in audit fees to demand greater external monitoring. This 
is consistent with H10d which posited that the ACFAEs have a positive relationship 
with the audit quality of the listed companies in Nigeria. The findings were also in 
line with the institutional theory which assumes that the AC that has members with 
specific expertise is associated with higher financial reporting quality. The result is 
consistent with the findings of Abbott et al. (2003), Carcello and Neal (2003), Cohen 
et al. (2014), Kim et al. (2016), and Lee and Mande (2005) who showed that AC 
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accounting experts request more audit assurance, and thus pay high audit fees. In 
addition, a similar result was reported by Salawu et al. (2017) and Urhoghide and 
Izedonmi (2015) who disclosed that a larger proportion of the board and AC 
expertise were associated to higher audit fees in Nigeria. 
Interestingly, the model also displayed evidence of a positive significant association 
between the ACLEs and the AUF at a 5 level of significance. This implies that 
having a higher percentage of legal experts in the AC enhances the audit assurance 
through the payment of a high audit price. The finding supports H10e which presumed 
that the ACLEs have a positive significant relationship with the audit quality of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. The finding is also consistent with the resource 
dependence theory which shows that diverse skills and expertise on the AC can 
improve the committees' ability to examine whether the accounting procedures 
correctly reflect the basic financial substance of the business activities, which will 
advance to a higher FRQ. This is not astonishing as legal experts in the AC are 
exhibited to be monitors rather than ordinary signals to the financial reporting  
(Krishnan et al., 2011). Although, most of the AC legal experts in Nigeria do not 
have financial expertise as observed from their profile during the data collection.  
But their legal know-how prompt other AC members to be more vigilant about the 
legal risks that are linked to erroneous or poor aggressive financial reports  (Krishnan 
et al., 2011). Consequently, they hire better auditors pay high audit prices which in 
returns enhanced FRQ. Thus, the finding supports H10e, which predicted that the 
ACLEs have a positive relationship with the audit quality. Hence, it is consistent 
with the complementary hypothesis of audit of paying a high AUF for greater audit 
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assurance. More so, Cohen et al. (2014) showed that AC members with specific 
expertise are active monitoring devices and thus, enhance FRQ. 
Table 5.9 also shows that the FACMs had a negative significant association with the 
AUF at a 5% significance level. This was observed from the coefficient of (-0.163) 
and p-value of (0.035). This infers that the presence of female directors in the AC 
decreases the likelihood of paying a high audit price. Surprisingly, the result 
contradicts H10f which presumed that the FACMs have a positive relationship with 
the audit quality. A potential clarification for this could be that female directors are 
more conservative throughout board consultations than the men (Gold et al., 2009). 
This could possibly make them purchase less audit services from the external 
auditors. In addition, at times, female directors have to exhibit superfluous skills in 
order to gain managerial positions and be on corporate boards (Gold et al., 2009). 
This may stimulate them to reduce their desire for the assurance expected from the 
external auditors and, consequently, pay fewer audit fees (Ittonen et al., 2010). The 
result is in line with the substitutional hypothesis of audit quality which suggests that 
greater internal control is accredited to lower audit processes and thus, to lower audit 
fees.  This also validates the findings of Ittonen et al. (2010) and  Xiang et al. (2015)  
who found a negative significant association between the FACMs and the AUF. In 
Nigeria, Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016b) revealed that board diversity was 
positively related to the audit fees. 
Table 5.9 also provides evidence of a positive relationship between the ACSO and 
the AUF. This was appended by a beta coefficient and p-value of 0.042 and 0.000, 
respectively. This implies that one unit increase of the ACSO will proportionately 
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increase the AUF. Thus, the finding is in line with H10g which predicted that the 
ACSO has a positive significant relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. This is not surprising because the more units of shares 
directors possess, the stronger their passion is to work to maximise the worth of the 
company‟s stock (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). The result is consistent with the 
prior expectation that the ACSO has a positive relationship with the audit quality of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. A possible explanation for this might be that 
shareholders in the AC demand for greater audit effort from the external auditors by 
paying high audit fees. This will supplement their monitoring ability on financial 
reporting process. Although it was earlier revealed that the low percentage of AC 
shares in Nigeria constrained them to make significant contribution in decreasing 
DA.  However, their willingness to incur higher audit fees may reduce EM and 
enhances FRQ. This validates the agency theory of the AC shares‟ alignment which 
suggests that the AC shares align the curiosity of the members of the AC with the 
interests of the other shareholders (Vafeas, 2005; Yermack, 2004). The result is also 
in line with the finding of Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016b) who showed that 
director ownership was positively related to the audit fees of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
In addition, the audit committee tenure (ACT) was established to have a positive 
insignificant association with the AUF. This indicates that the length of the directors‟ 
tenure does not influence the AUF. Thus, the finding contradicts H10h which assumed 
that the ACT has a positive significant relationship with the audit quality. A probable 
explanation for this could be that, considering the descriptive statistics, it was found 
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that there were some AC members that had served up to eight years. This period may 
be considered too prolonged as long-tenured directors may have a sociable 
connection with the management, which could be developed over time (Vafaes, 
2003). Furthermore, the management may participate in the nomination procedure of 
the non-executive directors; thus, the non-executive directors who have strong 
personal connections with the management are more probable to be re-elected and 
last for a long term. Hence, their contribution could be compromised by their cordial 
relationship with the managers (Vafaes, 2003). Consequently, it is probable that the 
positive influence of long-tenured directors on the monitoring effectiveness is 
compensated by its negative effect thereby making them become ineffective.  
Consistently, prior studies found that the positive effect of the directors‟ long tenure 
on monitoring the efficiency outweighs the negative influence of the long tenure of 
the directors on monitoring effectiveness, particularly in supervising financial 
reporting process (Chan et al., 2013; Vafeas, 2003). 
Table 5.9 also shows that the ACC had a negative significant relationship with the 
AUF. This was inferred from the beta coefficient of -0.651 and p-value of 0.000, 
respectively. This suggests that when the AC is chaired by a stockholder, the audit 
price decreases. The result contradicts the research expectation as hypothesised in 
H10i that the ACC has a positive relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The possible reason for this is that, it was evident from the 
descriptive statistics that almost 89% of  the AC were chaired by shareholders, and it 
was further found from the result on the relationship between the ACC and the DA  
that the exsistance of shareholders as AC chairs had no meaningful contribution to 
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the committees‟ effectivess on monitoring financial frauds. This is because their 
existence in the AC may reduce their monitoring role in the decision-making process. 
Because shareholders may be more induce to increase their value as a result of share 
price increase (Sharma & Kuang, 2014). This might enable them to acquire less audit 
services and are involved more in earnings manipulations.  
Regarding the control variables, it was found that the BI had a positive significant 
relationship with the AUF with a beta coefficient of 0.760 and p-value of 0.030, 
respectively. This suggests that the higher proportion of independent directors in the 
AC demand greater audit assurance in an exchange for payment of a high AUF. This 
is in line with the study expectations and also supports the findings of Abbott (2003) 
and Carcello (2002). Moreover, Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) revealed that a 
larger proportion of AC independence was positively related to audit fees in Nigeria.  
The result also shows that the BE has a positive significant relationship with the 
AUF with a beta coefficient and a p-value of (1.011 and 0.000), respectively. This 
confirms the notion that board members with financial expertise will be more willing 
to understand the audit risks and ligation, and thus pay a higher AUF in their quest 
for greater audit assurance. This is consistent with the findings of Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) and Vafeas and Waegelein (2007). More so, in Nigeria, 
Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) documented a positive significant relationship 
between the BE and the AUF.  
Moreover, firm size (FS) was revealed to have a positive relationship with the AUF 
at a 1% significance level. This is in line with the belief that larger firms are 
connected to higher FRQ since they are more closely monitored in the market thus, 
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they will be more willing to hire better auditors for greater audit assurance. The 
finding is line with the prior studies (Chan et al., 2013; Chen & Krishnan, 2016; 
Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). In Nigeria, Abdul Malik and Che-Ahmad (2016b) 
and Urhoghide et al. (2015) revealed that the FS had a positive significant 
relationship with the AUF. Table 5.9 also revealed that the LEV was found to have a 
positive insignificant association with the AUF. This implies that a firm‟s financial 
leverage had no influence on the AUF of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
Firm age (FAGE) was shown to have a positive significant relation with the AUF. 
This indicates that older firms pay a higher AUF. This is consistent with the previous 
studies which found a positive significant relationship between the FAGE and the 
AUF. The SGROWTH was revealed to have a positive significant relationship with 
the AUF. This means that growing firms demand exceptional audit efforts by paying 
higher audit fees. This is in line with the findings of  Chen and Krishnan (2016),  Ben 
Ali and Lesage (2013), and Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) who documented a 
positive significant relationship between the SGROWTH and the AUF. In addition, 
Asien (2014) found that the FAGE was positively and significantly related to the 
AUF of the listed firms in Nigeria.  
The comparison between the expected and the actual findings of the foregoing 
regression is presented in Table 5.10. From the nine variables tested in this model, 
four variables supported the predicted hypotheses whilst the remaining four did not. 
In particular, from the remaining four, three variables were insignificant whilst only 




The Summary of the Predicted and the Actual Results for on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and Audit Fees 
HYPOTHESIS E.Sign A.Sign Decision 
H10a: There is positive relationship between AC Size 
(ACS) and AUQ 
+ +sig. Supported  
H10b: There is positive relationship between AC 
Independence (ACI) and AQ 
+ +insig. Not 
supported 
H10c: There is positive relationship between AC 
Meetings (ACM) and AUQ 
+ +insig. Not 
Supported 
H10d: There is positive relationship between AC 
Financial Accounting Expertise (ACFAE) and AUQ 
+ +sig. Supported 
H10e: There is positive relationship between AC 
Legal Expert (ACLE) and AUQ 
+ +sig. Supported 
H10f: There is positive relationship between Female 
AC (FACM) and AUQ 
+ -sig. Not 
Supported 
H10g: There is positive relationship between AC 
Stock Ownership (ACSO) and AUQ 
+ +sig. Supported 
H10h:  There is positive relationship between AC 
Tenure (ACT) and AUQ 
+ +insig. Not 
Supported 
H10i: There is positive relationship between AC 
Chair (ACC) and AUQ 
+ -sig. Not 
Supported 
Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +vesig = positive 
significant, -vesig = negative significant, +veinsig positive insignificant, -veinsig negative 
insignificant supported. -vesig is supported otherwise and  not supported. 
 
5.4.3 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between AC 
Characteristics and Audit Quality (using BIG4 auditors) 
This section examines the second segment of objective two of the thesis which was 
to determine the relationship between the AC characteristics and the audit quality of 
the listed companies in Nigeria.  The section also tests the hypotheses (H10a-H10i) to 
examine the second condition of the mediation. In testing the hypotheses, the BIG 4 
auditor was used as an additional measurement for the audit quality. In the desire to 
make the interpretations, indicators, such as coefficient (β), robust standard error, t-
values and p-values, were generated and presented. Table 5.11 presents the logit 
results of model 1 (B) regression two of the relationships between the AC 
characteristics and the BIG 4 auditors. 
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Table 5.11 displays that the ACS was revealed to have a negative relationship with 
the BIG 4 auditors. This was shown by a coefficient of (-0.223) and p-value of 
(0.179), indicating an insignificant relationship at all levels. This suggests that a 
larger ACS may not engage BIG 4 auditors in the selection of the auditor brand name 
in the listed companies in Nigeria. Thus, the result is contrary to the prior expectation 
which was hypothesised (H10a) that, the ACS has a positive relationship with the BIG 
4 auditors of the listed companies in Nigeria. The result also contradicts the finding 
of ACS and AUF which revealed a positive significant relationship. A possible 
explanation for this could be that AUF is a function of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors 
(André, Broye, Pong & Schatt, 2011). Thus, listed companies in Nigeria were 
audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and each of them is expected to be paid for 
their services in form of AUF. This may likely alter the direction of relationships 
between the AC attributes and both proxies of audit quality (AUF and Big 4). 
Another possible explanation could be due to the fact that a smaller ACS could act 
more effectively than a bigger ACS since it is more likely for the smaller AC to 
make substantial decisions without wasting time. In addition, a large ACS may be 
too tough to manage because too large a number of AC members may result in 
slower decision-making progress. The result is in line with the findings of the agency 
theory proponents who argue that smaller boards are more effective monitoring 
mechanisms, and more organised and decisive (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 2005). 
However, Fodio et al. (2013) showed that a smaller board was better in mitigating 




Model 1 (B) Pool Logit of the Relationship between the AC Characteristics and the 
Audit Quality (using BIG4) 
Variable Coef. Robust Sd. E. T-Value P-Value 
ACS -0.223 0.166 -1.340 0.179 
ACI 2.189 1.207 1.810** 0.070 
ACM -0.656 0.209 -3.130*** 0.002 
ACFAE 2.420 0.872 2.780*** 0.006 
ACLE 2.104 1.281 1.640* 0.100 
FACM 0.935 0.248 3.770*** 0.000 
ACSO 0.309 0.105 2.940*** 0.003 
ACT -0.246 0.081 -3.030*** 0.002 
ACC -0.719 0.392 -1.830* 0.067 
BI 1.775 1.176 1.510 0.131 
BE 2.153 0.834 2.580*** 0.010 
FS 0.374 0.090 4.150*** 0.000 
LEV -7.035 6.437 -1.090 0.274 
FAGE 0.004 0.008 0.430 0.671 
SGROWTH -0.027 0.041 -0.650 0.514 
Cons -4.784 1.608 -2.980*** 0.003 
Pseudo R2        0.153    
Goodness-of-Fit Test(HL chi2 )       2.42    
(P-Value) 0.9655    
Model Spec. Test (correctly specified) 70%    
LM Test 0.0500    
Observations 440    
Note: BIG4 = Big4 Auditor auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and 
Deloitte), ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial 
expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size 
LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age and SGROWTH = sales growth, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
= significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Further, some prior studies conducted have revealed that board size is inversely 
related to financial performance (Yermack, 1996) this can be extended to the ACS. 
This is consistent with the findings of Leong et al. (2015), Lin et al. (2006), and 
Vafeas (2005) who found that smaller AC sizes had the capacity to make better 
decisions and have better coordination because their relative sizes reduced the 
meaningless discussions characterised by larger boards. 
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The next variable was the audit committee independence (ACI). It was observed 
from Table 5.11 that, the ACI had a positive significant relationship with the BIG 4 
firms. This was revealed from the regression coefficient and p-value of 2.189 and 
0.070, respectively. This implies that a larger proportion of independent directors on 
the AC increases the likelihood of hiring BIG 4 auditors. This is in line with the 
research prediction as hypothesised (H10b) that, the ACI has a positive relationship 
with the audit quality. The result contradicts the finding of the influence of ACI on 
AUF which revealed a positive insignificant relationship. However, a possible 
explanation for this variation may be that AUF is paid to both Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors (André, Broye, Pong & Schatt, 2011). This might affect the nature of their 
relationships in the regression estimation. This explains the premise that autonomous 
directors on the AC perform a greater monitoring role since they are independent of 
the management. This makes them acquire high quality auditing services and be 
more intense towards decreasing the propensity for financial reporting frauds. The 
finding is in line with the agency theory which suggests that an independent AC may 
be more ready to disagree with managers on different issues (Abbott et al., 2003; 
Carcello & Neal, 2003). This makes them more vigilant on financial reporting issues. 
The result is consistent with the findings of previous studies (Beasley, 1996; Hudaib 
& Cooke, 2005; Ejeagbasi et al., 2015). The result also validates the findings of 
Akhalumeh et al. (2017) and Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) who revealed  that  a 
larger proportion of AC independence was associated to higher audit fees in Nigeria. 
Contrary to the study‟s prediction, the audit committee meetings (ACMs) were also 
found to have a negative significant association with the BIG 4 auditors. Thus (H10c) 
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was not supported. This implies that a more ACM frequency decreases the 
probability of engaging the service of BIG 4 auditors. This supports the substitution 
effect hypothesis of audit quality which suggests an inverse relationship between the 
governance devices and the audit quality. A probable justification for this could be 
that an AC that meets recurrently can absolutely influence the audit coverage 
throughout the numerous steps of the audit. Based on the foregoing, there is a high 
likelihood that more frequent AC meetings may reduce the chance of financial frauds 
in a firm, and thus make them require less audit effort. This has been supported by 
previous studies  (Abbott et al., 2004; Raghunandan,  Read & Rama, 2001) which 
documented that regular AC meetings lessen the degree of financial restatements 
since such meetings with the internal auditor will keep them informed and 
conversant with the accounting and auditing issues. 
Table 5.11 also reveals that the audit committee financial accounting experts 
(ACFAEs) had a positive significant relationship with the BIG 4 auditors. The 
regression coefficient and p-value of (2.420 and 0.007) depicted the degree of this 
relationship which was significant at 1%. This is consistent with the research 
expectation (H10d) which hypothesised that the ACFAEs have a positive significant 
relationship with the audit quality (AUQ). This infers that members of the AC with 
financial accounting knowledge are extremely likely to acquire the services of BIG 4 
auditors in the process of selecting the audit brand name. This supports the demand 
hypothesis of audit that is aligned to the agency theory which suggests that audit 
services are required to lessen agency conflicts rising from the interests of equity 
holders and managers. Therefore, AC members with financial know-how will engage 
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better auditors who will be more effective monitors of the managers‟ actions and 
thus, ensure that appropriate financial reports and disclosure exist. This is in line with 
the findings of Abbott et al. (2003), Carcello and Neal (2003) and Kim et al. (2016) 
who found that the AC accounting experts are significantly related to the likelihood 
of engaging high-quality auditors, such as the BIG4 auditors or industry specialist 
auditors. In Nigeria, Urhoghide and Izedonmi (2015) revealed that a larger 
proportion of board expertise is associated with higher audit fees in their demand for 
greater assurance. 
Interestingly, it was observed that the audit committee legal experts (ACLEs) had a 
positive significant relation with the BIG 4 auditors. This implies that the members 
of the AC with legal backgrounds have the likelihood of employing BIG 4 auditors. 
The result supports (H10e) which presumed that the ACLEs have a positive 
association with the BIG 4 auditors. The result is consistent with the institutional 
theory which proposes that the AC which has members with specific expertise is 
associated with higher financial reporting quality (Cohen et al., 2014). This is not 
surprising as members of the AC with legal backgrounds prepare AC members to be 
extra careful about legal risks that are concomitant to inaccurate or inadequate 
aggressive financial reporting. Their risk avoidance makes them engage the services 
of better auditors, such as the BIG 4 auditors, in order to acquire greater audit 
assurance. This corroborates the findings of Krishnan et al. (2011) who found that 
legal experts in the AC will possibly assist in ensuring better FRQ since the quality 
of the financial reporting can be connected to legal liability threats and their legal 
backgrounds require them to be more watchful of such threats. 
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Table 5.11 also shows that the female audit committee members (FACMs) had a 
positive significant relationship with the BIG 4 firms. This was accompanied by the 
beta coefficient of 0.935 and p-value of 0.000, respectively. This signifies that the 
presence of at least one female director on the AC increases the likelihood of 
prioritising the services of the BIG 4 auditors than the non-BIG 4 auditors in the 
listed companies in Nigeria. The finding is consistent with H10f which presumed that 
the FACMs have a positive significant relationship with the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. However, this result is contrary to the finding of FACM and 
AUF which showed a negative significant relationship. This might be as a result of 
that fact the two proxies of audit quality (AUF and Big 4) have different 
measurement. AUF is a continuous variable whilst Big 4 auditor is a dummy 
variable. More so,  AUF can be determined by  Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors (André 
et al., 2011). This can influence the nature of their relationships in the regression 
model. This is as a result of the fact that, the FACMs demand greater audit efforts to 
safeguard the firms‟ reputational capital and hence, hire better auditors. This supports 
the notion that a diverse gender in the AC demands a higher audit quality in high risk 
circumstances. The result validates the social feminist theory which suggests that the 
innate difference between women and men does not infer that women are inferior to 
men since men and women may develop differently, but with equal effective 
qualities (Fischer et al.,1993). The result is consistent with the findings of Aldamen 
et al. (2016) Huang and Thiruvadi (2010), and Lai et al. (2017) who found that the 
FACMs demand high audit quality to obtain a greater audit assurance. In Nigeria, 
Dakata et al. (2016) showed that female AC members had the same functions as 
female directors in minimising the EM performed by the managers. 
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The next variable from the estimation was the audit committee stock ownership 
(ACSO). It was deduced that the ACSO had a positive significant relationship with 
the BIG 4 auditors at a 1% significance level. This implies that the unit of shares 
possessed by the AC members increases the likelihood of rendering services to the 
BIG 4 auditors. This supports the research expectation (H10g), and is thus consistent 
with the complimentary hypothesis which suggests that the monitoring role provided 
by the ACSO makes them demand greater audit assurance through engaging better 
auditors.  The result supports the finding of Kibiya et al. (2016b) who found that a 
large cumulative proportion of shares held by the AC enriches its monitoring 
function and enhances the FRQ in Nigeria. 
Contrary to the expectation of this study, it was found that the audit committee tenure 
(ACT) had a negative significant relationship with the BIG 4 auditors. This implies 
that long-tenured directors are less likely to engage BIG 4 auditors. The result also 
contradicts the study expectation (H10h). Possible elucidation for this could be that, 
work know-how can increase job performance since experience is the job-relevant 
knowledge that has grown over time. As such older directors can gain more 
familiarity with the firms‟ internal control systems and corporate operations over 
time. They can also develop interactions with the management to gain more valuable 
information for their decisions on financial matters. In addition, senior directors may 
have greater knowledge and proficiency, and promise to perform better. This makes 
them have less desire for the greater external monitoring provided by the BIG 4 
auditors. This supports the substitution effect hypothesis which suggests that there is 
an inverse relationship between the governance devices and the audit quality. The 
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findings also validate the arguments of the agency theory proponents who suggests 
that long serving directors are more familiar with and knowledgeable about the 
company‟s practices and thus, become more effective in decreasing the probability of 
financial reporting fraud (Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; and Vafeas 
2005). 
The audit committee chair (ACC) had an inverse significant association with the BIG 
4 auditors. This proposes that the chairmanship by the shareholders in the AC 
decreases the likelihood of employing the BIG 4 auditors. The result contradicts the 
prior expectation as hypothesised (H10i) that, the ACC has a positive relationship 
with the BIG 4 auditors of the listed companies in Nigeria. The possible explanation 
for this result is that it is evident from the regression of the relationship between the 
ACC and the AUF that, when the AC is chaired by shareholders the AUF decreases. 
Thus, the negative relationship between the ACC and the BIG 4 auditors can be 
linked to the AUF since it is believed that firms that are audited by the BIG 4 
auditors are more likely to pay high audit fees. Certeris paribus firms spend more 
when they employ the BIG 4 auditors (Abbott et al., 2003; Hallak & Silva, 2012; 
Jacob & Desai, 2012). The result is in line with the findings of  prior studies which 
have argued that the AC chair gains control over the AC, schedules the agendas, and 
controls the information flow (Sharma et al., 2009).  Similarly, Qu (2018) showed 
that the AC chairs are mostly in charge of more official duties, including scheduling 
for the committees‟ meetings, setting the agenda, collaborating with the internal and 
external auditors, and assessing the performance of the ordinary members. 
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Considering the control variables, the BE and FS were found to have positive 
siginificant relationships with the BIG 4 auditors. This means that board members 
with financial expertise in the AC increase the tendency of engaging the service of 
the BIG 4 auditors in their demand for better audit assurance. In this vein, larger 
firms are more probable to hire a BIG 4 auditor. This is consistent with the findings 
of  Hallak and Silva (2012) who found a positive significant relationship between the 
FS and BIG 4 auditors. More so, in Nigeria, Asien (2014) showed that larger firms 
were more likely to be audited by BIG 4 auditors. Whilst, the BI, LEV, FAGE, and 
SGROWTH were fonud to be insignificantly related to the BIG 4 auditors implying 
that the BI, LEV, FAGE, and SGROWTH did not influence the decision of selecting 
the auditor brand name of the listed firms in Nigeria.  
The summary of the comparison between the expected and the actual findings of the 
foregoing regression is presented in Table 5.12. Generally, from the nine variables 
tested in this model, five variables were consistent with the predicted hypotheses 
whilst the remaining four were not. In particular, from the remaining four, one 
variable was insignificant whilst the remaining three disclosed the opposite sign with 
the research anticipations.  
Table 5.12 
Results of the Predicted and the Actual Hypothesis on the Relationship between the 
AC Characteristics and Audit Quality (using BIG4) 
HYPOTHESIS (H10a H10i) E.Sign A.Sign Decision 
H10a: There is positive relationship between AC Size 
(ACS) and AUQ + -Insig. 
Not 
supported 
H10b: There is positive relationship between AC 






Table 5.12 Continued 
H10c: There is positive relationship between AC 
Meetings. (ACM) and AUQ + -sig. 
Not 
Supported 
H10d: There is positive relationship between AC 
Financial Accounting Expertise (ACFAE) and AUQ + +sig Supported 
H10e: There is positive relationship between AC 
Legal Expert (ACLE) and AUQ + +sig Supported 
H10f: There is positive relationship between Female 
AC (FACM) and AUQ + +sig. Supported 
H10g: There is positive relationship between AC 
Stock Ownership (ACSO) and AUQ + +sig Supported 
H10h:  There is positive relationship between AC 
Tenure (ACT) and AUQ + -sig 
Not 
Supported 
H10i: There is positive relationship between A Chair 
(ACC) and AUQ + -sig 
Not 
Supported 
Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +veSig = positive 
significant, -veSig = negative significant, +veInSig positive insignificant, -veInSig negative 
insignificant supported. -veSig  is supported otherwise and  not supported. 
 
5.4.4 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between the Audit 
Quality (using Audit fees) and the Discretionary Accruals 
This section examines the first part of objective three of the study which was to 
determine the relationship between the audit quality and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The section also tests the hypothesis (H11) in order to examine 
the third condition of the mediation effect. In testing the hypotheses, the DA was 
used as the first measurement for the FRQ. For interpretation purposes, indicators, 
such as the coefficient (β), robust standard error, t-values and p-values were 
generated and presented. 
Table 5.13 presents the results of model one (C) Regression one of the relationship 
between the audit quality (AUF) and the FRQ (DA).  Table 5.13 shows that the AUF 
had a negative relationship with the DA. This was revealed by a coefficient of (-
0.197) and p-value of (0.001). This indicates that the AUF was inversely and 
significantly related to the DA. It implies that an increase in the fees paid to the 
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external auditors decreases the DA and thus, improves the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. This is in line with the study expectation as hypothesised (H11) 
that, the audit quality has a positive relationship with the FRQ. 
The findings also validated the agency theory which proposes that auditing financial 
reports is recognised as a means to decrease agency cost. This is not surprising as it 
is evident that a higher AUF is associated with greater audit efforts, lower litigation, 
greater assurance, and better reputation. It is based on the premise that auditing 
financial reports is recognised as a means to decrease agency cost and thus, a high 
audit fee is associated with a lower EM and higher FRQ.  
Table 5.13 
Model One (C) The Relationship between Audit Quality (Audit fess) and FRQ 
(Discretionary Accruals) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. T-Value P-Value 
AUF -0.197 0.076 -2.600*** 0.010 
BI -0.259 0.428 -0.600 0.546 
BE -0.579 0.417 -1.390 0.166 
FS 0.125 0.060 2.100** 0.036 
LEV -6.767 2.968 -2.280** 0.023 
SGROWTH -0.001 0.004 -0.290 0.772 
Cons  -0.006 0.021 -0.270 0.787 
F- Stat 2.89    
Prob. F 0.001    
R2 0.045    
Hettest Chi2 0.070    
Prob. Chi2 0.787    
HM TestChi2 0.000    
Prob. Chi2 1.000    
Link test (hatsq) 0.285    
Mean VIF 1.400    
Note table. AUF = Audit fees, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = 
leverage and SGROWTH = sales growth, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 = significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively 
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The result corroborates the findings of Cohen et al. (2007), Franke et al.  (2002), 
Hoitash et al.  (2007) and Carmona et al. (2015) who found a negative significant 
association between the audit fees and the DA. However, in Nigeria, similar findings 
have been documented by Abdul Malik and Che-Ahmad (2016), Ndubuisi and 
Ezechukwu (2017), and Okolie (2014) who found that the  audit fee significantly 
decreases the DA and enhances the FRQ.  
5.4.5 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between the Audit 
Quality (using BIG4) and the Discretionary Accruals 
This section examines the second portion of objective three of the study which was 
to examine the relationship between the audit quality and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria.  The section also tests the hypothesis (H11). In testing the 
hypotheses, the DA was used as the measurement for the FRQ. For interpretation 
purposes, indicators, such as the coefficient (β), robust standard error, t-values, and 
p-values were generated and presented. 
Table 5.14 presents the results of model one (C) Regression two of the relationship 
between the audit quality (BIG 4) and the FRQ (DA). Table 5.14 shows that the BIG 
4 auditors had a positive relationship with the DA. This is shown by a coefficient of 
(0.121) and a p-value of (0.253). This means that the BIG 4 auditor was positively 
but insignificantly related to the DA. A possible explanation for this is that, 
considering the auditors‟ rotations as provided by in the SEC CCG (2011) where it is 
stipulated that auditors should be retained for no longer than 10 years. This period 
may be considered too long as exceptionally prolonged auditors‟ tenure might impair 
their independence since the longer they stay as auditors of the same firm, the more 
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possible it is that they will befriend the management and thus, become less critical of 
the accounting issues (Carey & Simnett, 2006).  
Table 5.14 
Model One (C) Regression Two of the Relationship between the Audit Quality 
(BIG4) and  FRQ (Discretionary Accruals) 
Variable         Coefficient       Std. Err.    t-value        p-value 
BIG4 0.121 0.106      1.140 0.253 
BI -0.479 0.425     -1.130 0.261 
BE -0.766 0.403     -1.900* 0.058 
FS -5.234 2.649  -1.980** 0.049 
LEV 0.002 0.149       0.020 0.987 
SGROWTH 0.000 0.000 -0.500 0.617 
Cons 2.974 0.364 8.180*** 0.000 
R2  0.147    
F- Stats 2.200    
 P-Value 0.042    
Hettest (Wald Chi2) 4.380    
Prob.Chi2 0.036    
HM Test(Wald Chi2) 9.470    
Prob.Chi2 0.149    
Link test (hatsq) 0.351    
Mean VIF 1.050    
Note: BIG4 = Big 4 auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte), BI = 
board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage and SGROWTH = sales 
growth, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
In addition, a substantial number of the sample firms were audited by the BIG 4 
auditors who had less information of the local markets compared to the non-BIG 4 
auditors. This may possibly create a gap as the non-BIG 4 auditors may have greater 
knowledge of local markets and a better relation with their clients. These reasons 
may enable the non-BIG 4 auditors to better recognise the irregularities in the 
companies (Louis, 2005). The result supports the findings of Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels (2014), Huang et al. (2009), and Yaşar (2013) who found a positive 
insignificant relationship between the DA and the BIG 4 auditors. 
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The comparison between the expected and the actual findings of the above regression 
is presented in Table 5.15. Generally, from the two variables tested in these models, 
one variable (AUF) was consistent with the predicted hypotheses whilst the 
remaining one was insignificant and disclosed the opposite sign with the research 
expectation. 
Table 5.15 
Summary Results of the Predicted and the Actual Hypothesis on the Relationship 
between the Audit Quality (Audit fees) and the Discretionary Accruals 
HYPOTHESIS (H11) E.Sign A.Sign Decision 
H11: There is positive relationship between AUQ 
(using AUF) and FRQ (using DA) 
- -sig Supported 
H11: There is positive relationship between AUQ 
(using BIG4) and FRQ (using DA) 
- +Insig Not 
Supported 
Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +veSig = positive 
significant, -veSig = negative significant, +veInSig = positive insignificant, -veInSig negative 
insignificant supported. -veSig  is supported otherwise and  not supported. 
5.4.6  Mediating Effect of Audit Quality (Audit fees) on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and the Discretionary Accruals 
This section tests the first part of objective four of the thesis which was to determine 
the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationships between the AC 
characteristics and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria.  The section also tests 
hypothesis twelve (H12) to examine the last condition of the mediation effect. The 
foregoing hypothesis was tested only on the variables that met the first three 
conditions of mediation under Baron and Kenny (1986). These included: (i) the 
dependent variable must be significantly associated with the predictor variable (the 
relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ), (ii) the mediating 
variable must be significantly associated with the predictor variable (the relationships 
between the AC characteristics and the AUQ), and (iii) the dependent variable must 
be significantly associated with the mediating variable (the relationship between the 
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QUQ and the FRQ). Consequently, two mediators were used in this current study to 
proxy for the audit quality (AUF and BIG 4). The mediation model is presented in 
this section using the AUF only since the BIG 4 model did not meet the third 
condition (the relationship between the BIG 4 auditors and the DA was not 
significant). Finally, the Sobel Test was applied to examine the significance of the 
mediation on any AC variable that satisfied all four conditions of mediation. In 
testing these hypotheses, the absolute discretionary accruals using the Kothari et al. 
model (2005) was adopted as a proxy for the FRQ. For the purpose of the 
interpretations, indicators, such as the coefficient (β), robust standard error, t-values, 
and p-values were generated and presented. 
Table 5.16 presents the regression results of Model 1 (D) of the mediating effect of 
the audit quality (AUF) on the relationships between the AC characteristics and the 
FRQ (DA). The mediating effect of the AUF on the AC characteristics was based on 
the basic perception that when the ACS increases, the FRQ is expected to increase as 
the AUF increase. Thus, the expected relationships for the model were as follows: i) 
the AC characteristics have negative relationships with the DA, ii) the AC 
characteristics have positive relationships with the AUF, iii) the AUF has a negative 
relationship with the DA, and iv) the AUF mediates the relationships between the 
AC characteristics and the FRQ. With respect to the first condition, the ACS and the 
FRQ (using DA) were consistent with the hypothesis; they had negative significant 
relationships with the DA (β= -0.234, p < 0.007). Concerning the second condition, 
the ACS and the AUF were in line with the hypothesis as they had positive 
significant relationships with the AUF (β= 0.392, p < 0.000). In testing the third 
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condition, the AUF and the DA was also consistent with the hypothesis as the result 
revealed that there were a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.003), 
respectively. 
On the fourth condition, the ACS had significantly shown a lower beta coefficient of 
(β= -0.199) compared to the first model of (β= -0.234), implying that the impact of 
the independent variable (βx) on the dependent variable Y in the mediation model 
was less in absolute terms compared to the impact in the direct model. This suggests 
that all of the conditions of the causal steps method were met. Thus, it implies that 
the AUF partially mediated the relationship between the ACS and the FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. 
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Table 5.16  
Model One (D) of the Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC Characteristics and FRQ (Discretionary Accruals) 











AC & AUF 
Model 
P-Val. 
AUF & FRQ Model 
(Third 
Condition) 










ACS -0.234 0.007 0.392 0.000   -0.199 0.025 
ACI -0.220 0.715 0.350 0.373   -0.196 0.745 
ACM -0.227 0.009 0.018 0.794   -0.225 0.009 
ACFAE -1.307 0.002 0.532 0.055   -1.254 0.002 
ACLE 1.514 0.013 0.789 0.043   1.577 0.011 
FACM 0.540 0.000 -0.163 0.035   0.526 0.000 
ACSO -0.028 0.657 0.043 0.000   -0.026 0.653 
ACT 0.022 0.508 0.002 0.948   0.022 0.511 
ACC 0.226 0.127 -0.651 0.000   0.168 0.251 
BI -0.430 0.355 0.760 0.030 -0.259  -0.361 0.434 
BE -0.270 0.480 1.011 0.000 -0.579  -0.179 0.640 
FS 0.103 0.023 0.372 0.000 0.125  0.136 0.020 
LEV -8.508 0.004 0.013 0.792 -6.767  -8.581 0.004 
FAGE -0.004 0.352 0.005 0.087   -0.003 0.414 
SGROWTH -0.012 0.534 0.036 0.014 -0.001  -0.009 0.641 
AUF     -0.197 0.010 -0.088 0.221 
Cons 2.969 0.000 0.362 0.460 -0.006 0.787 2.989 0.000 
R2   0.153      
F-Stat.   4.650      




Table 5.16 Continued 
Link Test (hatsq)   0.824      
Hettest   9.610      
Prob. Hettest   0.001      
HM test (Chi2)   13.100      
Prob. HM   0.5947      
Mean VIF   1.390      
Note: DA = discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = 
female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, 
FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and AUF = audit fees.
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The mediating effect was partial since the AUF did not decrease the effect of the 
ACS on the DA to insignificance. This supports the agency theory proponents who 
suggests that a larger number of AC members is associated with a higher increase in 
audit fees, which praises that an increase of one member to an AC brings about an 
extra increase in audit fees in their effort to enhance external monitoring (Kim et al., 
2016; Zaman et al., 2011). Further, the Sobel test was computed to determine 
whether the mediation was significant. The result from the Sobel test, as depicted in 
Table 5.17, revealed (t= -2.456 and p= 0.010). This justified the results obtained 
from the causal steps method, and thus implies that the AUF partially and 
significantly mediated the relationship between the ACS and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria.  
Table 5.17 
Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC Size 
and the Discretionary Accruals  
Inputs    Sb*SC = 









0.3921153   
Sobel test -2.45562221** 0.03156059 0.01406409 
Sb(Sa) 
0.066284 
Aroian test  -2.43603351** 0.03181437 0.01484931 
Sc(Sb) 
0.0527959   
Goodman 
test 
-2.47569119** 0.03130475 0.01329785 
βc = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, βb = 
Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the independent and mediator , Sb = Standard 
residual of mediator, Sc = Standard residual of predictor variable, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 = 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
The implication of this finding is that the AUF decreases the impact of the ACS on 
the FRQ (DA). Hence, the findings support the hypothesis (H12) of the study which 
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presumed that the AUF mediates the relationship between the ACS and the FRQ of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. The results further suggest that for the AC members 
in Nigeria to perform their oversight and monitoring roles credibly, they need to pay 
high audit prices to demand better audit assurance from the external auditor which, in 
turn, provides better FRQ. 
The result also validates the causal effect of the complementary hypothesis of audit 
quality which suggests that the AC needs greater assurance from the external 
auditors to guarantee the effective oversight of the financial reports and to safeguard 
their capital reputation (Boo & Sharma, 2008; Cohen et al., 2002; Marini et al., 
2016). This is not surprising since the institutional theory proposes that integrating 
the AC to work with the external auditors will augment healthier monitoring of the 
financial reporting process. This is because the AC is reflected to be a formal 
assembly that is engaged by an organisation in a ceremonial way, but the actual 
monitoring of an organisation is determine by other external factors, for example, 
external auditors in this context. This conjecture is popularly known as "decoupling" 
(Escobar & Demeritt, 2017; Baker et al., 2014; Fourcade & Savelsberg, 2006). 
The next variable was the ACI, considering the first condition of the ACI and FRQ 
(using DA), it had a negative insignificant relationship with the DA (β= -0.220, p < 
0.715). This is not consistent with the research hypothesis. Regarding the second 
condition of the ACI and AUF. it is not in line with the research hypothesis as it had 
a positive and insignificant relationship with the AUF (β= 0.350, p < 0.373). Though, 
the third condition of the AUF and DA, was consistent with the research hypothesis 
as the result showed a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.003), 
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respectively. The fourth condition, could not be accessed since in all of the above 
three conditions of the causal steps method, it was only condition three that was 
satisfied. Hence, as the ACI satisfied only condition three, the mediating effect of the 
ACI through the AUF on the DA was not supported by the results. 
The audit committee meetings (ACMs) was another AC variable considered in this 
current study, in testing the first condition of the ACM and FRQ (using DA), it had a 
negative significant relationship with the DA (β = -0.227, p < 0.009). This is in line 
with the research hypothesis (H3). Concerning the second condition of the ACM and 
AUF, it did not support the research hypothesis (H10C) as it had a positive an 
insignificant relationship with the AUF (β = 0.018, p < 0.794). Although, the third 
condition of the AUF and DA was consistent with the research hypothesis as the 
result showed a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.003), respectively. 
The fourth condition could not be examined since only condition three was fulfilled. 
Thus, the ACM fulfilled condition three only; so, the mediating effect of the ACM 
through the AUF on the DA was not supported by the results.  
The audit financial accounting experts (ACFAEs) was the next important AC 
attribute used by the study. In examining the first condition of the ACFAEs and FRQ 
(using DA), the result revealed a negative significant relationship with the DA (β = -
1.307, p < 0.002). Thus, it was consistent with the research hypothesis (H4). 
Concerning the second condition of the ACFAEs and AUF, it was also in line with 
the research hypothesis (H10d) revealing a positive significant relationship with the 
AUF (β= 0.532, p < 0.055). Interestingly, the third condition of the AUF and DA, 
was also consistent with the research hypothesis (H11) as the result showed a beta 
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coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.003), respectively. Proceeding with the 
fourth condition, the impact of the ACFAEs had disclosed a lower beta coefficient of 
(β = -1.254) compared to the first model of (β = -1.307), inferring that the effect of 
the independent variable (βx) on the dependent variable Y in the direct model was 
less in absolute terms compared to the impact in the mediation model. This proposes 
that all of the conditions of the causal steps method were met. Thus, it indicates that 
the AUF partially mediated the relationship between the ACFAEs and the FRQ of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. The mediating effect was partial because the AUF 
effect did not decrease the impact of the ACFAEs on the DA to insignificance. To 
validate this result from the causal steps method, the Sobel test was conducted to 
examine whether this mediation was significant. The result from the Sobel test, as 
depicted in Table 5.18, revealed a t-value of -1.648 and p-value of 0.099, 
respectively. This means that the AUF partially significantly mediated the 
relationship between the ACFAEs and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria.  
Table 5.18 
Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC 
Financial Accounting Expert and the Discretionary Accruals 











Sobel test -1.64834491* 0.06384307 0.09928191 
Sb(Sa) 
0.066284 





-1.71674681* 0.06129931 0.08602544 
βc = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, βb = 
Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the independent and mediator , Sb = Standard 
residual of mediator, Sc = Standard residual of predictor variable, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05 = significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
 242 
The implication of this result is that the AUF alters the impact of the ACFAEs on the 
FRQ (DA). A possible explanation for this could be as a result of the fact that 
Nigeria had recently adopted the IFRS which made the accounting practice become 
more complex. This is because the migration from the local standards (SAS) to the 
international standards (IFRS) requires a shift from „„rule-based standards” to 
“principles-based standards”. Thus, the „„rules-based standards” contain the precise 
criteria, such as the scope limitations, exemptions, successive precedents, and 
application guidance, amongst others. On the contrary, the „„principles-based 
standards” have to do with the basic understanding to report transactions and 
financial events. As a result of the foregoing fact, the ACFAEs in Nigeria need a 
thorough work effort from the external auditors requiring the payment of a high AUF 
resulting from the demand for greater audit efforts from the external auditors to 
enhance the FRQ. 
It also means that a larger proportion of the ACFAEs increases the AUF in their 
quest for greater assurance whilst the resultant increase in the AUF decreases the 
DA, and this is associated with better FRQ. Hence, the findings support the 
hypothesis (H12) of the study which presumed that the AUF mediates the relationship 
between the ACFAEs and FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. The results 
support the agency theory which advocates that financial accounting experts in the 
AC exhibit a greater increase in the AUF, which endorses that an increase of 
financial accounting experts on the AC is associated with a supplementary increase 
in the AUF in their effort to enhance the external monitoring (Abbott et al., 2003; 
Carcello & Neal, 2003; Kim et al., 2016). The findings also validate the prior studies 
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(Cohen & Hanno, 2000; Bédard et al., 2004; Kaplan & Reckers, 1985) which 
document that when the external auditors perceived that they could not depend on the 
internal mechanisms, like the board of directors or AC, to assist in supervising the 
FRQ, they increased the audit effort by charging higher audit fees. 
The next variable was the audit committee legal experts (ACLEs), in view of the first 
condition of the ACLE and FRQ, it had a positive significant relationship with the 
DA (β = 1.514, p < 0.013). Since it revealed the opposite sign, the result is not 
consistent with the research hypothesis (H5). In  examining the second condition of 
the ACLEs and AUF, it was found that the result is in line with the research 
hypothesis (H10e) as it had a positive  significant relationship with the AUF (β = 
0.789, p < 0.043). As for the third condition of the AUF and DA, it was consistent 
with the research hypothesis as the result showed a beta coefficient and p-value of 
(β= -0.198 and 0.003), respectively. Overall, the fourth condition could not be 
accessed since in the above three conditions of the causal steps method, condition 
one was not satisfied. Thus, the ACLEs fulfilled two conditions instead of three; 
hence, the mediating effect of the ACLEs through the AUF on the DA was not 
supported by the above results.  
With respect to the FACMs, the first condition which was the FACMs and FRQ 
(using DA), had a positive significant relationship with the DA (β = 0.540, p < 
0.000). It was revealed that there was an opposite sign; thus, it was not consistent 
with the research hypothesis (H6). For the second condition of the FACMs and AUF, 
the result is not consistent with the research hypothesis (H10f) since it revealed the 
opposite sign of a negative significant relationship with the AUF (β = -0.163, p < 
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0.035). Considering the third condition of the AUF and DA, it was consistent with 
the research hypothesis showing a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 
0.003), respectively. Thus, the fourth condition could not be achieved since from the 
foregoing causal steps method, condition one and two were not supported. Hence, the 
FACMs fulfilled only one condition instead of all three; therefore, the mediating 
effect of the FACMs through the AUF on the DA was not supported by the above 
results.  
Concerning the ACSO, the following results were revealed. The first condition 
showed a negative but insignificant relationship between the ACSO and the DA (β = 
-0.028, p < 0.657). Though it had a negative sign, it did not support the research 
hypothesis (H7). In relation to the second condition of the ACSO and AUF, it was 
consistent with the research hypothesis (H10g) since it showed a positive significant 
relationship with the AUF (β= 0.043, p < 0.000).  The third condition of the AUF and 
DA was also consistent with the research hypothesis (H11) as the result revealed a 
beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.003), respectively. Unfortunately, 
the fourth condition could not be accessed using the causal steps method since the 
first condition was not significant. But, luckily, Hayes and Rockwood (2017) 
contended that all of these conditions must not necessarily be met before mediation 
takes place since the relationship is not necessary or sufficient for causation. 
Therefore, since the sign of the ACSO in the first condition was negative, The Sobel 
test was conducted to determine whether the mediation was significantly existing. 
Interestingly, the results from the Sobel test, as depicted in Table 5.19, revealed a t-
value and p-value of (t= -2.287 and 0.022), respectively. This means that the AUF 
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significantly mediated the relationship between the ACSO and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. A possible explanation for this could be that considering the 
result of the second condition ACSO and AUF, it was found that shareholders in the 
AC demand for greater audit effort from the external auditors by paying high audit 
fees. This will complement their monitoring ability on financial reporting process. 
Because their willingness to incur higher audit fees indirectly reduced EM and 
enhance FRQ. This was found from the result of the third condition of mediation 
which revealed that higher AUF decreases DA, which in return enhance FRQ. This is 
not surprising because in Nigeria, Adam and Bala (2015) revealed that the directors‟ 
ownership had a significant influence on the audit quality of the Nigerian banks. 
They suggested that a higher proportion of the directors‟ ownership enhanced their 
monitoring role by providing greater audit assurance through engaging better 
auditors. 
Table 5.19 
Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC Stock 
Ownership and the Discretionary Accruals 










 0 .0120087 
Sobel test -2.28722705** 0.0036909 0.02218257 
Sb (Sa) 




test -2.34210325** 0.0036044 0.01917541 
βc = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, βb = 
Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the independent and mediator , Sb = Standard 
residual of mediator, Sc = Standard residual of predictor variable, * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 = 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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The consequence of this finding is that the AUF alters the impact of the ACSO on 
the FRQ (DA). Thus, the result supports the hypothesis (H12) of the study which 
assumed that the AUF mediates the relationship between the ACSO and the FRQ of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. The result also assists to provide a causal effect of 
the AC and the audit quality, thus establishing that the ACSO serves as a monitor by 
demanding higher audit quality in exchange for greater audit efforts. The findings 
also confirm the agency theory which suggests that the demand for an independent 
external auditor ascends from a desire to lower the management deception that 
results from asymmetric information between the shareholders and the managers 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Menon & Williams 1994). 
For the audit committee tenure (ACT), the first condition, which was the ACT and 
FRQ (using DA), revealed that it had a positive insignificant relationship with the 
DA (β = 0.022, p < 0.508). Thus, the result does not support the research hypothesis 
(H8). For the second condition of the ACT and AUF, the result is also inconsistent 
with the research hypothesis (H10h) since it had a positive insignificant relationship 
with the AUF (β = 0.022, p < 0.511). The third condition was fulfilled as it had a beta 
coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.003), respectively. Consequently, the 
fourth condition could not be achieved since from the foregoing causal steps method, 
only condition three was supported. Hence, the ACT fulfilled one condition instead 
of three, thus the mediating effect of the ACT through the AUF on the DA was not 
supported by the above findings. 
Finally, the results of the Audit committee chair (ACC), obtained from the first 
condition of the ACC and FRQ, show that it had a positive insignificant relationship 
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with the DA (β = 0.226, p < 0.127). Accordingly, the result does not support the 
research hypothesis (H9). For the second condition of the ACC and AUF, the result is 
also inconsistent with the research hypothesis (H10i) since it has an opposite sign, 
though it was significantly related to the AUF (β = -0.651, p < 0.000). The third 
condition was satisfied as it had a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 
0.003), respectively. As a result of the foregoing, the fourth condition could not be 
accomplished since from the above causal steps method, only condition three was 
supported. Hence, the ACC fulfilled one condition only instead of three; thus, the 
mediating effect of the ACC through the AUF on the DA was not supported by the 
above results. 
The comparison between the expected and the actual findings of the foregoing 
regression is presented in Table 5.20. Overall, from the nine variables tested in this 
mediation model, three variables supported the predicted hypotheses whilst the 
remaining six did not. Precisely, three variables were consistent with the condition of 
mediation whilst the remaining six variables were not. 
Table 5.20 
The Summary of the Predicted and the Actual Results for on the Mediating Effect of 






H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 
Size (ACS) and FRQ (IS) 
P.Mediated Supported 
H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 
Financial Accounting Expertise (ACFAE) and FRQ (IS) 




Table 5.20 Continued 
H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 
Stock Ownership (ACSO) and FRQ (IS) 
P.Mediated Supported 
H12:  AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +veSig = positive 
significant, -veSig = negative significant, +veInSig positive insignificant, -veInSig negative 
insignificant supported. -veSig  is supported otherwise and  not supported, P.Mediated = partially 
mediated. 
 
5.5 Robustness Check 
To assess the robustness of the results and to ensure that the findings were free from 
unsolicited bias, robustness tests were conducted to confirm that the findings of the 
study‟s estimations were insensitive to the firms‟ fixed effect and the firms‟ specific 
attributes, alternative measurements, and selection of the outcome variable. The 
following provides the results for the robustness checks employed by the study. 
5.5.1 Alternatives Estimation 
Since the data set of the study consisted of time-variant and industry specifications, 
this may lead to errors that are clustered and presumably correlated overtime. And, 
this may affect the outcome of the criterion variable and the predictor variables, thus 
leading to misleading inferences (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012). Similarly, the reportage 
time and the number of industries in the data set might suggest two broad forms of 
dependence, which might be cross-sectional dependence or time series or both 
(Wooldridge, 2007). For that, the heteroscedastic robust standard errors clustered 
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across firms were used to re-estimate the previous main models (both direct and 
meditated model) following Bronson et al. (2017), Bruynseels et al. (2015), 
Christensen et al. (2016), Krishnan et al. (2011), and Lai et al. (2017). 
The result of the models‟ heteroscedastic robust standard errors clustered across 
firms revealed that the coefficients of the estimation, the sign, and the levels of 
significance for each variable were consistent with the main models (both the direct 
and meditated model). It is notable that the consistencies of the findings of the 
heteroscedastic robust standard errors clustered across firms with those of the main 
models presented in Table 5.21 implies that the findings were unbiased due to the 
likelihood of heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 5.21 
Results of the Alternatives Estimation (Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Error 
Clustered across Firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





ACS -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.199** -0.199** 
 (0.0868) (0.0804) (0.0885) (0.0888) 
ACI -0.220 -0.220 -0.196 -0.196 
 (0.604) (0.577) (0.601) (0.569) 
ACM -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.225*** -0.225*** 
 (0.0859) (0.0789) (0.0854) (0.0783) 
ACFAE -1.307*** -1.307*** -1.254*** -1.254*** 
 (0.410) (0.400) (0.407) (0.406) 
ACLE 1.514** 1.514** 1.577** 1.577** 
 (0.605) (0.649) (0.614) (0.646) 
FACM 0.540*** 0.540*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 
 (0.113) (0.121) (0.116) (0.123) 
ACSO -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.060) (0.065) 
ACT 0.0219 0.0219 0.0216 0.0216 
 (0.033) (0.0317) (0.0329) (0.0315) 
ACC 0.226 0.226* 0.168 0.168 
 (0.148) (0.128) (0.146) (0.135) 





Table 15.21 Continued. 
 (0.465) (0.473) (0.461) (0.470) 
BE -0.270 -0.270 -0.179 -0.179 
 (0.382) (0.348) (0.383) (0.357) 
FS 0.103** 0.103** 0.136** 0.136** 
 (0.0451) (0.0469) (0.0585) (0.0532) 
LEV -8.508*** -8.508*** -8.581*** -8.581*** 
 (2.917) (2.864) (2.935) (2.873) 
FAGE -0.00363 -0.00363 -0.00319 -0.00319 
 (0.00390) (0.00380) (0.00390) (0.00375) 
SGROWTH -0.0122 -0.0122 -0.00915 -0.00915 
 (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0188) 
AUF   -0.0881 -0.0881 
   (0.0719) (0.0590) 
Constant 2.969*** 2.969*** 2.989*** 2.989*** 
 (0.773) (0.782) (0.768) (0.781) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.153 0.153 
Note table DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC 
meetings, ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, 
ACSO = AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = 
board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and 
AUF = audit fees, Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. = significant at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
5.5.2 Alternative Measure of the Independent Variables 
This section provides alternative measures of the independent variables of the study. 
The alternatives measurements were selected as additional sensitivity checks. In the 
main analysis, seven independent variables were measured as continuous variables. 
These included the ACS, ACI, ACMs, ACFAEs, ACLEs and ACT. Following 
Krishnan et al. (2011), Xie et al. (2003), Yasin and Nelson (2012), and Zhang et al. 
(2007), in this additional analysis, the continuous variables were re-measured as 
dummy variables. The FACM variable was re-measured from the dummy to the 
continuous variable. ACSO was re-measured from the units of shares possessed by 
the AC members to the percentage of the AC shares (units of AC shares divided total 
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number of shares outstanding to the firm). Table 5.22 presents the main and 
alternative results for the robustness test. 
It was observed that the signs and the coefficients of the main models (both direct 
and mediated) were substantially similar to those of the robustness checks. A slight 
change was also observed in the ACMs and ACFAEs as their levels of significance 
reduced from 1% in the main analyses to 5% in the additional analysis. In addition, 
the ACLEs have also been revealed to have a slight change from 5% in the main 
models to 1% in the sensitivity checks. 
Table 5.22 
Result for the Alternative Measure of Independent Variables 












ACS -0.234*** -0.573*** -0.199** -0.493*** 
 (0.0868) (0.165) (0.0885) (0.171) 
ACI -0.220 -0.248 -0.196 -0.265 
 (0.604) (0.430) (0.601) (0.417) 
ACM -0.227*** -0.374** -0.225*** -0.378** 
 (0.0859) (0.165) (0.0854) (0.166) 
ACFAE -1.307*** -0.381** -1.254*** -0.360** 
 (0.410) (0.165) (0.407) (0.163) 
ACLE 1.514** 0.353*** 1.577** 0.360*** 
 (0.605) (0.114) (0.614) (0.115) 
FACM 0.540*** 2.209*** 0.526*** 2.157*** 
 (0.605) (0.552) (0.614) (0.555) 
ACSO -0.028 -0.00479 -0.026 -0.00115 
 (0.062) (0.0188) (0.060) (0.0192) 
ACT 0.226 0.0501 0.168 0.0490 
 (0.148) (0.103) (0.146) (0.103) 
ACC -0.430 0.208 -0.361 0.147 
 (0.465) (0.146) (0.461) (0.144) 
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 (0.382) (0.458) (0.383) (0.457) 
BE 0.103** -0.342 0.136** -0.253 
 (0.0451) (0.399) (0.0585) (0.401) 
FS -8.508*** 0.0917** -8.581*** 0.134** 
 (2.917) (0.0443) (2.935) (0.0591) 
LEV -0.00363 -6.105** -0.00319 -6.275** 
 (0.00390) (2.897) (0.00390) (2.926) 
FAGE -3.49e-10 -0.00342 -3.53e-10 -0.00288 
 (7.86e-10) (0.00407) (7.86e-10) (0.00405) 
SGROWTH -0.0122 -0.00161 -0.00915 -0.00154 
 (0.0197) (0.00130) (0.0196) (0.00132) 
AUF   -0.0881 -0.105 
   (0.0719) (0.0737) 
Constant 2.969*** 1.963** 2.989*** 2.080** 
 (0.773) (0.955) (0.768) (0.937) 
Observations 440 440 440 433 
R-squared 0.150 0.127 0.153 0.132 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, 
ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = 
AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board 
expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and AUF = 
audit fees, Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 = significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 
5.5.3 Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variables 
This section provides an alternative measure of the dependent variable of the study. 
The alternative measurement was opted for as another additional sensitivity check. In 
the main analysis, Kothari et al.‟s model (2005) was used.  Following Collins et al. 
(2017),  Huang, Lao and McPhee (2017), and Kim, Su and Zhu (2017), this study 
used the firms‟ growth adjusted model developed by Collins et al. (2017) as an 
alternative measurement of the DA. The model controls the firm growth in addition 
to the control of the performance by Kothari et al.‟s model (2005). 
Table 5.23 presents the main and alternative results for the sensitivity checks. It was 
manifest from Table 5.23 that, the signs and the coefficients of the main models 
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(both direct and mediated) were considerably similar to those of the sensitivity 
checks. It was evident that one major distinction was shown in the ACI that was 
negatively and insignificantly related to the DA in the main model, but changed to a 
positive insignificant relation in the sensitivity checks.  
Table 5.23 
Result for the Alternative Measure of Dependent Variables 
 (1) (1) (2) (2) 
Variable Robust Main Robust Main Alt. Robust Main Med Robust Med. Alt. 
ACS -0.234*** -0.0666*** -0.199** -0.0522** 
 (0.0868) (0.0239) (0.0885) (0.0254) 
ACI -0.220 0.147 -0.196 0.157 
 (0.604) (0.175) (0.601) (0.175) 
ACM -0.227*** -0.0506* -0.225*** -0.0499* 
 (0.0859) (0.0303) (0.0854) (0.0302) 
ACFAE -1.307*** -0.427*** -1.254*** -0.405*** 
 (0.410) (0.123) (0.407) (0.123) 
ACLE 1.514** 0.402** 1.577** 0.428** 
 (0.605) (0.187) (0.614) (0.187) 
FACM 0.540*** 0.0854** 0.526*** 0.0795** 
 (0.113) (0.0348) (0.116) (0.0349) 
ACSO -0.028 -0.014 -0.026 -0.014 
 (0.062) (0.017) (0.060) (0.017) 
ACT 0.226 0.00231 0.168 0.00221 
 (0.148) (0.0113) (0.146) (0.0113) 
ACC -0.430 0.0136 -0.361 -0.0102 
 (0.465) (0.0526) (0.461) (0.0545) 
BI -0.270 -0.118 -0.179 -0.0898 
 (0.382) (0.154) (0.383) (0.155) 
BE 0.103** -0.206 0.136** -0.169 
 (0.0451) (0.127) (0.0585) (0.129) 
FS -8.508*** 0.0286** -8.581*** 0.0422*** 
 (2.917) (0.0128) (2.935) (0.0153) 
LEV -0.00363 -2.206** -0.00319 -2.236** 
 (0.00390) (0.945) (0.00390) (0.943) 
FAGE -0.00363 -0.00160 -0.00319 -0.00142 
 (0.00390) (0.00124) (0.00390) (0.00124) 
SGROWTH -0.0122 -0.00656 -0.00915 -0.00529 
 (0.0197) (0.00623) (0.0196) (0.00627) 
AUF   -0.0881 -0.0360 
   (0.0719) (0.0220) 
Constant 2.969*** 0.736*** 2.989*** 0.744*** 
 (0.773) (0.235) (0.768) (0.234) 
     
Observations 440 440 440 440 
R-squared 0.150 0.112 0.153 0.117 
Note: DA= discretionary accruals, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = 
AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = 
leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and AUF = audit fees, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 = 




Furthermore, the FACMs and ACMs were also revealed to have a slight variation 
from a 1% to 5% significance level and from a 1% to 10% significance level, 
respectively, in the sensitivity checks. 
5.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter presented the results to answer the first section of questions, one to four, 
of the thesis, which were: 1) Do the AC characteristics influence the FRQ (DA) of 
the listed companies in Nigeria?, 2) Do the audit committee characteristics influence 
the audit quality (AUF and BIG 4) of the listed companies in Nigeria?, 3) Does the 
audit quality affect the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria, and 4) Does the audit 
quality mediate the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria?. 
The analyses and interpretations consisted of a series of regressions to suit the 
mediation procedure using the causal steps method and the Sobel test.  The first 
procedure was set to examine the relationships between the independent variables 
(AC characteristics) and the dependent variable FRQ (proxied by the DA). The 
second procedure was to test the relationships between the independent variables and 
the mediator, audit quality (proxied by AUF and BIG 4). These procedures consisted 
of two regression estimations. The next step was examining the relationship between 
audit quality and FRQ which also included two regression equations. Finally, the 
mediating effect of audit quality on the relationships between the AC characteristics 
and the FRQ was accessed. This also required two regression estimations, but subject 
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to the fulfillment of the conditions of mediation as suggested by Baron and Kenny 
(1986), Sobel (1982), and Hayes and Rockwood (2017). In line with these, only the 
first mediator (AUF) was considered whilst the second mediator (BIG 4) did not 
meet the criterion. 
From the results of the first procedure (the relationship between the AC 
characteristics and the DA), the study established that the ACS, ACMs, ACFAEs, 
and ACSO reduced the magnitude of managers‟ opportunistic behaviours in the form 
of the DA. Thus, these findings supported H1, H3, H4 and H7 as predicted. The study 
has also confirmed that the ACI, ACLEs, FACMs, ACT, and ACC did not 
meaningfully mitigate earnings management practices and thus, may not improve the 
FRQ. 
Considering the second procedure (the relationships between the AC characteristics 
and audit quality), the study provides evidence that the ACS, ACFEs, ACLEs, and 
ACSO performed a complimentary effect on the audit quality by increasing the AUF 
for greater audit assurance. The FACMs, and ACC showed evidence of a 
substitutional effect of providing greater commitment to the AC in order to decrease 
the audit fees. The ACI did not provide any meaningful contribution in the 
determination of the audit price. More so, the study has provided the premise that the 
ACI, ACFEs, ACLEs, FACMs and ACSO increase the likelihood of engaging the 
services of BIG 4 auditors in the listed companies in Nigeria. On the contrary, the 
ACS did not establish any significant influence on the choice of auditor brand name. 
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The findings from the third step of mediation (the relationship between the audit 
quality and the FRQ) established that increasing the AUF is associated with lower 
DA, thus supporting the predicted hypothesis. On the other hand, it was documented 
that the choice of auditor brand name did not play any pivotal role in constraining 
managers from earnings management practices. Finally, the last analysis was 
conducted to test the mediating role of the audit quality on the effect of the AC 
characteristics and the FRQ (DA). From the mediators, only the AUF has satisfied 
condition three and thus, the mediating analysis in the last step was conducted only 
using the AUF. The results reveal that the AUF partially and significantly mediated 
the relationships between the ACS, ACFEs, ACSO, and the DA of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The mediating effects of the AUF on the relationships between 
the ACI, ACMs, ACLEs, FACMs, ACT, and ACC were not accessed since some 









FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS II (IS) 
 AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS AND INCOME 
SMOOTHING: THE MEDIATING EFFECT OF AUDIT QUALITY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the analysis of the second measurement of the dependent 
variable (FRQ) proxied by EM measurement using income smoothing (IS). In this 
chapter, income smoothing (IS) is used as another measurement of FRQ. The chapter 
also presents the results and analyses of the last segment of objectives one to four of 
the thesis, which were: 1) to determine the influence of the audit committee 
characteristics on the FRQ (IS) of the listed companies in Nigeria, 2) to determine 
the effect of the audit committee characteristics on the audit quality (AUF and BIG 
4) of the listed companies in Nigeria, 3) to assess the effect of the audit quality on the 
FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria, and 4) to examine the mediating effect of the 
audit quality on the relationship between the AC characteristics and the FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 6.1 
contains the outline of the chapter. Section 6.2 elucidates the post estimation tests for 
binomial logistic regression. Section 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics related to the 
dichotomous variables of the study. Section 6.4 interprets the findings of the 
multivariate analysis enumerating the relationship between the AC characteristics 
and IS, audit quality and IS, and the mediating effect of audit quality on the 
relationship between the AC characteristics and IS. An additional analysis is 
provided in Section 6.5 and, finally, Section 6.6 is the summary of the chapter. 
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6.2 Post-estimation Tests for Binomial Logistic Regression 
This section elucidates the post-estimation tests performed in order to ensure that the 
assumptions of the logistic regressions are met to evade misleading inferences. The 
post-estimation tests conducted in this study comprised the multi-collinearity test, 
tests of model fitness, and model specification test. 
6.2.1 Multicollinearity Test 
This test is usually conducted to check for the presence of collinearity or otherwise 
amongst the predictor variables. This is widely conducted using correlation. It was 
essential to test the correlation between the predictor variables used in the present 
study. Consequently, Table 6.1 presents the correlation coefficients amongst the 
predictor variables to identify whether multi-collinearity existed. It is observed that 
the uppermost correlation coefficients were between the ACM and ACS (0.480), and 
the AUF and ACS (0.430), respectively. Nevertheless, these correlations were below 
the benchmark of 0.8 suggested by Gujarati (2004) and 0.9 suggested by Hair et al. 





Correlation Matrix of the Relationship between the AC Characteristics, Audit Quality and Income Smoothing 
Variable IS ACS ACI ACM ACFAE ACLE FACM ACSO ACT 
IS 1         
ACS -0.09 1        
ACI -0.108* 0.063 1       
ACM 0.021 0.48*** 0.028 1      
ACFAE 0.077 0.035 0.114* 0 1     
ACLE -0.14** 0.24*** 0.034 0.176 0.013 1    
FACM -0.100* 0.23*** 0.037 0.21** 0.067 0.344 1   
ACSO -0.049 0.002 0.001 -0.02** 0.108* -0.08** -0.065 1  
ACT -0.105* 0.04 -0.048 0.111 -0.009 -0.045 -0.002 -0.052 1 
ACC 0.031 0.13**** 0.12** 0.073* 0.005 0.17** 0.13** -0.005 -0.095 
BI -0.034 -0.22*** 0.15** -0.086 0.111* 0.066 -0.13** -0.034 0.053* 
BE 0.122* 0.01 0.023 0.07 0.19** -0.10** -0.039 0.074 0.083 
FS 0.015 0.17*** -0.019 0.083 0.012 0.059 0.054 0 0.061 
LEV -0.047 -0.043 0.005 -0.10** -0.012 0.059 -0.032 -0.014 -0.103* 
FAGE 0.039 0.033 -0.03 0.049 0.008 -0.025 0.027 0.038 0.043 
SGROWTH 0.097* -0.07 -0.057 -0.10** -0.005 -0.009 -0.055 0.005 -0.007 
AUF -0.078* 0.51*** 0.08 0.22** 0.152* 0.082 0.011 0.068 0.093 
 
ACC BI BE FS LEV FAGE SGROWTH AUF 
 ACC 1        
 BI -0.057 1       
 BE -0.011 0.21** 1      
 FS 0.05 -0.057 0.16** 1     
 LEV -0.098* 0.052 0.03 -0.018 1    
 FAGE 0.089 0.029 0.130* 0.098 0.058 1   
 SGROWTH -0.073 0.038 -0.14** -0.069 -0.03 -0.09** 1  
 AUF -0.094* 0.021 0.28** 0.168 0.004 0.18*** -0.02 1 
 Note : IS = Income smoothing, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise,  FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth AUF = audit fees and BIG4  = Big4 
auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Furthermore, the VIF test is used to confirm whether multi-collinearity exists or not. 
Table 6.2 designates the values of tolerance and the VIF for the AC characteristics, 
audit quality, and control variables. The tolerance values of less than 1 and a VIF of 
less than 10 as depicted in Table 6.2 indicates that there was no evidence of a multi-
collinearity issue amongst the independent variables. 
Table 6.2 
Collinearity Diagnostic of the AC Characteristics, Audit Quality and Control 
Variables 
Variable VIF      Tolerance 
ACS 1.880 0.531 
ACI 1.080 0.925 
ACM 1.310 0.764 
ACFAE 1.110 0.900 
ACLE 1.280 0.781 
FACM 1.280 0.784 
ACSO 1.040 0.966 
ACT 1.090 0.921 
ACC 1.140 0.874 
BI 1.210 0.825 
BE 1.290 0.775 
FS 1.080 0.927 
LEV 1.060 0.947 
FAGE 1.080 0.923 
SGROWTH 1.060 0.945 
AUF 1.740 0.575 
BIG4 1.230 0.814 
Note: ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial 
expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise,  FS = firm size 
LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth AUF = audit fees and BIG4  = Big4 
auditors (KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) and VIF = Variance 
Inflation Factor. 
6.2.2 Model Fitness Test 
Table 6.3 represents the results of the model fitness. The models‟ overall goodness of 
fit was conducted by using the likelihood ratio x2. The likelihood ratio x2 statistics of 
78.76 and 67 were significant at 1% levels, signifying goodness of fit of all the 
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models. Another indicator for model fitness is the Wald tests. Table 6.3 reveals the 
„Wald chi-square test statistics‟ of 44.580 and 46.480, significant at 1% (p-value = 
0.000). This designates that, at a minimum, one of the parameters in the estimation 
has an impact on the outcome variable of the study. 
Table 6.3 
Goodness of Fit Test of the Models 
Test     
    IS & AC 
     (Direct) 
      IS & AC 
     (Mediated) 







0.001     0.001 
Wald Test P-val. 





0.000     0.001 
Hosmer-
Lemeshow 
0.638 0.572 0.502     0.194 
% Correct 
Prediction 
67.88% 67.43% 64.77%    65.230% 
Note: IS =Income smoothing, AC = Audit committee, AUF = Audit fees BIG4 = Big 4 auditors. 
The Pseudo R2 is an additional indicator of model fitness. Conversely, Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) contended that the reportage of the Pseudo R2 is incomparable to 
the R2 in the ordinary least squares (OLS). They suggested a test which shows how 
well a model fits the data. Consequently, supplementary confirmation on model 
fitness is established by the Hosmer and Lemeshow test which recommends 
partitioning the observations into ten identical sized groups in accordance with their 
predicted probabilities. In line with this, an insignificant chi-square demonstrates the 
adequate fitness of the model; whereas, a significant chi-square indicates that the 
model does not sufficiently fit the data. Table 6.3 shows the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
insignificant p-values of 0.638, 0.572, 0.502, and 0.194, respectively, from all the 
models. Hence, this implies that the estimations of the models fit the data at a 
tolerable level. Finally, the percentage of the correct predictions is another yardstick 
for the goodness of model fit. This test is obtained using a classification table which 
 
 262 
demonstrates the predictive power of the model by calculating the models‟ capacity 
in categorising the outcomes of the criterion variable. Accordingly, the percentage of 
correct predictions confirms the degree to which the actual result resembles the 
predictions made. Table 6.3 reveals the percentages of the cases appropriately 
predicted as 67.88%, 67.43%, 64.77%, and 65.230%, respectively, in all the models. 
Thus, it may be considered high since Pampel (2000) recommends the ranges of 50% 
and 100% correctly predicted cases as a measurement of the predictive accuracy. 
6.2.3 Model Specification Test 
The model specification test is another significant mechanism that is used to check 
the reliability of the regression estimates. Since illusive inferences could be the 
consequence of improper model specification, to avoid bias and inconsistent 
findings, the model specification test was conducted using the link test. Table 6.4 
presents the link test results of all the models of the study. 
Table 6.4 
Model Specification Test  











Note: IS =Income smoothing, AC = Audit committee, AUF = Audit fees BIG4 = Big 4 auditors. 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics Related to the Regression Variables 
Table 6.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the dichotomous variables employed 
by this study using frequencies and percentages. Table 6.5 reveals that 270 
observations occupying 54 companies were recognised as income smoothers whilst 
the remaining 170 observations (34 companies) were recognised as non-smoothers. 
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This implies that more than 61% of the sampled firms in the listed companies in 
Nigeria engaged in the IS practice. It is observed that only 54 companies out of the 
total 88 had at least one female director in their AC whilst the remaining 46 
companies did not recognize the presence of female directors. 
Table 6.5 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dichotomous Variables 
  
Frequency Percentage Total  
% 
Variable Obs. 0 1 0 1  
IS 440 170 270 38.64 61.36 100 
FACM 440 201 239 45.68 54.32 100 
ACC 440 49.0 391 11.14 88.86 100 
BIG4 440 185 255 42.05 57.95 100 
Note: IS = Income smoothing index (A dummy 1 was assigned to a firm classified as income 
smoother and otherwise 0), FACM = female AC member, ACC = AC chair, BIG4 = Big4 auditors 
(KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte) and No. of observations = is made 
of 88 companies multiply by 5 years (440 firm-year observations). 
Table 6.5 also showed that about 89% of the AC chairs of the sampled firms were 
shareholders whilst only 11% of the AC chairs were directors. It was also revealed 
that 58% of the sampled firms were audited by BIG 4 auditors whilst the remaining 
42% were audited by Non-BIG 4 auditors.  Next, Table 6.6 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the IS partitioned by year.  
Table 6.6 
Descriptive Statistics of  the Income Smoothing Partitioned by Year  
               IS 2012 2013 2014 2015     2016           Total 
0 35 37 37 30 31 170 
1 53 51 51 58 57 270 
Total 88 88 88 88 88 440 
Note: IS = Income smoothing index, & No. of observations = is made of 88 companies multiply by 5 
years (440 firm-year observations). 
It is deduced from Table 6.6 that the smoothing behaviour decreased from 53 
companies to 51 companies from 2012 to 2013 and 2014, respectively. This implies 
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that the IS was high during the first year of the IFRS adoption and remained constant 
in the succeeding two years from 2013 to 2014. The numbers of smoothed firms 
continued to increase in the years from 2015 to 2016, with 2015 having the highest 
number of smoothers. The result implies that the IS practice increased during and 
after the adoption of the IFRS. This corroborates the findings of Ozili (2015) who 
revealed that the listed banks in Nigeria smoothed their reported income over time 
during the periods of the voluntary IFRS adoption, and suggested that the IFRS 
adoption reduced the reliability of the loan loss provisions in Nigeria. 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis: Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the 
Relationship between the AC Characteristics and Income Smoothing 
This section provides the statistical results for the variables of the study that were 
tested to examine the mediating effect of audit quality (AUF and BIG 4) on the 
relationship between the AC characteristics and FRQ proxied by EM measurement 
(using IS). The section also utilises the two approaches of testing the mediation 
effect under multiple regressions. They were the causal steps developed by Baron 
and Kenny (1986) and the Sobel Test. The causal steps examined whether the 
conditions of the mediation were met before applying the Sobel Test. The next 
sections present these sequences of regressions as proposed by Baron & Kenny 
(1986) and the Sobel Test. 
6.4.1 Pooled Logit Regression Result and discussion on the Relationship 
between the AC Characteristics and FRQ (Income Smoothing) 
This section tests the last part of objective one of the thesis, which was to determine 
the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ (proxied by EM) of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. It also tests hypotheses one to nine (H1-H9) consistent 
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with the first condition of the mediating effect. In testing these hypotheses, the 
income smoothing model (IS) following Eckel (1981) and Albrecht and Richardson 
(1990) was adopted. The results reveal some indicators, such as the coefficient (β), 
robust standard error (formed using the marginal effect which measures the discrete 
variation or how do projected probabilities vary as the binary predictor variable 
changes from 0 to 1), t-values, and p-values, which were used for the purpose of the 
interpretations. 
Table 6.7 shows the pool logit which presents the regression results of model two (A) 
to test the relationships between the AC and IS. Table 6.7 reveals that the ACS had a 
negative significant relationship with IS. This relationship was significant at 10%. It 
implies that larger numbers of members on the AC were better in reducing the 
likelihood of practicing artificial income smoothing in the listed firms in Nigeria. 
Thus, the lower the likelihood of IS practices, the better the FRQ will be. The results 
support hypothesis one (H1) of this current study which assumed that the ACS has a 
positive relationship with FRQ. It also supports the resource dependence theory 
which recommends that the ACS seems to be highly ingenious in enhancing the FRQ 
because of the various skills and experiences the members share amongst themselves 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Hillman et al., 2000). This supports the findings of prior 
studies which established that a larger AC size is more active in monitoring 
management which makes the AC to be more effective in improving the FRQ (Ben 
Ali,  2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Fodio et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2000; Ismail & 
Kamarudin, 2017; Leong et al., 2015; Miko, 2016; Setiany et al., 2017). 
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Furthermore, Bala and Kumai (2015) and Umar and Hassan (2017) revealed that the 
ACS was inversily related to the DA in Nigeria. 
The next variable was audit committee independence (ACI) which showed a negative 
relationship with IS at a 5% significance level. This suggests that a larger percentage 
of outside directors in the AC decreased the probability that a firm smoothed its 
earnings in Nigeria. Thus, decreasing the chance of artificial IS practices and which, 
in turn, improves FRQ. The results are consistent with hypothesis two (H2) of this 
study which anticipated a positive relationship between the ACI and FRQ. It is also 
in line with the signaling theory which hypothesises that accruing the existence of 
independent non-executive directors on the board could signal to owners that the 
company has a robust corporate governance which will, in the long run, promote 
investors‟ protection and thus, enhance FRQ. This supports the findings of Ben Ali  
(2013), Amin et al. (2018),  Che-Ahmad and Mansor (2009) Huang, Zhang, Deis and 
Moffitt (2009), Ismail and Kamarudin, (2017) and Uzun et al. (2004) who found a 
negative significant relationship between outside directors in the AC and IS. More 
so, in Nigeria, Miko (2016) documented that AC independence was inversely 
associated with discretionary accruals. Whilst, Kibiya et al. (2016c) revealed that AC 
independence reduced managers' earnings manipulations and improved the financial 
reporting quality of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
The ACM was revealed to have a positive significant relationship with IS. This 
means that the ACM increased the probability of a firm to be an income smoother in 
Nigeria. The results are contrary to the research expectation which hypothesised that 
the ACM has a positive relationship with the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
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A probable explanation for this might be that high frequent consultations could lead 
to exhaustion and weariness, which may increase the likelihood of formulating 
inappropriate discussions that may result in ineffective decisions.  
Table 6.7 
Model Two (A) Pool Logit Regression of the Relationship between AC 
Characteristics and FRQ (Income Smoothing)  
Variable coefficient Robust 
Std. Err. 
Delta-method  




ACS -0.277 0.145 -0.059 0.030 -1.910* 0.056 
ACI -2.785 1.210 -0.591 0.252 -2.300** 0.021 
ACM 0.288 0.146 0.061 0.030 1.970** 0.048 
ACFAE 1.513 0.828 0.321 0.173 1.830* 0.067 
ACLE -0.382 0.232 -0.081 0.049 -1.640* 0.100 
FACM -0.398 0.230 -0.084 0.048 -1.730* 0.084 
ACSO -0.252 0.135 -0.054 0.028 -1.880* 0.061 
ACT -0.209 0.071 -0.044 0.014 -2.970*** 0.003 
ACC 0.391 0.334 0.083 0.071 1.170 0.243 
BI -1.439 1.083 -0.305 0.228 -1.330 0.184 
BE 2.095 0.839 0.445 0.174 2.500** 0.012 
FS 0.006 0.014 0.001 0.003 0.450 0.649 
LEV -0.172 0.191 -0.036 0.040 -0.900 0.369 
FAGE 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.850 0.397 
SGROWTH 0.100 0.043 0.021 0.009 2.340** 0.019 
CONS 2.702 1.316   2.050** 0.040 
Pseudo R2     0.082    
Wald chi2  44.580    
Prob.   0.000    
Specification Test: 
Linktest (Hatsq) 
   
0.895 
   
Gof Test group (9) 












   
Note: IS = income smoothing index, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = 
AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, 
ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = 
leverage, FAGE = firm age and SGROWTH = sales growth Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1,  = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
This makes more frequent meetings to be a repetitive formality used by firms with 
few real accomplishments thus making corporate governance reforms become more 
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„form than substance‟ (Yang et al., 2012). The results support the findings of Katmon 
and Farooque (2015) and Uzun et al. (2004) who found that AC meetings had 
positive significant relationships with EM, which suggests that more frequent 
meetings are related to higher EM. Similarly, Dabor and Dabor (2015) and Ibrahim 
et al. (2016) found a negative significant effect between the AC meetings and EM in 
Nigeria.   
Surprisingly, the results of the audit committee financial accounting experts 
(ACFAEs) revealed a positive significant relationship with IS. It implies that the 
proportion of financial accounting experts on the AC increased the likelihood of a 
firm to be a smoother. This is contrary to the research prediction (H4) which assumed 
that ACFAEs have a positive significant association with the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria.  A probable explanation for this might be as a result of the fact 
that profit smoothing could be considered deceptive or informative. AC financial 
accounting experts might stand to view smoothness as an informative device used by 
management to maximise the investors‟ benefits, such as reducing the inclusive 
corporate tax, dodging debt covenant violations, and lessening agency cost (Habib, 
2005; Ismail & Kamarudin, 2017). Another possible reason could be due to the fact 
the recent IFRS adoption in Nigeria has made accounting practices become more 
complex since the process involves a shift from „„rule-based standards” to “practice-
based standards”. Thus, “rules-based” contain precise criteria, such as the scope 
limitations, exemptions, successive precedents, application guidance, amongst 
others. On the contrary, „„principles-based standards” have to do with the basic 
understandings to report transactions and financial events. Hence, „„principles-based” 
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standards may be of higher quality accounting standards, but this may not 
automatically convert into higher quality reporting. Consequently, ACFAEs may not 
have the basic understanding of this new transition since they are not aggressively 
involved in the practice thus, their inexperience with the practice could make them 
stand to be mere experts by designation rather than the effective monitors that they 
are meant to be.  
Another possible reason for this positive relation might be that, it is likely that the 
AC members that are highly connected with the chief executive officer may acquire 
fewer audit services and be involved more in earnings manipulation (Bruynseels et 
al., 2015). This is evident by prior studies which established that the connectedness 
of chief executive officers and AC members provide a negative impact on the 
worthiness of the AC‟s oversight. This negative impact is more severe, 
predominantly, when chief executive officers and members of the AC are connected 
through companionship (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014; Krishnan, Raman, Yang & 
Yu, 2011) Thus, this connectedness may impair their independent expertise and 
make them less critical about financial deception. Similarly, prior studies (Kusnadi, 
Leong, Suwardy & Wang, 2016; Qi & Tian, 2012) reveal a positive significant 
relationship between the ACFAEs and DA. However, in Nigeria, Madawaki and 
Amran (2013) found a positive significant relationship between the ACFAEs and 
DA. 
Interestingly, the findings of the audit committee legal experts (ACLEs) revealed a 
negative significant relationship with IS. This implies that a larger percentage of 
legal experts in the AC decreases the likelihood of artificial IS practices by firms and 
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thus, enhance FRQ. This supports the prediction of the study which hypothesised 
(H5) that the ACLEs have a positive significant association with the FRQ. The result 
is consistent with the resource dependence theory perceived by Cohen et al. (2008) 
who revealed that non-accounting expertise on the AC can improve the audit 
committee‟s ability to examine whether the accounting procedures correctly reflect 
the basic financial substance of the business activities, which will lead to a higher 
FRQ. This is based on the premise that legal experts in the AC act as monitors rather 
than ordinary signals to financial reports. Since, their legal know-how makes them be 
more informed about litigation and legal liability threats relating to financial 
reporting fraud (Krishnan et al., 2011). The results support the advocates of the 
illusive perspective of IS where such practice is considered as an intolerable act in 
reporting earnings.  The results are consistent with the findings of Baxter and Cotter  
(2009), Krishnan et al. (2011) and Shankaraiah and Amiri (2017) who documented a 
negative significant relationship between the ACLEs and DA. 
The next variable was the female audit committee members (FACMs) which showed 
a negative significant relationship with IS. This suggests that the presence of at least 
one female director in the AC decreases the probability that a firm will smooth its 
earnings. This is consistent with the research expectation (H6) which projected that 
the FACMs have a positive association with FRQ. The finding is also in line with the 
notion that females are more risk antagonistic, vigilant, and decent than men (Gold et 
al., 2009). This makes them view IS as an unacceptable act or deceptive practice that 
distorts the quality of the financial reports. It also validates the social feminist theory 
which proposes that the intrinsic dissimilarity between women and men does not 
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translate to women being inferior to men since men and women may perhaps develop 
differently, but with identical effective qualities (Fischer et al.,1993). The results also 
support the findings of Zalata et al. (2018), Eze (2017), Ittonen et al. (2016), Lenard 
et al. (2017), and Sánchez et al. (2017) which show that FACMs reduce the 
occurrences of earnings management in the form of DA. However, Ogbaisi et al. 
(2016) found that the FACMs were more likely to reduce the financial reporting 
delay amongst the listed companies in Nigeria. 
It is also observed from Table 6.7 that, the ACSO had a negative significant 
relationship with IS. The implication of this result is that the AC shares reduce the 
probability that a firm will smooth its income and, in turn, improves FRQ.  The result 
supports hypothesis seven (H7) of the study which conjectured that the ACSO has a 
positive relationship with the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. It is also in 
line with the agency theory which proposes that the AC shares align the interests of 
the members of the AC with the interests of other shareholders (Vafeas, 2005; 
Yermack, 2004).. The results also confirm the findings of previous studies (Rose et 
al., 2013; Yang & Krishnan 2005) which reveal that the ACSO reduced the 
propensity for EM in the companies. In Nigeria, Kibiya et al. (2016b) found that the 
more shares the AC members possess the more watchful they will be about financial 
reporting issues because of the stake they have in the firm. 
Table 6.7 also revealed that the audit committee tenure (ACT) had a negative 
significant relationship with income smoothing (IS). This suggests that long-tenured 
directors are more likely to decrease the artificial IS practices by the firms and 
accordingly enhance the FRQ. This is consistent with the research hypothesis (H8) 
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which presumed that the ACT has a positive association with the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The results also confirmed the findings of the agency theory 
proponents who showed that the longer the directors serve on the board, the more 
familiar and knowledgeable they will be about the company‟s practices and thus, 
become more effective in curtailing the likelihood of financial reporting fraud 
(Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas, 2005). Prior studies also found 
a negative significant influence between the ACT and earnings management 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Firoozi et al., 2016; Jintawattanagul et al., 2016; Yang & 
Krishnan, 2005). 
The model also recognised that the audit committee chair (ACC) had a positive 
insignificant relationship with IS. Thus, it implies that the chairmanship of the 
shareholders in the Nigerian ACC does not have any pertinent contribution in 
reducing the likelihood of financial fraud in the form of artificial smoothing.  Thus, 
the result is not consistent with H9. A posibble explanation for this could linked to 
the result of relatioship between ACC and DA, which revealed a positive 
insignificant relationship.  Thus, similar justification can be given as evidenced from 
the descriptive statistics, more than 89% of the AC chairs in Nigeria were 
shareholders. Consequently, the presence of shareholders in the AC may decrease 
their monitoring role in the decision-making process (Ahmed, 2017). This is because 
shareholders may be more convince to increase their value as a result of share price 
increase (Sharma & Kuang, 2014). 
The comparison between the projected and the actual results of the foregoing 
regression is presented in Table 6.8. In summary, from the nine variables tested in 
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the study, six variables supported the predicted hypotheses whilst the remaining three 
did not. In particular, from the remaining three, one variable was insignificant whilst 
the remaining two revealed the opposite sign with the research anticipations. 
Table 6.8 
Summary of the Predicted and Actual Results for on the Relationship between the AC 
Characteristics and Income Smoothing 
HYPOTHESIS E.Sign A.Sign Decision 
H1: There is positive relationship between AC Size 
(ACS) and FRQ 
-ve -Sig. supported 
H2: There is positive relationship between AC 
Independence (ACI) and FRQ 
-ve -sig. supported 
H3: There is positive relationship between AC 
Meetings (ACM) and FRQ 
-ve +Sig. Not 
Supported 
H4: There is positive relationship between AC 
Financial Accounting Expertise (ACFAE) and FRQ 
-ve +Sig. Not 
Supported 
H5: There is positive relationship between AC Legal 
Expert (ACLE) and FRQ 
-ve -sig. supported 
H6: There is positive relationship between Female 
AC (FAC) and FRQ 
-ve -sig. supported 
H7: There is positive relationship between AC Stock 
Ownership (ACSO) and FRQ 
-ve -sig. supported 
H8:  There is positive relationship between AC 
Tenure (ACT) and FRQ 
-ve -sig. supported 
H9: There is positive relationship between AC Chair 
(ACC) and FRQ 
-ve +Insig. Not 
supported 
Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +veSig = positive 
significant, -veSig = negative significant, +veInSig positive insignificant, -veInSig negative 
insignificant supported. -veSig  is supported otherwise and  not supported. 
6.4.2 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between Audit Fees 
and Income Smoothing 
This section examines the last part of objective three of the study, which was to 
determine the relationship between the audit quality (proxied by AUF) and the FRQ 
(proxied by IS) of the listed companies in Nigeria. The section also tests hypothesis 
(H11) to examine the third condition of the mediating effect. In this section, IS was 
used as the measurement for the FRQ. The results also reveal some indicators, such 
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as coefficient (β), robust standard error (formed using the marginal effect), t-values, 
and p-values, which were used for the purpose of the interpretations. 
Table 6.9 presents the results of model two (d) regression one of the relationships 
between the audit quality (AUF) and FRQ (IS).  It is revealed from Table 6.9 that, 
the AUF had a negative significant relationship with IS. This implies that a higher 
AUF decreases the likelihood of the artificial smoothing behaviour of firms and, 
accordingly, enhances the FRQ. This is in line with the research expectation as 
hypothesised by (H11) that the audit quality has a positive relationship with the FRQ 
of the listed companies in Nigeria.  
Table 6.9 
Model Three (C) Regression One of the Relationship between the Audit Quality 
(AUF) and the FRQ (using IS) 
Variable coefficient Robust 
Std. Err. 
Delta-method  




AUF -0.291 0.098 -0.065 0.021 -2.970*** 0.003 
BI -1.743 0.889 -0.388 0.195 -1.960** 0.050 
BE 2.673 0.722 0.595 0.151 3.700*** 0.000 
FS 0.007 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.440 0.659 
LEV -0.173 0.173 -0.039 0.038 -1.000 0.315 
FAGE 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.002 1.560 0.119 
SGROWTH 0.109 0.041 0.024 0.009 2.640*** 0.008 
Cons 2.773 1.094   2.530** 0.011 
Pseudo R2      0.046    
Wald chi2   24.890    
Prob.   0.000    
Specification Test: 
Linktest (Hatsq) 
   
0.924 
   
Gof Test group(9) 












   
Note: IS = Income smoothing index, AUF= Audit fees, BI = board independence, BE = board 
expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage FAGE = firm age and SGROWTH = sales growth *** 




The findings also validate the agency theory which proposes that auditing financial 
reports is recognised as a means to decrease agency cost. This is not astonishing as it 
is evident that a higher AUF is associated with better audit efforts, less litigation, and 
greater assurance. It also interprets that auditing financial reports is renowned as a 
means to cut agency cost and thus, a high audit fee is accredited to lower earnings 
management and a higher FRQ. 
The results corroborate the findings of previous studies which have documented that 
companies that purchased higher audit quality were less likely to engage in earnings 
management (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014; Cohen et al., 2007; Franke et al., 
2002; Hoitash et al., 2007; Carmona et al., 2015). Thus, they found a negative 
significant association between audit fees and DA. Moreover, Abdul Malik and Che-
Ahmad (2016) and Abdul-Rahman et al. (2017) documented that audit fees had a 
positive significant association with the FRQ of the listed firms in Nigeria. 
6.4.3 Regression Result and Discussion on the Relationship between the BIG 4 
Auditors and Income Smoothing 
This section also examines the last part of objective three of the study which was to 
examine the relationship between the audit quality and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria.  The section also tests hypothesis (H11). The results reveal 
some indicators, such as the coefficient (β), robust standard error (formed using the 




Table 6.10 presents the results of model two (D) Regression two of the relationships 
between the audit quality (BIG 4) and FRQ (IS). It is observed from Table 6.10 that 
BIG 4 firms were revealed to have a positive significant relationship with IS. This 
means that BIG 4 auditors increased the likelihood of firms artificially smoothing 
their incomes. The results also suggested that Non-BIG 4 auditors were more 
probable to decrease the IS behaviour of the listed companies in Nigeria. This 
contradicts the study‟s expectation of (H11) which assumed that the audit quality has 
a positive significant relationship with the FRQ. A possible explanation for this is 
that it is observed from the descriptive statistics that a substantial number of the 
sample firms were audited by the BIG 4 auditors who may have less information of 
the local markets compared to the Non-BIG 4 auditors (Carey & Simnett, 2006). This 
could posibly create a vaccum as the Non-BIG 4 auditors may have greater 
knowledge of the local markets and better relations with their clients. These reasons 
may enable the Non-BIG 4 auditors to better recognise irregularities in the 
companies. 
Another probable justification may be that the tenure of the external auditors 
provided by the SEC CCG (2011) may be considered too extensive as it establishes 
that external auditors should be engaged for no longer than ten years. Thus, 
exceptionally prolonged external auditors‟ tenures might impair their independence 
since the more extensive their stay as the auditors of the same entity, the more 
probable it is for them to be networking with the management, thus becoming less 




Model Two (D) Regression Two of the Relationship between the BIG4 Auditors and 
FRQ (Income Smoothing) 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. T-Value P-Value 
BIG4 0.374 0.209 1.790** 0.073 
BI -2.205 0.939 -2.350** 0.019 
BE 2.622 0.800 3.280*** 0.001 
FS -0.166 0.067 -2.470** 0.014 
LEV -0.177 0.161 -1.100 0.270 
FAGE 0.008 0.008 1.080 0.279 
SGROWTH 0.097 0.041 2.360** 0.018 
Cons 3.049 1.303 2.340** 0.019 
Pseudo R2     0.043    
Wald chi2  24.270    
Prob.   0.001    
Specification Test: 
Linktest (Hatsq) 
   
0.505 
   
Gof Test group (9) 












   
Note: IS = Income smoothing index, BIG4 = Big 4 auditors, BI = board independence, BE = board 
expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age and SGROWTH = sales growth *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Similar results were documented by Bruynseels & Cardinaels (2014); Huang et al. 
(2009); and Yaşar (2013) who found a positive relationship between  BIG 4 auditors 
and DA. Similarly, in Nigeria, Ozili (2017) found that banks which were audited by 
the BIG 4 auditors were more likely to smooth their reported earnings than the banks 
that were audited by the Non-BIG 4 firms. 
The comparison between the predicted and the actual findings of the aforementioned 
regressions are presented in Table 6.11. Generally, from the two variables tested in 
these models, one variable (AUF) is consistent with the predicted hypotheses whilst 
the remaining one discloses the opposite sign with the research expectation. 
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Table 6. 11 
Results of the Predicted Hypothesis on the Relationship between the Audit Fees and 
Income Smoothing 
HYPOTHESIS (H11) E.Sign A.Sign Decision 
H11a: There is positive relationship between AUQ 
(using AUF) and FRQ (using IS) 
- -sig Supported 
H11b: There is positive relationship between AUQ 
(using BIG4) and FRQ (using IS) 
- +insig Not 
Supported 
Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +veSig = positive 
significant, -veSig = negative significant, +veInSig positive insignificant, -veInSig negative 
insignificant supported. -veSig  is supported otherwise and  not supported. 
6.4.4 Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the Relationship between the AC 
Characteristics and Income Smoothing 
This section examines the last part of objective four of the study which was to 
determine the mediating effect of the audit quality (AUF) on the relationship 
between the AC characteristics and the FRQ (IS) of the listed companies in Nigeria.  
The section also tests the last hypothesis of the study (H12) which aims at examining 
the last condition of the mediating effect. Thus, the hypothesis was tested only on the 
variables that met the first three conditions of mediation under Baron and Kenny 
(1986) as highlighted in the previous chapter. Recall that two mediators were 
employed by the study as proxies for audit quality (AUF and BIG 4). Like in the 
previous chapter, the meditational model is tabulated in this section using AUF only 
since the BIG 4 model did not meet the third condition (the relationship between the 
BIG 4 auditors and IS was positively significant, signifying the opposite sign to the 
research prediction).  
Similar to the previous chapter, the Sobel Test was applied to examine the 
significance of the mediation on any AC variable that satisfied all four conditions of 
mediation. In that, the income smoothing index using Eckel Model (1981) and 
Albrecht and Richardson (1990) was employed. The results from Table 6.12 reveal 
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some indicators, such as the coefficient (β), robust standard error (formed using the 
marginal effect which measures the discrete variation or how do projected 
probabilities vary as the binary predictor variable changes from 0 to 1). This was 
done to enable the study to determine whether the impact of the independent variable 
(βx) on the outcome variable Y should be less in absolute terms in the meditational 
model compared to the impact of the independent variable (βx) in the direct model. 
T-values and p-values were also extracted for the purpose of the interpretations. 
Table 6.12 presents the regression results of model 2 (D) of the mediating effect of 
audit quality (AUF) on the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ 
(IS).  This is based on the belief that the AC attributes increase the AUF to demand 
greater audit assurance and, in turn, the successive increase in the AUF is expected to 
enhance the FRQ. Thus, these relationships are expected to be as follows: i) AC 
characteristics have negative relationships with IS, ii) AC characteristics have  
positive relationships with AUF, iii) AUF has a negative relationship with IS, and iv) 
AUF mediates the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ. 
Considering the first condition of the ACS and FRQ (IS), this relationship was found 
to be consistent with the hypothesis, as it was revealed to have a negative significant 
relationship with IS (β= -0.059, p < 0.056). Regarding the second condition of the 
ACS and AUF, it is also in line with the hypothesis as it revealed a positive 
significant relationship with the AUF (β= 0.392, p < 0.000). The third condition of 
the AUF and IS was also consistent with the hypothesis as the result showed a beta 
coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.065 and 0.003), respectively. For the last condition, 
Table 6.12 reveals that the ACS had a lower beta coefficient of (β= -0.031) compared 
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to the direct model of (β= -0.059).  This implies that the influence of the independent 
variable (βx) on the dependent variable, Y, in the meditational model was less in 
absolute terms compared to the effect in the direct model. This recommends that all 
the conditions of the Causal steps method were met. Thus, it implies that the AUF 
partially mediated the relationship between the ACS and the FRQ (IS) of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The mediation was partial because the AUF did not decrease 
the effect of the ACS on IS to insignificance. To further justify this result, the Sobel 
test was computed to determine whether the mediation was significant.
 281 
Table 6.12  
Model One (D) of the Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ (Income Smoothing) 








AC & AUF 
Model  
(Second 
 Condition)  
AC & AUF 
Model  
P-Val. 
AUF & FRQ (IS) Model 
(Third 
 Condition) 










ACS -0.059 0.056 0.392 0.000   -0.031 0.382 
ACI -0.591 0.021 0.350 0.373   -0.543 0.032 
ACM 0.061 0.048 0.018 0.794   0.060 0.054 
ACFAE 0.321 0.067 0.532 0.055   0.351 0.046 
ACLE -0.081 0.100 0.789 0.043   -0.078 0.112 
FACM -0.084 0.084 -0.163 0.035   -0.094 0.055 
ACSO -0.054 0.061 0.043 0.000   -0.052 0.087 
ACT -0.044 0.003 0.002 0.948   -0.043 0.004 
ACC 0.083 0.243 -0.651 0.000   0.057 0.417 
BI -0.305 0.184 0.760 0.030 -0.388  -0.281 0.216 
BE 0.445 0.012 1.011 0.000 0.595  0.510 0.005 
FS 0.001 0.649 0.372 0.000 0.002  0.003 0.422 
LEV -0.036 0.369 0.013 0.792 -0.039  -0.037 0.355 
FAGE 0.001 0.397 0.005 0.087 0.003  0.002 0.286 
SGROWTH 0.021 0.019 0.036 0.014 0.024  0.022 0.014 
AUF     -0.065 0.003 -0.041 0.105 
Cons 2.969 0.040 0.086 0.460 -0.006 0.787  0.016 
Pseudo R2      46.480      




Table 6.12 Continued 
Prob.   0.000      
Specification Test: 
Linktest (Hatsq)   
 
0.652      
Gof Test group(9) 
          Prob. chi2   
 
0.5723      
 
Correctly classified   
 
67.430%      
Note: IS = Income smoothing  index, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = 
female AC member, ACSO = AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, 
FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and AUF = audit fees *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 283 
 
The results from the Sobel test, as depicted in Table 6.13, reveal a t-value and p-
value of (t= -2.834 and 0.005), respectively. 
Table 6.13 
Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC Size and 
Income Smoothing 
Inputs    Sb*SC = 
 







 (b)  
.3921153    
Sobel test -2.8342108*** 0.00896934 0.0045939 
Sb (Sa) 
 .0211432   





-2.8564186*** 0.0088996 0.0042845 
Note: βc = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, 
βb = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the independent and mediator, Sb = 
Standard residual of mediator, Sc = Standard residual of predictor variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
This substantiates that the results obtained from the causal steps method were free 
from false negative conclusions and thus, this implies that the AUF partially and 
significantly mediated the relationship between the ACS and the FRQ of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The insinuation of these findings are that the AUF decreases 
the influence of the ACS on the FRQ (IS). Hence, the findings support the hypothesis 
(H12) of the study which presumed that the AUF mediates the relationship between 
the ACS and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. The results also provide the 
causal effect of the complementary hypothesis of the audit quality which proposes 
that the AC needs greater assurance from the external auditors to guarantee the 
effective oversight of the financial reports, and to safeguard their capital reputations 
(Boo & Sharma, 2008; Cohen et al., 2002; Marini et al., 2016). This supports the 
institutional theory which suggests that integrating the AC to work with external 
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auditors will enhance the monitoring of the financial reporting process. This is 
because the AC is reflected to be a formal assembly that is engaged by an 
organisation in a ceremonial way, but the actual monitoring of an organisation is 
determined by other external factors, for example, the external auditors in this 
context. This conjecture is popularly known as "decoupling" (Escobar & Demeritt, 
2017; Baker et al., 2014; Fourcade & Savelsberg, 2006). 
Another important AC attribute used by the study was the audit committee 
independence (ACI); in view of the first condition of the ACI and FRQ (IS), it had a 
negative significant relationship with IS (β= -2.785, p < 0.021). This is consistent 
with the research hypothesis (H2). As regards the second condition of the ACI and 
AUF, the result was not in line with the research hypothesis since it revealed a 
positive insignificant relationship with the AUF (β= 0.350, p < 0.373). However, the 
third condition of the AUF and IS was in line with the research hypothesis as the 
results showed a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.291 and 0.002), respectively. 
Consequently, the last condition, could not be accessed since condition two was not 
satisfied. Therefore, the mediating effect of the ACI through the AUF on the IS was 
not supported by the results. 
The next AC characteristic used in this present study was the audit committee 
meetings (ACMs). With reference to the first condition of the ACMs and the FRQ 
(IS), the results are contrary to the research hypothesis (H3) as it was revealed to 
have a positive significant association (β = 0.288, p < 0.048). Relating to the next 
condition of the ACMs and AUF, it had a positive and insignificant relationship with 
the AUF (β = 0.018, p < 0.794), hence, it did not support the research hypothesis 
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(H10C). Although, the third condition of the AUF and IS was fulfilled. The last 
condition could not be observed since only condition three was satisfied. Thus, the 
mediating effect of the ACMs through the AUF on the IS was not supported by the 
results.  
Audit committee financial accounting experts (ACFAEs) was another vital AC 
characteristic employed by the study. After examining the first condition, which was 
ACFAEs and FRQ (IS), the result showed a positive significant relationship with IS 
(β = 0.321, p < 0.067). This is contrary to the research hypothesis (H4). The second 
condition revealed that the ACFAEs had a positive significant relationship with the 
AUF (β= 0.532, p < 0.055) and it is consistent with the research hypothesis (H10d). 
The third condition is also consistent with the research hypothesis (H11) as the results 
showed a beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.065 and 0.002), respectively. The 
last condition, showed that the ACFAEs had disclosed a higher beta coefficient of (β 
= 0.351) in the mediation model compared to the one obtained from the direct model 
of (β = 0.321), concluding that the effect of the independent variable (βx) on the 
dependent variable Y in the direct model was high in absolute term. Thus, the 
mediating effect of the ACFEs through the AUF on the IS was not supported by the 
sequence of the results.  
The next variable was the audit committee legal experts (ACLEs), recalling the first 
condition of the ACLEs and FRQ (IS), the results reveal a negative significant 
relationship with the regression coefficient and p-value of (β = -0.081, p < 0.100), 
respectively. Consequently, it is consistent with the research hypothesis (H5). The 
second condition of the ACLEs and AUF was also in line with the research 
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hypothesis (H10e) as it showed a positive significant relationship (β = 0.789, p < 
0.043). Regarding the third condition of the AUF and IS, the results disclose a beta 
coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.065 and 0.003), respectively. Finally, the fourth 
condition was accessible since all of the above three conditions of the causal steps 
method were fulfilled. Interestingly, the fourth condition, which was the effect of the 
ACLEs, has been revealed to have a lower beta coefficient of (β = -0.078) in the 
mediation model as against (β = -0.081) in the direct model, concluding that the 
effect of the predictor variable (βx) on the outcome variable Y in the direct model is 
less in absolute terms compared to the effect in the mediation model. Thus, it 
suggests that the AUF partially mediated the relationship between the ACLEs and 
the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
A possible explanation for the above results could be as a result of the fact that it is 
evident that the majority of the AC legal experts in Nigeria do not have accounting 
expertise or experience. Thus,  mechanisms through which the legal experts can help 
enhance FRQ can be indirect, for instance, through inquiry and interrogation, or 
through ensuring the hiring of competent and sufficient management personnel 
(Krishnan et al., 2011). This is because legal directors are sensitive to the litigation 
risk associated with FRQ (Krishnan et al., 2011). Then they could hire better auditors 
and pay them hire audit fees to oversee the financial reporting process which in 
returns enhanced FRQ. 
Furthermore, to confirm the result of the causal steps method, the Sobel test was also 
conducted to determine whether the mediation effect was significant. The results 
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from the Sobel test, as depicted in Table 6.14, reveals a t-value and p-value of (t = -
1.691 and 0.090), respectively.  
Table 6.14 
Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC Legal 
Expert and Income Smoothing 











Sobel test -1.69124516* 0.03024403 0.09078999 
Sb (Sa) 
 .0211432 





-1.75752649* 0.02910345 0.07882811 
Note: βc = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, 
βb = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the independent and mediator, Sb = 
Standard residual of mediator, Sc = Standard residual of predictor variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
This implies that the AUF partially and significantly mediated the relationship 
between the ACLEs and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. The 
consequence of this result is that the excessive AUF paid to the external auditors in 
the listed companies in Nigeria significantly complement the oversight function of 
the ACLEs on the IS practices. 
The results also imply that, when the responsibility of the external auditors to 
examine the accounts and the oversight function of the ACLEs are put together, they 
may have a greater effect on the managers‟ use of flexible accounting choices to 
artificially smooth income.  Hence, the finding supports the hypothesis (H12) of the 
study which predicted that the AUF mediates the relationship between the AC 
characteristic (ACLEs) and the FRQ (IS) of the listed companies in Nigeria. The 
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findings also provide an insight on the causal effect of the complementary hypothesis 
of the audit quality from the institutional theory perspectives which suggests that the 
experts on the AC support a greater increase in the AUF for better audit assurance. 
Those experts allow the AC members to better recognise the auditing issues, risks, 
and litigation, and how to address them (Cohen et al., 2014). The results also confirm 
the findings of prior studies which documented that the ACLEs are more informed 
on legal liability threats, and their legal backgrounds require them to be more 
watchful of such threats (Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2011). 
With reference to female audit committee members (FACMs), the first condition of 
the FACMs and FRQ revealed a negative significant relationship with IS (β = -0.084, 
p < 0.084). Thus, the results support the research hypothesis (H6). On the second 
condition of the FACMs and AUF, the results are not in line with the research 
hypothesis (H10f) since it reveals the opposite sign that, there was a negative 
significant relationship with the AUF (β = -0.163, p < 0.035). As for the third 
condition of the AUF and IS, it was consistent with the research hypothesis showing 
a beta coefficient of -0.065 and p-value of 0.002, respectively. Consequently, the 
fourth condition could not be attained since, from the foregoing Causal steps method, 
condition two was not supported. Henceforth, the FACMs fulfilled two conditions 
instead of three; therefore, the mediating effect of the FACMs through the AUF on 
IS was not supported by the above results. 
Next was the audit committee stock ownership (ACSO), which revealed the 
following results. On the first condition of the ACSO and FRQ, the result disclosed a 
negative significant relationship with IS (β = -0.054, p < 0.061). The results support 
 
 289 
research hypothesis (H7). With respect to the second condition, the ACSO and the 
AUF were also in line with the research hypothesis (H10g) because it was revealed to 
have a positive significant relationship with the AUF (β= 0.012, p < 0.000).  The 
next condition of the AUF and IS is also consistent with the research hypothesis 
(H11) since the results reveal a regression coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.065 and 
0.002), respectively. Finally, the fourth condition revealed that the impact of the 
ACSO has shown a lower beta coefficient of (β = 0.052) in the mediation model in 
contrast to (β = -0.054) in the direct model, confirming that the impact of the 
predictor variable (βx) on the outcome variable Y in the direct model was less in 
absolute terms compared to the effect in the mediation model. Hence, it suggests that 
the AUF partially mediated the relationship between the ACSO and the FRQ (IS) of 
the listed companies in Nigeria.  
Moreover, to examine whether the above sequence of regressions were free from 
false positive and false negative conclusions, the Sobel test was performed to test 
whether the mediation was significant or not.  Interestingly, the results from the 
Sobel test, as represented in Table 6.15, disclose a t-value and p-value of (t= -2.328 
and 0.020), respectively. 
This confirms that the AUF significantly mediated the relationship between the 
ACSO and the FRQ (IS) of the listed companies in Nigeria. The implication of this 
result shows that the AUF reduced the impact of the ACSO on the FRQ (IS). Thus, 
the result supports the hypothesis (H12) of the study which assumed that the AUF 
mediated the relationship between the ACSO and the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. The result also provides a causal effect of the AC and the audit quality thus, 
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establishing that the ACSO functions as a monitor by requiring higher audit quality 
in exchange for greater audit efforts. 
Table 6.15 
Sobel Test: Mediating Effect of the Audit Fees on the Relationship between AC Stock 
Ownership and Income Smoothing 










  1.23e-10     
Sobel test -2.32760026** 0.0000000 0.01993334 
Sb (Sa) 
 .0211432 
Aroian test  -2.27685450** 0.0000000 0.02279492 
Sc (Sb)  
3.44e-11   
Goodman 
test 
-2.38189767** 0.0000000 0.01722368 
Note: βc = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the mediator and outcome variable, 
βb = Unstandardized parameter of the relationship between the independent and mediator, Sb = 
Standard residual of mediator, Sc = Standard residual of predictor variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. = significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
The findings also support the agency theory which advocates that the demand for 
independent external auditors ascends from a desire to lower the management‟s 
deceptive behaviours that result from the asymmetric information between the 
stockholders and the managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Menon & Williams 
1994). Prior studies have also documented that a larger proportion of ACSO reduces 
DA and is inversely and significantly associated with the probability that the auditor 
suggests a going-concern report for financially distressed firms and auditor 
dismissals (Bronson et al., 2009; Carcello & Neal, 2003;  Hamdan et al., 2013; 
Vafeas, 2005). 
Audit committee tenure (ACT) was the next variable of consideration. To start with 
the first condition, which was the ACT and FRQ, it had a negative significant 
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relationship with IS (β = -0.044, p < 0.003). Thus, the results support research 
hypothesis (H8). On the second condition of the ACT and AUF, the results are 
contrary to research hypothesis (H10h) since it reveals an insignificant relationship (β 
= 0.022, p < 0.511). Although the third condition was fulfilled, it showed a 
regression coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.065 and 0.002), respectively; so the 
fourth condition could not be accomplished because, from the aforementioned Causal 
steps, condition two was not supported. For that reason, the mediating effect of the 
ACT through the AUF on the IS was not supported by the above findings. 
Lastly, the results of the Audit committee chair (ACC) and the FRQ, from the first 
condition, reveal a positive insignificant relationship with IS (β = 0.083, p < 0.243). 
Equally, the results do not support research hypothesis (H9). The second condition of 
the ACC and the AUF was also not in line with research hypothesis (H10i) since it 
revealed the opposite sign (β = -0.651, p < 0.000). The third condition was fulfilled 
as disclosed by the beta coefficient and p-value of (β= -0.198 and 0.002), 
respectively. Going by these results, the fourth condition could not be achieved since 
condition two was not supported. Henceforward, the mediating effect of the ACC 
through the AUF on the IS was not supported by the above results.   
The comparison between the expected and the actual findings of the mediating effect 
of the AUF on the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ (IS) are 





Summary of the Predicted and Actual Results for the Mediating Effect of the Audit 
Fees on the Relationship between the AC Characteristics and Income Smoothing 
HYPOTHESIS Type of 
Med. 
  Decision 
H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC Size 
(ACS) and FRQ (IS) 
P.Mediated Supported 
H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC Legal 
Expert (ACLE) and FRQ (IS) 
P.Mediated Supported 
H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between Female 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC Stock 
Ownership (ACSO) and FRQ (IS) 
P.Mediated Supported 
H12:  AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC 





H12: AUQ (AUF) mediates the relationship between AC Chair 





Notes: E.Sign = expected sign, A.Sign = actual sign, +ve = positive, -ve = negative , +vesig = positive 
significant, -vesig = negative significant, +veinsig = positive insignificant, -veinsig negative, 
insignificant supported, -vesig  is supported otherwise and not supported, P.Mediated = partially 
mediated. 
 
In general, from the nine variables tested in this mediation model, three variables 
supported the predicted hypotheses whilst the remaining six did not. Precisely, three 
variables were consistent with the condition of mediation whilst the remaining 
variables were not. 
6.5 Robustness Check 
To assess the robustness of the results and to ensure that the findings were not 
sensitive to alternative measurements and the selection of the outcome variable, 
robustness tests were conducted. The following provides the results for the 
sensitivity checks employed by the study. 
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6.5.1 Alternative Measurements of the Independent Variables 
This section provides alternative measurements for the predictor variables of the 
study. The alternative measurements were designated as additional sensitivity 
checks. Recall that seven independent variables were measured as continuous 
variables in the main analysis, these included the ACS, ACI, ACMs, ACFAEs, 
ACLEs and ACT. Following Krishnan et al. (2011), Xie et al. (2003), Yasin and 
Nelson (2012) and Zhang et al. (2007), in this additional analysis, the continuous 
variables were re-measured as dummy variables. The FACMs‟ variable was re-
measured from the dummy to the continuous variable. ACSO was re-measured from 
the units of shares possessed by the AC members to the percentage of the AC shares 
(units of AC divided by total number of shares outstanding to the firm). 
Table 6.17 presents the main and alternative estimates for the robustness test. From 
Table 6.17, it is inferred that the signs and the coefficients of the main models (both 
direct and mediated models) are considerably similar to those of the robustness 
checks. The only noble variation observed was in the ACS which revealed a negative 
insignificant relation with the IS in the robustness checks, but it showed a negative 
significant association in the main models. Another insensitive change was revealed 
in the ACMs and the ACT as their levels of significance reduced from 5% to 10% 
and 1% to 10%, respectively, in the additional analysis (direct model only). On the 
contrary, the ACFAEs, FACMs, and the ACSO revealed a slight increase from 10% 





Result for the Alternative Measure of the Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









ACS -0.277* -0.324 -0.145 -0.00347 
 (0.145) (0.269) (0.166) (0.305) 
ACI -2.785** -2.819** -2.576** -2.536** 
 (1.210) (1.216) (1.202) (1.210) 
ACM 0.288** 0.615* 0.284* 0.651* 
 (0.146) (0.352) (0.147) (0.340) 
ACFAE 1.513* 0.677** 1.666** 0.736** 
 (0.828) (0.310) (0.834) (0.311) 
ACLE -0.382* -0.451* -0.368 -0.442* 
 (0.232) (0.240) (0.232) (0.241) 
FACM -0.398* -2.355** -0.444* -2.632** 
 (0.230) (1.061) (0.231) (1.074) 
ACSO -0.153* -0.197** -0.152* -0.189* 
 (0.028) (0.0939) (0.031) (0.100) 
ACT -0.209*** -0.378* -0.203*** -0.368* 
 (0.0705) (0.212) (0.0703) (0.213) 
ACC 0.391 0.502 0.271 0.355 
 (0.334) (0.349) (0.333) (0.343) 
BI -1.439 -1.757 -1.335 -1.637 
 (1.083) (1.100) (1.080) (1.095) 
BE 2.095** 1.896** 2.421*** 2.310*** 
 (0.839) (0.850) (0.871) (0.882) 
FS 0.00638 0.00321 0.0128 0.0104 
 (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0154) 
LEV -0.172 -0.175 -0.176 -0.183 
 (0.191) (0.185) (0.191) (0.184) 
FAGE 0.00691 0.00681 0.00887 0.00953 
 (0.00816) (0.00813) (0.00832) (0.00832) 
SGROWTH 0.0999** 0.0962** 0.105** 0.103** 
 (0.0428) (0.0431) (0.0427) (0.0432) 
AUF   -0.195 -0.252** 
   (0.120) (0.116) 
Constant 2.702** 1.588 3.437** 3.257** 
 (1.316) (1.051) (1.423) (1.350) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
R2 0.082 0.076 0.086 0.085 
Note: IS= income smoothing index, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, 
ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = 
AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board 
expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and AUF = 
audit fees, Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. = significant at 1%, 




6.5.2 Alternative Measurements of the Dependent Variables 
This section offers an alternative measurement of the dependent variable of the 
study. The alternative measurement was opted as another robustness check. In the 
main analysis, the Eckel model, using the coefficient variation of a change in income 
(Net income) divided by the coefficient variation of a change in sales, was used.  
Following Albrecht and Richardson (1990), Ashari et al. (1994), Habib (2005), 
Michelson et al. (1995) and Young (2012), the study employed operating income 
(OPI) in addition to net income as alternative measurements of the IS. They defined 
the operating income as the operating income from sales minus the cost of goods 
sold and the operational cost, excluding depreciation and amortisation. 
Table 6.18 presents the main and alternative results for the robustness checks. It is 
evident from Table 6.18 that the signs and the regression coefficients of the main 
models (both direct and mediated) are substantially similar to those of the robustness 
checks. It is manifest that the only major difference was disclosed in the ACS, 
though the sign remained the same, which was negatively and significantly related to 
the IS in the main model, but there was a chance for an insignificant relation in the 
sensitivity checks. Similarly, the sign of the ACFAEs also remained the same, but 
turned to a positive insignificant relation in the additional analysis. The ACI showed 
a decrease in the confidence interval from 5% to 10% in the mediated alternative 
models. In contrast, the ACMs revealed an increase in the level of significance from 






Result for the Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









ACS -0.277* -0.150 -0.145 -0.0329 
 (0.145) (0.142) (0.166) (0.163) 
ACI -2.785** -2.383** -2.576** -2.188* 
 (1.210) (1.183) (1.202) (1.176) 
ACM 0.288** 0.453*** 0.284* 0.452*** 
 (0.146) (0.138) (0.147) (0.140) 
ACFAE 1.513* 0.586 1.666** 0.715 
 (0.828) (0.813) (0.834) (0.813) 
ACLE -0.382* -0.384* -0.368 -0.372 
 (0.232) (0.233) (0.232) (0.232) 
FACM -0.398* -0.388* -0.444* -0.428* 
 (0.230) (0.234) (0.231) (0.235) 
ACSO -0.153* -0.249* -0.052* -0.249* 
 (0.028) (0.140) (0.031) (0.151) 
ACT -0.209*** -0.180** -0.203*** -0.174** 
 (0.0705) (0.0706) (0.0703) (0.0705) 
ACC 0.391 0.407 0.271 0.306 
 (0.334) (0.337) (0.333) (0.342) 
BI -1.439 -0.449 -1.335 -0.356 
 (1.083) (1.098) (1.080) (1.104) 
BE 2.095** 1.904** 2.421*** 2.181** 
 (0.839) (0.854) (0.871) (0.888) 
FS 0.00638 0.00258 0.0128 0.00585 
 (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0138) 
LEV -0.172 -0.120 -0.176 -0.123 
 (0.191) (0.175) (0.191) (0.173) 
FAGE 0.00691 0.0127 0.00887 0.0145* 
 (0.00816) (0.00818) (0.00832) (0.00840) 
SGROWTH 0.0999** 0.128*** 0.105** 0.132*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0426) 
AUF   -0.195 -0.168 
   (0.120) (0.121) 
Constant 2.702** 0.595 3.437** 1.226 
 (1.316) (1.295) (1.423) (1.378) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
R2 0.082 0.079 0.086 0.081 
Note: IS= income smoothing index, ACS = AC size, ACI = AC independence, ACM = AC meetings, 
ACFAE = AC financial expertise, ACLE = AC legal expert, FACM = female AC member, ACSO = 
AC stock ownership, ACT = AC tenure, ACC = AC chair, BI = board independence, BE = board 
expertise, FS = firm size LEV = leverage, FAGE = firm age, SGROWTH = sales growth and AUF = 
audit fees, Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. = significant at 1%, 




6.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter presented the results that answered the last section of questions, one to 
four, of the thesis, which were: 1) Do the audit committee characteristics influence 
the FRQ (IS) of the listed companies in Nigeria?, 2) Do the audit committee 
characteristics influence the audit quality (AUF and BIG 4) of the listed companies 
in Nigeria?, 3) Does the audit quality affect the FRQ of the listed companies in 
Nigeria?, and 4) Does the audit quality mediate the relationships between the AC 
characteristics and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria? 
The chapter also presented detailed analyses and the interrelations of the sequence of 
regressions that addressed the mediation process using the causal steps method and 
the Sobel test. The first process was set to examine the relationship between the 
independent variables (AC characteristics) and the dependent variable, FRQ (proxied 
by the IS). The next process was to test the association between the independent 
variables and the mediator, audit quality (proxied by the AUF and BIG 4), which 
consisted of two regression estimations. Another step in the process was examining 
the association between the audit quality and the FRQ. This also involved two 
regression equations. Lastly, the mediating effect of the audit quality on the 
relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ was accessed. This also 
involved two regression estimations, but it was subject to fulfillment of the 
conditions of mediation as recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986), Sobel (1982), 
and Hayes and Rockwood (2017). Consequently, only the first mediator of the AUF 
was considered whilst the second mediator (BIG 4) did not meet the criterion like in 
the previous chapter. 
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The findings of the firsts process (the relationship between the AC characteristics 
and IS) recognised that the ACS, ACI, ACLEs, FACMs, ACSO, and ACT reduced 
the likelihood of the artificial IS behaviour practiced by firms in Nigeria. Thus, these 
findings support H1, H2, H4, H5, H6, and H7.as predicted by the study. The study also 
confirmed that the ACMs, ACFAEs, and ACC did not meaningfully contribute in 
decreasing the probability of the IS practices in the listed companies in Nigeria.  In 
view of the second process (the relationships between the AC characteristics and 
audit quality), the study provides evidence that the ACS, ACFAEs, ACLEs, and 
ACSO functioned in a complimentary way with the audit quality by raising the AUF 
for greater audit assurance. In contrast, the FACMs and ACC showed evidence of a 
substitutional effect of giving greater commitment to the AC in order to decrease the 
audit effort. Whilst the ACI did not establish any meaningful contribution in the 
determination of the audit price in Nigeria. 
The findings from the third condition of mediation (the relationship between the 
audit quality and FRQ) recognised that increasing the AUF was associated with a 
lower likelihood of the smoothing behaviour, thus supporting the predicted 
hypothesis. Finally, the last analysis was performed to examine the mediating effect 
of the audit quality on the relationships between the AC characteristics and the FRQ 
(IS). From the two mediators (AUF and BIG 4), only the AUF fulfilled the condition 
three and thus, the mediating analysis in the last step was conducted only using the 
AUF. Thus, the results show that the AUF partially and significantly mediated the 
relationships between the ACS, ACLEs, and ACSO and the IS of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. However, the mediating effects of the AUF on the 
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relationships between the ACI, ACMs, ACFAEs, FACMs, ACT, and ACC were not 






SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
Financial reports are notable means through which companies interact with their 
users. It is a mechanism through which a company portrays its financial results and 
its position. Financial analysts and investors make use of financial reports to make 
rational decisions. Ideally, the financial reports are meant to provide reliable, timely 
and relevant information to assist users in decision making, but not be intentionally 
prepared with any form of material error and bias that could mislead the users. 
Consequently, the information contained in the financial reports ought to be clearly 
accessible, with supplementary proof supplied in the supporting footnotes as required 
to assist in the interpretation. Thus, the steadfastness of the financial reports depends 
on the relevance and reliability of the accounting earnings. Hence, the relevance of 
accounting earnings to the stakeholders of any given firm is very crucial since the 
entire faith of the entity as well as of its stakeholders depends on it. 
A number of accounting scandals and failures (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, Xerox, 
and WorldCom) have made a lot of investors lose confidence and accordingly, raised 
grave concerns about the trustworthiness and steadfastness of the financial reports 
and AC‟s effectiveness in protecting their interests. For this reason, there is a 
growing need to be more proactive in CG issues since they are so imperative, as a 
weak CG can lead to the failure of a country‟s economic structure. To address this 
issue, the regulatory agencies and policy makers have responded by promoting and 
reviewing governance mechanisms to minimise the opportunistic behaviours and 
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agency costs that have smashed shareholders‟ reliability in financial information. 
Therefore, several studies have examined the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms (including the most pivotal of theses mechanisms, AC and 
audit quality) and FRQ. However, the evidence documented about these relations is 
still equivocal. 
This study adds value to the existing and on-going argument on the relationships 
between AC characteristics and FRQ. This present study has closed some gaps by 
providing empirical evidence on the influence of: 1) AC characteristics and FRQ, 2) 
AC characteristics and audit quality, 3) audit quality and FRQ, and 4) the mediating 
effect of audit quality on the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ. This 
study has recognised that some AC characteristics have significant influence on FRQ 
in the Nigerian context that is characterised with a distinct AC formation. Similarly, 
the study has documented that several AC attributes were consistent with the 
complementary premise of audit quality whilst a few supported the substitution 
hypothesis. Also, the study established that audit quality has a significant influence 
on the FRQ of the listed firms in Nigeria. It was recognised that audit quality 
partially and significantly mediated the relationship between the AC characteristics 
(precisely ACS, ACFAEs, ACLEs, and ACSO) and the FRQ. 
7.2 Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises the empirical findings on four imperative steps of mediation 
(mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between the AC characteristics 
and the FRQ (proxied by EM measurement) of the listed companies in Nigeria. 
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These steps have been classified into, 1) the relationship between AC characteristics 
and FRQ, 2) the relationship between AC characteristics and audit quality, 3) the 
relationship between audit quality and FRQ, and 4) the mediating effect of audit 
quality on the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ. Chapter One of the 
thesis reflected the importance and issues of FRQ and AC effectiveness across the 
globe. Chapter One also discussed the theoretical problem relating to FRQ and AC 
effectiveness in the problem statement and highlighted the research questions, 
objectives of the study, scope, and significance of the study. Chapter Two presented 
the overview of FRQ, financial reporting framework in Nigeria, AC effectiveness, 
and an overview of the Codes of CG in Nigeria. The chapter also recapped the 
similarities and differences between the Nigerian GAAP and IFRS. The chapter also 
reviewed the related literature on the AC characteristics, audit quality, and FRQ. 
Moreover, Chapter Three discussed the theoretical background and hypotheses 
development. Chapter Four discussed the research methodology employed by the 
study. Chapter Five explained the analyses of the findings on the mediating effect of 
audit quality on the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ proxied by EM 
measurement (using DA). Chapter Six discussed the findings about the mediating 
effect of audit quality on the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ 
proxied by EM measurement (using IS). Chapter Seven completed this thesis by 
providing an overview of the work, summary of the findings, highlights of the 





7.3 Summary of the Findings 
The thesis addressed four main objectives. First, was to examine the relationship 
between AC characteristics and FRQ proxied by EM measurement. Second, was to 
find out the relationship between AC characteristics and audit quality.  Third, was to 
assess the relationship between audit quality and FRQ. Last, was to examine the 
mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between AC characteristics and 
FRQ. The next subsections provide the summary of the findings on these four main 
objectives. 
7.3.1 Findings on the Relationship between AC Characteristics and Financial 
Reporting Quality 
This section outlines the findings of the first main objective that stressed on the 
relationship between the AC characteristics and the FRQ (proxied by EM 
measurement) of the listed companies in Nigeria. The study focused on DA and IS as 
proxies for FRQ. Nine AC attributes were used in this study. These were the ACS, 
ACI, ACMs, ACFAEs, ACLEs, FACMs, ACSO, ACT, and ACC. As regards the 
findings of the relationship between AC characteristics and DA, the study partially 
supports the influence of AC attributes on FRQ relating to DA. The first AC 
attribute, ACS, supports the resource dependence theory and concludes that a larger 
ACS is considered to be highly resourceful in improving the FRQ. The study did not 
find statistical evidence to support the negative relationship between ACI and DA, 
suggesting that the proportion of independent directors to the AC does not make any 
meaningful contribution to the effectiveness of AC in curtailing earnings 
management practices in the form of DA. A possible explanation for this could be 
related to the connectedness of the independent directors with the CEOs. It is likely 
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that connectedness of the independent directors with the CEOs may impair their 
independence and hence, decrease their monitoring ability in the financial reporting 
process. The study provides statistical evidence that the more frequent the AC meets, 
the more inspection and conversation they have on financial reporting matters and 
thus, it positively influences FRQ. This supports the agency theory which proposes 
that AC members that are keen on meaningful and substantive meetings provide 
superior monitoring and enhance the financial reporting process. Consistent with the 
resource dependence theory, the study has established that AC members with 
financial accounting expertise are more likely to prevent earnings manipulation in 
Nigeria. Thus, accounting experts in the AC are resource providers recognised 
through their know-how, skills, and experiences. 
Furthermore, the study provides a premise that the presence of legal experts on the 
AC does not prevent managers‟ intensity in participating in earnings management 
practices in form of DA in Nigeria. The possible explanation for this could be due to 
the fact that legal directors do not have the specific training relating to financial 
reporting like financial experts. Thus, their inexperience of accounting may likely 
make them to be ineffective in decreasing financial accounting manipulation in the 
form of DA. The study has also established that FACMs have positive influence on 
the DA of the listed firms in Nigeria. This supports the liberal feminist theory which 
suggests women are deprived compared to men as a result of obvious discrimination 
and systemic influence that keep them away from receiving vital resources, such as 
business education and experience. The ACSO is another AC attribute consider by 
the study. It was documented that the ACSO does not support the agency theory of 
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shareholders-managers‟ alignment.  A possible reason for this could be attributed to 
the number of shares the AC members possess as they have been found to be 
negligible compared to the total number of shares outstanding by the firm. It has also 
been established that the extended tenure of directors in the AC and the chairmanship 
of the shareholders in the AC do not decrease earnings management and thus, do not 
guarantee better FRQ. A possible reason might be that exceptionally long-tenured 
board service may potentially impair independence as the oldest directors might be 
more apparent to befriend management and hence, become less critical of the quality 
of its financial statement. Meanwhle, the presence of shareholders may reduce their 
monitoring role in the decision-making process. Since shareholders can be more 
convince to increase their value as a result of share price increase (Sharma & Kuang, 
2014). 
Considering the findings of the relationship between AC characteristics and IS, most 
of the AC attributes support the influence of the AC on FRQ relating to IS.  The first 
variable considered by this study was the ACS; prior studies have documented that a 
bigger AC size is more effective in monitoring management (Liu & Sun, 2010; 
Setiany, et al., 2017;). This study has also established that more AC members are 
superior in decreasing the likelihood of performing artificial IS in the listed firms in 
Nigeria. Consequently, the lower the probability of IS practice, the better the quality 
of the FRQ.  Consistent with the signaling theory, it is assumed that increasing the 
presence of independent non-executive directors in the board may possibly gesture to 
owners that the company has strong corporate governance which will, in turn, 
enhance investors‟ protection and thus, promote FRQ.  This study has also provided 
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evidence that a larger percentage of ACI reduces the probability that a firm will 
engage in artificial IS and, in turn, increases FRQ. It is evident from the prior 
literature that more frequent ACMs enhance FRQ (Habbash & Alagla, 2015; 
Hamdan et al., 2013). Conversely, this study found that ACMs increase the 
likelihood of IS practices in the listed companies in Nigeria. This is line with the 
notion that more frequent meetings is a repetitive formality used by companies with 
little real accomplishments (Katmon & Farooque, 2015; Uzun et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, contrary to the research expectation, it was documented that the 
ACFAEs exhibit a positive significant association with IS. One possible explanation 
for this is that it is very likely that members of the AC who are extremely connected 
with chief executive officers (CEOs) may purchase fewer audit services and be more 
involved in earnings smoothing. Prior literature has also recognised that the 
connectedness of the CEOs and AC members offers a negative impact on the worth 
of the AC‟s oversight (Bruynseels & Cardinaels, 2014; Krishnan, Raman, Yang, & 
Yu, 2011).  One of the interesting findings of this current study is between the 
ACLEs and IS, which unveils that the existence of legal experts in the AC reduces 
the likelihood of artificial IS practices and thus, enriches FRQ. This supports the 
belief that the legal experts in the AC act as monitors of rather than mere signals to 
the financial report (Krishnan, et al. 2011; Shankaraiah & Amiri, 2017). Another 
interesting finding of this present study is manifest from the result of FACMs, which 
reveals a negative significant relationship with IS. The result confirms the social 
feminist theory which suggests that the core dissimilarity between women and men 
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does not infer that women are inferior to men as men and women may perhaps 
develop differently but with identical effective qualities. 
Supporting the agency theory, the study has documented that AC shares lessens the 
likelihood that a firm will be an income smoother and, in turn, improves FRQ. This 
suggests that AC shares aligns the interests of its members with the interests of other 
shareholders (Vafeas, 2005a; Yermack, 2004). Similarly, consistent with the 
advocates of the agency theory, this study has established that the longer the 
directors have to function on the board, the more accustomed and experienced they 
will be about the firm‟s practices and, consequently, they will become more effective 
in preventing the likelihood of financial reporting fraud (Beasley, 1996; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas, 2005). Finally, it has been documented that the ACC does 
not have any pertinent influence in lowering the probability of artificial smoothing.   
7.3.2 Findings on the Relationship between AC Characteristics and Audit 
Quality 
This section summarises the findings of the second main objective that emphasises 
the relationship between the AC characteristics and the audit quality of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The study considered AUF and BIG4 auditors as proxies for 
audit quality. To recap, the results of the relationship between AC characteristics and 
AUF moderately supports the impact of the AC attributes on audit quality. The ACS 
as of the first attribute of the AC used in the study supports the insinuation that larger 
ACS has a higher prospect of increasing the AUF and thus, enhances audit quality. 
The study has established that the existence of independent or nonexecutive directors 
on the AC may not have a considerable effect on the AUF of the listed companies in 
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Nigeria. It has also been established that a high frequency of AC meetings might not 
guarantee a high AUF. This is may be due to the fact that a more persistent frequency 
of meetings could lead to exhaustion and weariness, consequently crafting room for 
accepting irrelevant consultations that are exterior to the overall objectives of the 
firm. 
Furthermore, it has also been concluded that an increase of one member with an 
accounting professional certificate to the AC intensifies the AUF to demand for 
greater external monitoring and assurance in the listed companies in Nigeria. The 
ACLE was the next variable of interest employed by the study. It has been 
recognised that legal experts in the AC are manifested to be monitors rather than 
normal signals to financial reporting. Since their existence with legal backgrounds 
makes them want to avoid ligation risk by paying high audit prices. The study has 
also inferred that the presence of a female director in the AC cuts the audit price. 
Because the FACM acquires less audit services from the external auditors since they 
usually have to display excessive skills for them to gain managerial positions and be 
on corporate boards. The study also supports the proponents of the agency theory on 
shareholders-management alignment that, a unit increase of the ACSO 
proportionately increases the AUF in their quest for greater assurance. It has been 
concluded that the ACT did not meaningfully influence the audit price of the listed 
firms in Nigeria. This might be because the extensive tenure of the director could 
lead to a sociable connectedness with the management that might be developed over 
time. Thus, directors who have strong personal connections with the management are 
more likely to be reappointed and last for a long term which makes their contribution 
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to be impaired by such cordial relationships with the managers. Lastly, the study has 
also established that when the chairmanship of the AC is saddled in the hand of the 
shareholders, the AUF decreases.  
On the findings of the relationship between AC characteristics and BIG4 auditors, 
some of the AC attributes support the research hypothesis on the positive influence 
of AC characteristics on audit quality (using BIG4). The study has recognised that 
the size of the AC did not provide any substantial role in the choice of the BIG 4 
auditors. This is consistent with the notion that small ACs could act more effectively 
than the larger ACs as it is more probable that the smaller AC will make substantial 
decisions without wasting time. It has been found that a higher proportion of 
independent or nonexecutive directors to the AC raises the probability of employing 
BIG 4 auditors in the listed companies in Nigeria. Thus, this makes them purchase 
high quality auditing services and more forceful in reducing the tendency of financial 
reporting frauds. It has been established that the frequency of ACMs reduces the 
likelihood of admiring the services of a BIG 4 auditor. This could be due to the fact 
that more frequent AC meetings might reduce the tendency of financial reporting 
frauds in a firm and accordingly making them require less audit assurance. 
The study also supports the demand hypothesis of audit that is allied to the agency 
theory which proposes that audit services are required to lessen agency conflicts 
growing from the interests of equity holders and managers. As has been revealed, AC 
members with financial accounting acquaintance are highly likely to procure the 
services of BIG 4 auditors in the process of selecting an audit brand name.  It has 
also been concluded that the ACLEs are risk avoidant, thus making them engage 
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better auditors, such as the BIG 4 in order to gain greater audit assurance. The study 
has also recognised that FACMs prefer BIG 4 auditors in their demand for greater 
audit efforts to safeguard the firms‟ reputational capital. This is consistent with the 
belief that a diverse gender in the AC requires a higher audit quality in high risk 
environments. 
The next variable of interest was ACSO. The result from their relationship supports 
the complimentary hypothesis as it has been established that the monitoring role 
provided by the ACSO makes them demand greater audit assurance through 
engaging the service of BIG 4 auditors. Contrary to the research expectation, it was 
revealed that the elongated tenure of directors results in less likelihood of engaging 
BIG 4 auditors. This could be as a result of the fact that job-relevant knowledge is 
grown over time and thus, older directors can become very acquainted with the 
firms‟ internal control system and corporate operations over time. This, 
consequently, makes them demand less audit effort. Similarly, it has also been 
concluded that the chairmanship by shareholders in the AC decreases the likelihood 
of engaging BIG 4 auditors. The inverse relationship can be interconnected to the 
result of the realationship between the ACC and the AUF, which also revealed an 
inverse association. Therefore, it is believed that firms which are audited by BIG4 
are more likely to pay high audit fees. 
7.3.3 Findings on the Relationship between Audit Quality and Financial 
Reporting Quality 
This section summarises the findings of objective three of the thesis, which was to 
determine the relationship between audit quality and the FRQ of the listed companies 
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in Nigeria. In testing the hypotheses, audit quality was presented by the AUF and 
BIG 4 auditors; whereas, DA and IS were used as proxies for FRQ.  In support of the 
agency theory, the result of the relationship between the AUF and DA revealed that 
an increase in the AUF decreases the DA and, accordingly, enhances the FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. It is based on the evidence that auditing of financial 
reports is acknowledged as a means to decrease agency cost and thus, a high AUF is 
associated to lower EM and higher FRQ. The study has also established that there 
has been no difference found in the audit quality between BIG4 and Non-BIG4 
auditors in Nigeria. This might be accredited to the auditors‟ rotations as provided by 
the SEC CCG (2011), which stipulates that auditors should be retained for no longer 
than ten years. Thus, extremely prolonged auditors‟ tenures might impair their 
independence since the longer they stay as auditors of the same firm, the more likely 
it is that they will befriend management and thus, become less critical of accounting 
issues. 
Moreover, the finding of the relationship between the AUF and IS has demonstrated 
that a higher AUF reduces the likelihood of the artificial smoothing behaviour of the 
firms and thus, enhance FRQ. This is based on the inference that auditing of financial 
reports is prominent as a means to cut agency costs and thus, a high AUF minimises 
EM and promotes FRQ. On the contrary, the study has established that Non-BIG 4 
auditors are more likely to decrease the IS behaviour of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. This is because, the Non-BIG4 auditors may have superior knowledge of the 
local markets and better relations with their clients which enables them to better 
recognise irregularities in the companies. 
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7.3.4 Findings on the Mediating Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship 
Between AC Characteristics and Financial Reporting Quality 
This section summarises the findings of objective four of the study which was to 
determine the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between the AC 
characteristics and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. In testing hypothesis 
(H12), two mediators (AUF and BIG4) were used as proxies for audit quality. From 
the findings, only the AUF model fulfilled all the conditions of mediation as it 
moderately satisfied (H10a-H10i) and fully supported (H11). Consequently, the AUF 
partially mediated the relationship between the AC characteristics and FRQ of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. From the nine variables used as proxies for the AC 
characteristics, four satisfied all the conditions of mediation following Baron and 
Kenny (1986),  Hayes and Rockwood (2017), Holmbeck (1997), and Sobel (1982). 
These included the ACS, ACFAEs, ACLEs, and ACSO. The remaining five 
variables (ACI, ACMs, FACMs, ACT, and ACC) failed to meet all the conditions 
thus, the mediating effect of ACI, ACMs, FACMs, ACT, and ACC through the AUF 
on FRQ was not supported by the results of the study. 
The finding of the mediating effect of the AUF on the relationship between the ACS 
and FRQ (using both DA and IS) was that, the AUF partially mediated the 
relationship between the ACS and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. The 
mediation was partial since the AUF did not decrease the effect of the ACS on FRQ 
to insignificance. A further test (Sobel Test) also revealed that the mediation was 
significant thus, a false positive and negative conclusions were avoided. The finding 
provides an insight on the causal effect of the complementary hypothesis of audit 
quality, which proposes that ACs will demand greater assurance from the external 
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auditors to guarantee an effective oversight of the financial reports and to safeguard 
their capital reputations. The result also supports the institutional theory, which 
suggests that integrating ACs to work with external auditors will enhance, better, the 
monitoring of the financial reporting process. 
The study has also documented that the AUF partially and significantly mediated the 
relationship between the ACFAEs and the FRQ (using the DA only) of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. This implies that a greater proportion of ACFAEs increases 
the AUF in their quest for greater assurance, whilst the resultant increase in the AUF 
decreases the DA, and this is associated with better FRQ.  From the IS model, it has 
been established that the AUF partially mediated the relationship between the 
ACLEs and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. This effect has further been 
confirmed by the Sobel test, and the result was found to be significant. Consequently, 
this finding suggests that the excessive AUF paid to the external auditors in the listed 
companies in Nigeria significantly complements the oversight function of the ACLEs 
on the managers‟ use of flexible accounting choices to artificially smooth income. 
The study has also concluded that the AUF partially and significantly mediated the 
relationship between the ACSO and the FRQ (in both the DA and IS) of the listed 
companies in Nigeria. The result provides an insight on the causal effect of the AC 
and audit quality thus, it has been recognised that the ACSO acts as a monitor by 
demanding higher audit quality in exchange for greater audit efforts. This supports 
the agency theory, which suggests that the demand for independent external auditors 
rises from a desire to lessen the management‟s deceptive behaviour, which results 




This study has made several contributions in the following manners. First, as 
mentioned in Chapter One, this current study provides an initial insight into the 
mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship between the AC characteristics 
and income smoothing in Nigeria. Consequently, the study fills this literature 
vacuum by providing evidence on how the AUF mediates the relationship between 
the AC characteristics and the FRQ of the listed companies in Nigeria. The study has 
documented that the AUF partially and significantly mediates the relationship 
between the AC characteristics (ACS, ACFAEs, ACLEs, and ACSO) and the FRQ of 
the listed companies in Nigeria. These findings provide an initial insight about how 
the influence of the AC affects audit quality and, in return, affects FRQ. At the same 
time, the findings provide a better understanding about how the influence of the AUF 
affects the AC oversight function which, in return, enhances FRQ. 
Secondly, the study has also provided an additional contribution from the direct 
models tested. For instance, prior studies have documented the importance of legal 
experts in monitoring financial reporting by curtailing EM in the form of DA (Baxter 
& Cotter, 2009; Krishnan, et al., 2011). This present study has extended the above by 
documenting an initial evidence about how legal experts in the AC constrains 
artificial income smoothing. The study has established that a larger percentage of 
legal experts in the AC decreases the likelihood of artificial IS practices by firms and 
thus, enhances FRQ. This will serve as additional evidence to the body of literature.  
More so, the study provides initial evidence on the relationship between the ACLEs, 
FACMs, ACSO, ACT, and ACC and IS in Nigeria. The study has also documented 
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initial evidence about the influence of the ACLEs, FACMs, ACSO, ACT, and ACC 
on the audit quality (proxied by the AUF and BIG4) in Nigeria. Consequently, the 
findings documented in this study have contributed to the current trend in financial 
reporting studies by identifying the roles these AC attributes can play in enhancing 
the FRQ in Nigeria. For instance, this study has documented that: Legal experts in 
the AC decrease the likelihood of artificial IS practices in the listed companies in 
Nigeria. It has also been recognised that the presence of legal experts in the AC 
increases the likelihood of engaging the services of BIG4 auditors and paying high 
audit prices in the quest to enhance audit assurance. Thus, these findings have 
exposed the importance of legal experts in the AC formation in Nigeria. 
For the income smoothing model, it was recognized that the presence of female 
directors in the AC decreases the likelihood of artificial income smoothing behaviour 
in Nigeria. It signifies that, female directors have to exhibit superfluous skills in 
order to gain managerial positions and be on corporate boards, thus making them 
reduce the need for the assurance expected from external auditors. These findings 
have also stressed the importance of the existence of female directors in the AC 
formation in Nigeria, particularly at this present time, when the issue of gender is of 
considerable attention in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, using the income smoothing model, it was established that the larger 
the number of units of shares possessed by the AC, the more powerful they are in 
reducing the likelihood of IS practices in Nigeria. The ACSO increases the 
probability of purchasing high audit services by hiring BIG 4 auditors and the 
payment of high audit fees. All of this initial evidence documented by this study 
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provides an insight to the importance of the shares possessed by the AC in improving 
the FRQ in Nigeria. 
The long tenure of directors in the AC plays a pivotal role in lessening the likelihood 
of IS practices in Nigeria. Long-tenured directors are less likely to purchase the 
service of BIG 4 auditors in Nigeria since elder directors can gain a lot of familiarity 
with the firms‟ internal control systems and corporate operations over time. They can 
develop interactions with the management to gain more valuable information for 
their judgments on financial matters. They also have greater knowledge, and 
expertise, and promise to perform better, thus enabling them to have less desire for 
the greater external monitoring provided by BIG 4. This also provides a guide about 
how this attribute of the AC influences the FRQ in Nigeria. 
Finally, one of the distinctive attributes of the AC formation in Nigeria is the 
recognition of membership from both shareholders and directors as required by the 
CAMA (2004). Thus, this study has empirically examined this uniqueness by testing 
whether AC chairmanship would be more effective at the hands of shareholders who 
occupied 89% of the AC chairmanship of the listed companies in Nigeria. The study 
has documented that, when the AC is chaired by a shareholder, no meaningful 
contribution is accomplished in reducing financial reporting frauds and improving 
the FRQ in Nigeria. In addition, shareholders‟ chairmanships in the Nigerian ACs 
did not provide meaningful influence on the audit quality of the listed companies in 
Nigeria. This interesting finding has a significant role to play for policy makers in the 
selection of AC chairpersons in Nigerian companies. 
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Third, this present study contributes to the existing literature on FRQ. Most of the 
prior studies on FRQ have concentrated on the accrual measures of FRQ. However, 
Chen et al. (2010) confirmed that the majority of the FRQ indicators (absolute 
discretionary accruals, managing earnings toward targets, and accruals quality) 
improved after the IFRS adoption in 15 European Union nations, which indicates 
lower discretionary accruals. In contrast, corporations were involved in IS and a 
large recognition of losses in a less timely manner after the IFRS adoption. As such, 
IS seems to be a common practice by corporations in many countries of the world 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  This study has extended the level of understanding of the 
FRQ using the DA by considering the IS practices in the financial statements of the 
listed companies in Nigeria. This contribution is timely as the recent changes in 
regulations in the Nigerian reporting system (the revised SEC CCG 2011 and IFRS 
adoption 2012) could have made some companies shift their attention from the DA 
practices to the IS practices. Consequently, identifying the tricks that might be 
employed to perpetrate IS practices is pivotal. Interestingly, this study has 
established that more than 61% of the listed firms in Nigeria had smooth their 
reported incomes, over time, during the periods of the study. This could have an 
adverse effect on the financial reporting process in Nigeria. Thus, the findings serve 
as an insight to the regulators and policy makers in Nigeria. 
Moreover, the study adds value to the understanding of the existing theories. 
Because, it contributes to the agency theory by detecting some factors that can be 
employed to lessen agency costs.  The agency theory suggests that monitoring 
devices have to align with the interests of the management and the owners in order to 
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reduce the conflict of interest as well as any feasible managers' opportunistic 
behaviours that might arise. This study has established that the ACFAEs, ACLEs, 
ACSO, and ACT can be used to lessen the agency costs. The study has also provided 
an initial understanding on the complementary hypothesis of audit quality as it 
identifies that the ACS, ACFAEs, ACLEs, and ACSO demand greater audit 
assurance by paying a high AUF in their desire to lower managers‟ deceptive 
behaviours that result from asymmetric information between the stockholders and the 
managers. It has also evidenced that the ACC cannot be relied upon to lessen agency 
problems in a situation where the AC is chaired by a shareholder. Similarly, the 
study also adds value to the understanding of IS as a technique to be adopted by 
firms to detect deceptive financial information which eventually lessens agency 
conflicts. 
Furthermore, the study adds worthiness to the resource dependence theory. As it 
empirical provides evidences that ACS and ACFAE have greater influence on 
financial reporting quality. Thus, emphasizes the need for companies‟ AC to be 
bigger and source more directors with financial accounting expertise in order to share 
the diverse skills expertise and experience amongst themselves. 
More so, the study contributes to the signaling theory. Though the study has not 
documented evidence of any statistical influence of the ACI on the DA, it has 
established that for the ACI, a larger proportion of autonomous directors in the AC 
decreases the probability that a firm will smooth its earnings. Thus, this decreases the 
chance of artificial IS practices and which, in turn, improves FRQ. This stresses that 
increasing the presence of independent non-executive directors in the AC could 
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signal to owners that the company has robust corporate governance which, in turn, 
promotes investors‟ protection and thus, enhances FRQ.  
The study contributes to the feminist theory and thus, validates both the social 
feminist theory and liberal feminist theory. Consistent with the social feminist 
theory, the study provides empirical evidence that the presence of at least one female 
director in the AC decreases the probability that a firm will smooth its earnings. 
Thus, it suggests that the innate difference between women and men does not infer 
that women are inferior to men since men and women may develop differently, but 
with equal effective qualities. In contrast, supporting the liberal feminist theory, the 
study has established that the presence of a female director in the AC might not 
reduce the likelihood of managers‟ deceitful behaviours towards the earnings inform 
of DA, which has an adverse effect on FRQ. Thus, this suggests that women are 
deprived compared to men as a result of obvious discrimination and systemic 
influence that keep them away from receiving vital resources, such as business 
education and experience. 
Lastly, the study also contributes to the institutional theory. Interestingly, the study 
provides initial empirical evidence on the mediating effect of audit quality (AUF) on 
the relationship between AC characteristics (ACS, ACFAEs, ACLEs, and ACSO) 
and FRQ. Thus, it has been recognised that combining the AC‟s work with those of 
the external auditors enhances better monitoring of the financial reporting process. 
This is because, the AC is reflected to be a formal assembly that is engaged by an 
organisation in a ceremonial way, but the actual monitoring of an organisation is 
determined by other external factors, for example, external auditors in this context. 
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This conjecture is popularly known as "decoupling" by the proponents of the 
institutional theory. 
7.5 Practical Implication 
The findings of this study have exposed some weakness in the Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance. It is obvious that the code has put emphasis on the provision 
of at least one independent non-executive director on the board and the need for AC 
financial expertise. There is no such provision about AC independence, which is 
contrary to the global best practice. However, this study has documented the 
importance of the presence of independent non-executive directors in the AC as they 
show a signal to investors that the company has robust corporate governance which, 
in turn, promotes their protection and thus, enhances FRQ. This study recommends 
that the Nigerian SEC should, in the forthcoming code, recognise the presence of 
independent non-executive directors in the AC. 
More so, the Code‟s definition of financial expertise is equivocal. It is apparent that 
section 30(1) of the Code provides that “at least one member of the committee 
should be financially literate”. However, section 30(2) stipulates that “members of 
the committee should have basic financial literacy and should be able to read 
financial statements. At least one member should have knowledge of accounting or 
financial management”. The foregoing ambiguous statements may lead to non-
compliance as a result of difficulties in the interpretation. Therefore, this study 
recommends that the Nigerian SEC should, in the forthcoming code, redefine 
financial expertise to mean: (a) A person with at least a bachelor degree and financial 
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accounting professional qualification and (b) A person with a minimum of five years 
of skills in a finance related position or audit firm. As well as, (c) The number of 
directors in the AC with the required professional qualifications should be increased 
to at least two persons. This will enable them to have a thorough knowledge of the 
companies‟financial reports and appreciate the advantage of collective responsibility. 
Furthermore, in addition to financial experts, the SEC should consider the presence 
of legal experts in the AC as this study has empirically documented the importance 
of legal experts in the AC formation in Nigeria. The study has established that AC 
legal experts serve as monitors rather than mere signals to the financial reporting. 
The tenure of external auditors should also be reduced to five years instead of ten 
years as required by the SEC (2011). This is because the period may be considered 
too long as exceptionally prolonged auditors‟ tenure might impair their independence 
as the longer they stay as auditors of the same company, the more probable it is that 
they will befriend the management and thus, become less critical of the accounting 
issues. 
In addition, as highlighted in Chapter One, the Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria (FRC) recently established a rule called Rule 2(c) in 2016, mandating AC 
chairs to have financial accounting expertise. However, a federal high court in 
Nigeria overruled the FRC rule in January 2018 on the grounds that it is contrary to 
the provision of the CAMA (2004) and the SEC Code (2011) (Egwuatu, 2018). Thus, 
this study has empirically documented that if the chairmanship of the  AC is in the 
hand of shareholders, it does not guarantee better FRQ. Consequently, this study 
recommends that the regulators should be very cautious about shareholders serving 
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as chairpersons of the AC. This is because; the presence of shareholders in the AC 
may reduce their monitoring role in the decision-making process. Since shareholders 
may be more induce to increase their value as a result of share price increase 
(Sharma & Kuang, 2014). 
Finally, the study has a considerable influence on the investors, academics, and 
analysts that need to extend their level of understanding on the extent of influence or 
causal relationship of AC attributes, audit quality, and FRQ. In general, the study has 
investigated the influence of AC characteristics and FRQ vis-a-vis  the DA and IS, 
the relationship between AC characteristics and audit quality proxied by AUF and 
BIG 4, the relationship between audit quality and FRQ, as well as the mediating 
effect of audit quality on the relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ. The 
findings of these relationships will assist the investors, academics, and analysts to 
better identify the consequences of these variables in enhancing the reliability of 
financial disclosure which, in return, will enhance investors‟ confidence. 
7.6 Limitations 
The findings of this study can be properly interpreted with a better apprehension of 
the following limitations. First, though the study employed two measures of FRQ, 
using DA and IS, there are a number of proxies to be used in measuring FRQ.  These 
in include value relevance models, earnings persistence and predictability, timeliness 
of reporting, and earnings conservatism. However, despite these numerous measures 
of FRQ there is no clear technique of measuring FRQ. 
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Second, the findings of this thesis are drawn from non-financial services hence 
generalisation is not possible. Thus, the findings of this thesis might not be 
applicable to the financial sector as financial services have their own unique 
characteristics and regulations. 
Finally, this study has focused on AC and audit quality as monitoring devices in 
determining FRQ. However, there are several monitoring devices that influence 
FRQ, such as ownership structure, board characteristics, and internal audit. Yet, 
though the above limitations highlight room for improvement in future FRQ studies, 
this should not undermine the worth of this research. 
7.7 Concluding Remark 
This section highlights the major inferences, contributions, limitations, and 
recommendations for upcoming research. This study has examined the influence of 
AC characteristics and FRQ (DA and IS), the relationship between AC 
characteristics and audit quality proxied by AUF and BIG4, the relationship between 
audit quality and FRQ, as well as the mediating effect of audit quality on the 
relationship between AC characteristics and FRQ. Generally, it has been observed 
that the issue of FRQ and strong corporate governance in Nigeria is imperatives since 
better FRQ and effective corporate governance boot investors‟ confidence which, in 
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Appendix A 
Listed companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31 December 2016 
Sn Company Sector 
1 ELLAH LAKES PLC. AGRICULTURE 
2 FTN COCOA PROCESSORS PLC  
3 LIVESTOCK FEEDS PLC.  
4 OKOMU OIL PALM PLC.  
5 PRESCO PLC  
6 A.G. LEVENTIS NIGERIA PLC. CONGLOMERATES 
7 CHELLARAMS PLC.  
8 JOHN HOLT PLC.  
9 S C O A NIG. PLC.  
10 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION OF NIGERIA PLC  
11 U A C N PLC.  
12 ARBICO PLC. CONSTRUCTION/REAL 
ESTATE 
13 JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC.  
14 ROADS NIG PLC.  
15 SKYE SHELTER FUND PLC  
16 SKYE SHELTER FUND PLC  
17 SMART PRODUCTS NIGERIA PLC  
18 UACN PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT CO. LIMITED  
19 UNION HOMES REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST (REIT)  
20 UPDC REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST  
21 CADBURY NIGERIA PLC. CONSUMER GOODS 
22 CHAMPION BREW. PLC.  
23 DANGOTE FLOUR MILLS PLC  
24 DANGOTE SUGAR REFINERY PLC  
25 DN TYRE & RUBBER PLC  
26 FLOUR MILLS NIG. PLC.  
27 GOLDEN GUINEA BREW. PLC.  
28 GUINNESS NIG PLC  
29 HONEYWELL FLOUR MILL PLC  
30 INTERNATIONAL BREWERIES PLC.  
31 MCNICHOLS PLC  
32 MULTI-TREX INTEGRATED FOODS PLC  
33 N NIG. FLOUR MILLS PLC.  
34 NASCON ALLIED INDUSTRIES PLC  
35 NESTLE NIGERIA PLC.  
36 NIGERIAN BREW. PLC.  
37 NIGERIAN ENAMELWARE PLC.  
38 P Z CUSSONS NIGERIA PLC.  
39 UNILEVER NIGERIA PLC.  
40 UNION DICON SALT PLC.  
41 VITAFOAM NIG PLC.  
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Sn Company Sector 
42 ABBEY MORTGAGE BANK PLC FINANCIAL SERVICES 
43 ACCESS BANK PLC.  
44 AFRICA PRUDENTIAL PLC  
45 AFRICAN ALLIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY PLC  
46 AIICO INSURANCE PLC.  
47 ASO SAVINGS AND LOANS PLC  
48 AXAMANSARD INSURANCE PLC  
49 CONSOLIDATED HALLMARK INSURANCE PLC  
50 CONTINENTAL REINSURANCE PLC  
51 CORNERSTONE INSURANCE COMPANY PLC.  
52 CUSTODIAN AND ALLIED PLC  
53 DEAP CAPITAL MANAGEMENT & TRUST PLC  
54 DIAMOND BANK PLC  
55 ECOBANK TRANSNATIONAL INCORPORATED  
56 EQUITY ASSURANCE PLC.  
57 FBN HOLDINGS PLC  
58 FCMB GROUP PLC.  
59 FIDELITY BANK PLC  
60 FORTIS MICROFINANCE BANK PLC  
61 GOLDLINK INSURANCE PLC  
62 GREAT NIGERIAN INSURANCE PLC  
63 GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC.  
64 GUINEA INSURANCE PLC.  
65 INFINITY TRUST MORTGAGE BANK PLC  
66 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INSURANCE COMPANY PLC  
67 JAIZ BANK PLC  
68 LASACO ASSURANCE PLC.  
69 LAW UNION AND ROCK INS. PLC.  
70 LINKAGE ASSURANCE PLC  
71 MUTUAL BENEFITS ASSURANCE PLC.  
72 N.E.M INSURANCE CO (NIG) PLC.  
73 NIGER INSURANCE CO. PLC.  
74 NIGERIA ENERYGY SECTOR FUND  
75 NPF MICROFINANCE BANK PLC  
76 OMOLUABI MORTGAGE BANK PLC  
77 PRESTIGE ASSURANCE CO. PLC.  
78 REGENCY ALLIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY PLC  
79 RESORT SAVINGS & LOANS PLC  
80 ROYAL EXCHANGE PLC.  
81 SIM CAPITAL ALLIANCE VALUE FUND  
82 SKYE BANK PLC  
83 SOVEREIGN TRUST INSURANCE PLC  
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84 STANBIC IBTC HOLDINGS PLC  
85 STANDARD ALLIANCE INSURANCE PLC.  
86 STANDARD TRUST ASSURANCE PLC  
87 STERLING BANK PLC.  
88 UNIC DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS PLC.  
89 UNION BANK NIG.PLC.  
90 UNION HOMES SAVINGS AND LOANS PLC.  
91 UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC  
92 UNITED CAPITAL PLC  
93 UNITY BANK PLC  
94 UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY PLC  
95 VERITAS KAPITAL ASSURANCE PLC  
96 WAPIC INSURANCE PLC  
97 WEMA BANK PLC.  
98 ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC  
99 EKOCORP PLC. HEALTHCARE 
10
0 EVANS MEDICAL PLC.  
10
1 FIDSON HEALTHCARE PLC  
10
2 GLAXO SMITHKLINE CONSUMER NIG. PLC.  
10
3 MAY & BAKER NIGERIA PLC.  
10
4 MORISON INDUSTRIES PLC.  
10
5 NEIMETH INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS PLC  
10
6 NIGERIA-GERMAN CHEMICALS PLC.  
10
7 PHARMA-DEKO PLC.  
10
8 UNION DIAGNOSTIC & CLINICAL SERVICES PLC  
10
9 CHAMS PLC ICT  
11
0 COURTEVILLE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS PLC   
11
1 CWG PLC   
11
2 E-TRANZACT INTERNATIONAL PLC   
11
3 NCR (NIGERIA) PLC.   
11
4 OMATEK VENTURES PLC   
11
5 TRIPPLE GEE AND COMPANY PLC.   
11
6 AUSTIN LAZ & COMPANY PLC INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
11
7 BERGER PAINTS PLC  
11
8 BETA GLASS PLC.  
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11
9 CAP PLC  
12
0 CEMENT CO. OF NORTH.NIG. PLC  
12
1 CUTIX PLC.  
12
2 DANGOTE CEMENT PLC  
12
3 FIRST ALUMINIUM NIGERIA PLC  
12
4 GREIF NIGERIA PLC  
12
5 LAFARGE AFRICA PLC.  
12
6 MEYER PLC.  
12
7 PAINTS AND COATINGS MANUFACTURES PLC  
12
8 PORTLAND PAINTS & PRODUCTS NIGERIA PLC  
12
9 PREMIER PAINTS PLC.  
13
0 ALUMINIUM EXTRUSION IND. PLC. NATURAL RESOURCES 
13
1 B.O.C. GASES PLC.  
13
2 MULTIVERSE MINING AND EXPLORATION PLC  
13
3 THOMAS WYATT NIG. PLC.  
13
4 11 PLC OIL AND GAS 
13
5 ANINO INTERNATIONAL PLC.  
13
6 CAPITAL OIL PLC  
13
7 CONOIL PLC  
13
8 ETERNA PLC.  
13
9 FORTE OIL PLC.  
14
0 JAPAUL OIL & MARITIME SERVICES PLC  
14
1 MRS OIL NIGERIA PLC.  
14
2 OANDO PLC  
14
3 RAK UNITY PET. COMP. PLC.  
14
4 SEPLAT PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD  
14
5 TOTAL NIGERIA PLC.  
14
6 ACADEMY PRESS PLC. SERVICES 
14
7 AFROMEDIA PLC  
14
8 ASSOCIATED BUS COMPANY PLC  
14
9 C & I LEASING PLC.  
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15
0 CAPITAL HOTEL PLC  
15
1 CAVERTON OFFSHORE SUPPORT GRP PLC  
15
2 DAAR COMMUNICATIONS PLC  
15
3 GLOBAL SPECTRUM ENERGY SERVICES PLC  
15
4 IKEJA HOTEL PLC  
15
5 INTERLINKED TECHNOLOGIES PLC  
15
6 JULI PLC.  
15
7 LEARN AFRICA PLC  
15
8 MEDVIEW AIRLINE PLC  
15
9 NEWREST ASL NIGERIA PLC  
16
0 NIGERIAN AVIATION HANDLING COMPANY PLC  
16
1 R T BRISCOE PLC.  
16
2 RED STAR EXPRESS PLC  
16
3 SECURE ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY PLC  
16
4 STUDIO PRESS (NIG) PLC.  
16
5 TANTALIZERS PLC  
16
6 THE INITIATES PLC  
16
7 TOURIST COMPANY OF NIGERIA PLC.  
16
8 TRANS-NATIONWIDE EXPRESS PLC.  
16
9 TRANSCORP HOTELS PLC  
17








List of Sample Companies Examined by the Study 
Main Board Firms  Listing Sector Total  
FTNCOCOA 2008 AGRICULTURE  
LIVESTOCK 1978   
OKOMUOIL 1997   
PRESCO 2002  4 
    
AGLEVENT 1973 CONGLOMERATES  
CHELLARAM 1974   
SCOA 1977   
TRANSCORP 2006   
UACN 1974  5 
    
ARBICO 1978 CONSTRUCTION/REAL ESTATE  
JBERGER 1991   
UAC-PROPERTY 1998  3 
    
7UP 1986 CONSUMER GOODS  
CADBURY 1976   
CHAMPION 1983   
DANGFLOUR 2008   
DANGSUGAR 2007   
FLOURMILL 1978   
GUINNESS 1965   
HONYFLOUR 2009   
INTBREW 1995   
NNFM 1978   
NASCON 1992   
NESTLE 1979   
NB 1973   
ENAMELWA 1979   
PZ 1972   
UNILEVER 1973   
UNIONDICON 2011   
VITAFOAM 1978  18 
    
EVANSMED 1979 HEALTHCARE  
FIDSON 2008   
GLAXOSMITH 1977   
MAYBAKER 1994   
MORISON 1978   
NEIMETH 1991   
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PHARMDEKO 1979   
UNIONDIAGN 2007  8 
    
CHAMS 2008 ICT  
COURTVILLE 2009   
Comp W-house-Grp 2013   
ETRANZACT 2009   
NCR 1979   
OMATEK 2008  6 
    
ASHAKACEM 1990 INDUSTRIAL GOODS  
LAFARGE AFRICA PLC    
AVONCROWN 1991   
BERGER Paints 1974   
BETAGLAS 1986   
CAP 1977   
CCNN 1993   
CUTIX 1987   
FIRSTALUM 1992   
Dangote cement 2010   
GREIF NIG(VANLEER) 1979   
PAINTCOM 2008   
PORTPAINT 2008   
PREMPAINTS 1995  14 
    
ALUMINIUM EXTRUSION IND. PLC. 1990 NATURAL RESOURCES  
B.O.C. GASES PLC. 1979   
MULTIVERSE MINING & EXPLORATION PLC 2008   
THOMAS WYATT NIG. PLC.[MRS] 1948  4 
    
ETERNA PLC 1997 OIL AND GAS  
CONOIL PLC 1989   
Forte Oil (Afr Pet) 1978   
JAPAULOIL 1997   
MOBIL 1979   
MRS 1978   
SEPLAT PET 2009   
OANDO 1992   
TOTAL 1979  9 
    
ACADEMY 1995 SERVICES  
AFROMEDIA 2009   
AIRSERVICE 2007   
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ABCTRANS 2006   
CILEASING 1997   
CAPHOTEL 1986   
CAVERTON 2008   
DAAR COMM 2007   
IKEJA HOTEL    
INTERLINK 1993   
LEARNAFRCA 1996   
NAHCO 1996   
RTBRISCOE 1973   
REDSTAREX 2007   
TANTALIZER 2008   
TOURIST 2004   
TRANSEXPR 1993   
UNIVERSITY PRESS 1978  17 
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Boo & Sharma (2008) US LN Audit fees 
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independence 
 
          +ve sig. 
Krishnan & Visvanathan 
(2009) US LN Audit fees 




            -ve sig. 
Hoitash & Hoitash 
(2009) US LN Audit fees 
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Redmayne et al.  (2011) New Zealand LN Audit fees AC formation             +ve sig.  
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(2018) Malaysian LN Audit fees 
Board 
attributes, AC  
size, AC 
independence, 
AC  financial 
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Wan Hussin et al. (2018) Malaysian 
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 Big 5               -ve sig. 
Hoitash et al. (2007) US 
DA, McNichols 
(2002), 
Francis et al. 
(2005) 
 
LN Audit fees -ve sig. 
Mitra et al. (2009) US 
Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
 
LN Audit fees  -ve sig 





  Big 4  -ve sig 




LN Audit fees -ve sig 
Carmona et al.  (2015) Spain DA, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 






Aliyu et al. (2015) Nigeria DLLP, Beaver & Engel (1996) 




Khalil & Ozkan (2016) Egypt  
DA, Kothari 
etal. (2005) 




Saleem  & Alzoub 
(2016) Jordan 
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DA, Kothari et 
al. (2005) 




Asthana et al. (2018) US 
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Audit fees -ve sig. 
Asthana et al. (2018) US 
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Note: DA = discretionary accruals, DLLP = discretionary loan loss provision, LN = natural logarithm, 
+ve sig. = positive significant, -ve sig. = negative significant. 
